United Nations S/PV.4710

Security Council

Fifty-eighth year

Provisional

4710th meeting

Thursday, 20 February 2003, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Pleuger	(Germany)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Bulgaria	Mr. Raytchev
	Cameroon	Mr. Tidjani
	Chile	Mr. Maquieira
	China	Mr. Wang Donghua
	France	Mr. Florent
	Guinea	Mr. Zoumanigui
	Mexico	Mr. Aguilar Zinser
	Pakistan	Mr. Khalid
	Russian Federation	Mr. Karev
	Spain	Mr. Arias
	Syrian Arab Republic	Mr. Wehbe
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Ms. Howe-Jones
	United States of America	Mr. Cunningham

Agenda

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

03-25285 (E)



The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belarus, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Greece, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Myanmar, Peru, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen, in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Dilja (Albania), Mr. Cappagli (Argentina), Mr. Dauth (Australia), Mr. Almansoor (Bahrain), Mr. Ivanou (Belarus), Mr. Heinbecker (Canada), Mr. Giraldo (Colombia), Mr. Ognjanovac (Croatia), Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla (Cuba), Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt), Mr. Lagos Pizzati (El Salvador), Mr. Naidu (Fiji), Mr. Vassilakis (Greece), Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran), Mr. Gillerman (Israel), Mr. Haraguchi (Japan), Mr. Wenaweser (Liechtenstein), Mr. Swe (Myanmar), Mr. De Rivero (Peru), Mr. Kumalo (South Africa), Mr. Pamir (Turkey), Mr. Kuchinsky (Ukraine) and Mr. Alsaidi (Yemen) took the seats reserved for them at the side of the Council Chamber.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to His Excellency Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Sir Jeremy Greenstock to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now continue its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2003/191, which contains the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 1456 (2003).

In view of the long list of speakers before us, I would kindly request all speakers to limit their statements to no more than seven minutes in order to enable the Council to carry out its work expeditiously. We have 27 speakers on the list. So, every minute that participants add to their seven minutes of speaking time adds half an hour to the deliberations of the Council. Delegations with lengthy statements are kindly requested to circulate their text in writing and to deliver the condensed versions in the Chamber.

In another measure to optimize the use of our time in order to allow as many delegations to take the floor as possible, I will not individually invite speakers to take seats at the table or invite them to resume their seats at the side of the Chamber. When a speaker is taking the floor, the Conference Officer will seat the next speaker on the list at the table. I think that that is a procedure that served us well yesterday, and we would like to continue this procedure, if the Council agrees.

I thank representatives for their understanding and their cooperation.

I shall first give the floor to the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, Sir Jeremy Greenstock.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock: Mr. President, I very much appreciate the time that you have allocated for this important subject today to hear the views of Members of the United Nations.

On 20 January, we heard the views of our ministers on the Security Council's work on counter-terrorism, including the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). I welcome the support that they expressed for the work of the CTC and their commitment to achieving the full implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and to further developing the CTC's role.

The CTC has discussed the challenge which ministers set for us all in the declaration adopted by resolution 1456 (2003). We have agreed on a set of actions for the CTC to take forward the points in the declaration. This set of actions is being circulated to delegations with my speaking notes. The CTC will keep the Council and the wider membership fully informed of progress.

The Committee continues to work with the vigour, focus and transparency which the fight against terrorism demands. Our expert team is back up to strength and is continually gaining in experience and effectiveness. In the current period, as our published work programme shows, we are concentrating on three areas: first, working with Member States to raise their capacity to defeat terrorism in each of their countries; secondly, promoting assistance programmes to accelerate the capacity-building process; and thirdly, creating a global network of international and regional organizations to maximize the efficiency of each of them in dealing with terrorism and to share experience and best practice. The special meeting of the CTC which I have called for 7 March will help in taking forward this global effort.

In accordance with resolution 1373 (2001), the CTC will continue to encourage States to become party as soon as possible to the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, as the matter of urgency demanded by the ministerial declaration. The CTC will remain aware of the links between its work and Member States' obligations under international law, including international human rights and humanitarian law.

The CTC welcomes this opportunity to hear the views of Member States on the work of the United Nations in the field of counter-terrorism. I thank them for their engagement with the CTC in its work so far. The Committee will continue to be effective only if it has the confidence and support of the United Nations membership, and it would be most helpful to hear their views on the way ahead, as set out for the Council in my report on behalf of the CTC on 20 January, and in the ministerial declaration.

The President: I thank Sir Jeremy Greenstock for his statement.

I should like to request speakers not to address kind words to the presidency. Let us use our valuable time only on the subject.

The next speaker on my list is the representative of Japan, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Haraguchi (Japan): I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting to follow up the ministerial-level meeting held on 20 January on combating international terrorism.

In a democracy, people express their views freely, and differences of views are resolved peacefully through the ballot. Terrorists, on the other hand, seek to realize their objectives violently, through bullets. Terrorists try to justify themselves by insisting that they are denied democratic means and have no other recourse but terror to realize their goals. But acts of terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances. All too often, it is the innocent who are the victims of terrorist acts. Such acts must be strongly rejected and condemned.

But simple condemnation is not sufficient to protect democratic systems and ensure security. Efforts must be urgently made in order to implement ongoing counter-terrorism measures even more effectively. At the same time, I would like to add that it is also important to make honest efforts to analyse the root causes of terrorism and to try to redress them.

In the past, terrorist activities generally targeted certain regions, but, with the spread of globalization and with advances in science and technology, terrorists now have a more global reach, with greater destructive and lethal capacities, as we witnessed in the 11 September attacks and in the bombing incident in Bali. The situation would become even more dangerous if terrorists were to have access to weapons of mass destruction. Traditional means of deterrence cannot adequately address the threat of international terrorism. International terrorism is thus a new and grave threat to international peace and security in the twenty-first century and demands resolute and concerted action by the international community. The existing global cooperative mechanism and international rules must be strengthened.

In the global fight against terrorism, Japan considers the following three objectives to be of particular importance: first, denying terrorist groups safe haven; secondly, denying terrorist groups the means to conduct terrorism; and thirdly, eliminating vulnerability to terrorism. In order to achieve these objectives, cooperative relations and networks among countries must be built in a wide range of areas,

including not only military organizations but also law-enforcement agencies and intelligence organizations. Capacity-building efforts in developing countries to strengthen their counter-terrorism measures are also vital.

We appreciate very much the work done by the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to that end. Japan, for its part, attaches particular importance to such efforts in the Asian region and has been holding seminars and training courses for developing countries, mainly in Asia, in the following six areas: immigration, aviation security, customs cooperation, export control, law-enforcement cooperation and anti-terrorist financing. It received 220 officials in fiscal year 2001, and approximately 250 in fiscal year 2002, for training in these six areas. In addition, my country is planning to receive 30 trainees each year for the next five years, for a total of 150 trainees, with a view to enhancing the crisis- and consequence-management capacity of their respective countries in the event of a chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear terrorist attack. Japan is also planning to hold a seminar to encourage accession to counter-terrorism-related international conventions, to which it will invite officials from Asian countries.

Every member of the international community must actively take part in the global combat against terrorism. We have to mobilize the resources available, including the expertise of all relevant international, regional and subregional organizations. From this viewpoint, Japan strongly endorses the sixth work programme of the CTC and its intention to expand and deepen its contacts with these organizations. It goes without saying that global efforts must be well coordinated to avoid any duplication of work. We believe that the dialogue between the CTC and these organizations, which has already begun, will greatly contribute to such coordination.

The special meeting with representatives of international, regional and subregional organizations, to be held next month, will be an important occasion for both the CTC and other relevant international organizations to assess their respective contributions to combat terrorism and explore ways of improving coordination.

In its 17 months of work, the CTC has made remarkable progress in implementing resolution 1373 (2001). For that, I would like to reiterate our appreciation to Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, Chairman of the CTC, and other members of the Bureau. But the fight against terrorism, especially international terrorism, is by no means complete. Much more needs to be done. I trust that, under the new leadership of Ambassador Inocencio Arias, the Committee will continue its highly effective efforts to combat terrorism.

The President: I call now on the representative of Belarus.

Mr. Ivanou (Belarus) (*spoke in Russian*): In the year following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), one of the major achievements of the international campaign to combat terrorism launched after 11 September 2001, important results were achieved in strengthening the anti-terrorism potential of the United Nations and in the establishment, under its auspices, of a broad international coalition to counteract terrorism as a serious threat to peace and security.

Belarus is firmly committed to a policy of expanding international cooperation to combat international terrorism and to implement resolution 1373 (2001). It considers itself an integral part of the international anti-terrorism coalition. We value highly the efforts of the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), which is charged with overseeing the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The CTC has become a key link in the United Nations anti-terrorism system and has received needed support from national and regional institutions involved in the struggle against terrorism.

Belarus has submitted two timely reports for consideration by the CTC on progress in its implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). It has also submitted the questionnaire on the provision of technical assistance to ensure more effective border control to combat terrorism, illegal migration and related criminal activity. Work is now under way on the next report on the implementation of the resolution.

The dual political position of Belarus, which is a kind of corridor between Europe and the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), makes it particularly important to ensure tight border and customs controls to prevent the illegal transportation of weapons and munitions and to halt illegal migration, drug trade and other actions linked to

terrorist activity. Those measures require significant material and financial resources.

Belarus has done much to improve border and customs controls within the context of combating terrorism and related criminal activity. Nevertheless, to resolve that problem our State is counting on the future assistance of the CTC, international organizations and donor countries. In our view, the Security Council meeting held at the ministerial level on issues related to combating international terrorism, which took place on 20 January 2003, was very significant in terms of determining the future strategy for the activities of the CTC and of the Security Council as a whole. We support the provisions of the declaration annexed to resolution 1456 (2003), and we are ready to contribute to the attainment of its objectives. Moreover, we hope that, in the light of the approach set down in the declaration, the process of implementing resolution 1373 (2001) will continue to be as open as possible and will encourage a constructive dialogue between the CTC and States regarding measures needed to help States to fully carry out their obligations.

Continuing and giving fresh impetus to the present dynamic of cooperation between the CTC and Member States within the framework of resolution 1373 (2001) will be impossible without the further consolidation of an atmosphere of mutual trust regarding issues related to combating international terrorism and respect for the positions of all members of the international community on anti-terrorist activity. Only thus will it be possible to foresee a successful campaign against terrorism.

Belarus welcomes the intention of the CTC to hold a special meeting with international, regional and subregional organizations on 7 March 2003 at the United Nations. The CTC initiative to merge the efforts of international, regional and subregional organizations to combat international terrorism will undoubtedly promote closer coordination of action among those organizations regarding the problem and will have a positive impact on the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) by Member States.

Regarding the CIS, Belarus, together with other States, is taking measures to strengthen the potential of the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre and is considering ways to involve that international body in the process of promoting implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) at the regional level, as a promising area for its future work.

In conclusion, we wish to note that the practice of holding open Security Council meetings at which all Member States have the opportunity to state their positions on the Council's anti-terrorism efforts is a valuable way to assess the effects of measures undertaken to overcome this global problem of our time — namely, international terrorism — which is currently having a significant impact on international security policy. We hope that that practice will be continued and that it will make it possible in the near future to achieve a greater degree of unity among the participants of the campaign to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and to avoid the use of double standards in the approaches taken by members of the anti-terrorism coalition.

The President: I call now on the representative of Australia.

Mr. Dauth (Australia): Australia welcomes this opportunity to again address the Security Council on an issue of fundamental importance to the international community. As members know, on 12 October 2002 a terrorist attack on the Indonesian island of Bali took the lives of more than 200 innocent civilians from some 21 countries; 88 Australians were killed in that brutal attack, which, together with the attacks in Mombasa, Moscow and Bogota, demonstrated all too clearly terrorism's global reach and the threat it poses to peace and security. Those heinous attacks have only strengthened the Australian Government's resolve to protect Australian citizens and to confront the threat posed by international terrorism in our region and internationally. That was underlined, I should say, in our recently released foreign policy white paper. If anyone is short of bedtime reading, I will be happy to share a copy with him or her.

Australia's approach to combating terrorism is comprehensive, covering bilateral, regional and multilateral activities, as well as political, economic, diplomatic, legal and, where appropriate, military initiatives. Bilaterally, we have concluded formal counter-terrorism arrangements with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. We are close to finalizing similar arrangements with other friends in our region, including the Philippines and Fiji. Those arrangements promote stronger cooperation in the fight against terrorism in key areas such as intelligence exchange,

law enforcement, anti-terrorist financing and border controls. The excellent cooperation between Australian and Indonesian police in investigating the Bali bombings has been facilitated by our arrangements with Indonesia, which have also served as a foundation for counter-terrorism capacity-building activities.

At a regional level, Australia has been active in supporting counter-terrorism initiatives and programmes. Australia is strengthening its own and the Asia-Pacific region's defences against terrorism, working with our Asian and Pacific-island neighbours, and also with the United States and the United Kingdom and others. In cooperation with New Zealand and the United States, we are assisting Pacific island countries to implement their obligations under resolution 1373 (2001). In December, Australia and Indonesia co-hosted a regional conference on combating money-laundering and terrorist financing in Bali. The conference raised awareness of the problem of terrorist financing and encouraged action to cut off funding of terrorist groups. Within the Regional Forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), planning is well advanced for a workshop that Australia will be co-hosting with Singapore on managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. In the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) association, we are exploring options to help countries in the region implement their commitments under APEC's Secure Trade in the APEC Region initiative, which will help secure the flow of goods and people.

Globally, the United Nations must continue to play a key role in denying terrorists the opportunity to commit their appalling crimes. That is especially the case in relation to efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is no greater danger for the international community than that of weapons of mass destruction finding their way into the hands of terrorists, who, with such weapons, would have the capacity to kill tens or hundreds of thousands of innocent people.

Against that background, we welcome and endorse the ministerial declaration on terrorism annexed to resolution 1456 (2003), which highlighted the importance of tight controls over the use of and access to nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials. The declaration also emphasized the need for full compliance with existing legal obligations in the field of disarmament, arms limitation and non-proliferation. In that context, we would recall that, as we stated in the Council on Tuesday, 18 February, Australia considers that this body should act decisively and resolutely to deal with Iraq's disarmament.

Australia remains a strong proponent of the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism. We have made substantial efforts to achieve consensus on the convention, leading informal negotiations to resolve outstanding issues in relation to its scope. We welcome the encouragement in the ministerial declaration for the conclusion of the convention.

It would be entirely remiss of me not to mention the valuable work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) under the really quite exemplary, transparent and consultative leadership of Ambassador Greenstock, who in this area has demonstrated the great skill in this area that he brings to all the work that he does at the United Nations. In that context, I am pleased also to note that he is to be succeeded by another extremely able colleague of ours, the Permanent Representative of Spain. The CTC has played, and continues to play, a crucial role in global efforts to fight terrorism.

We also commend the excellent work of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999), whose consolidated list is a key counter-terrorism tool. We encourage more proactive listing of terrorists and terrorist entities under resolution 1267 (1999). Australia welcomes the steps being taken by the CTC and the 1267 sanctions Committee to better coordinate their activities and to improve the exchange of information.

Australia is acutely aware that winning the fight against terrorism will take long-term commitment. For its part, Australia will continue to shoulder its counter-terrorism responsibilities and can be counted on to support the efforts of the United Nations.

The President: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Croatia, to whom I give the floor.

Ms. Ognjanovac (Croatia): Memories of the recent wave of worldwide terrorist attacks make us painfully aware of how vulnerable all our societies are when faced with the threat of international terrorism. The continuing high terror alert, which is becoming a daily reality for many of us, reminds us that this new global scourge, which is indiscriminate in its attacks, does not recognize borders, nationalities, religion, race or age.

Although anti-terrorism is not a new item on the United Nations agenda, it took the horrors of 11 September 2001 to galvanize the international community and to step up the global fight against terrorism. Those acts, which shook the foundations of the world order, have redefined our understanding of the notion of a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council responded to that threat appropriately and promptly by adopting resolution 1373 (2001) and by subsequently creating the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). The almost universal response of Member States to the CTC's requests is a telling example of how efficient the United Nations can be in mobilizing the international community in this fight.

We believe that the CTC's work thus far has been a success. By prompting Member States to consolidate and improve their legislative and law-enforcement measures and to identify possible weak spots in countering terrorism at the national level, the CTC reporting system has proved to be more than purely a stock-taking exercise. I would like to use this opportunity to express my Government's thanks and appreciation to the Committee's Chairman, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, for his dedication, efficiency and transparency in guiding the work of the CTC.

This meeting comes at an opportune time for discussing how to enhance and intensify the Committee's work. As last month's ministerial meeting indicated, the CTC is ready to enter a new phase, which should be more action-oriented. We were particularly encouraged by proposals aimed at the establishment of a special cooperation and assistance fund, under United Nations auspices, that would cooperate closely with international financial institutions. For many countries, including mine, the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) could be significantly upgraded through technical and financial assistance. For its part, Croatia has already elaborated several projects that could benefit from such assistance — ranging from enhancing border controls to the training of law enforcement and anti-terrorist experts to protection against attacks involving radiation and weapons of mass destruction — as described in its earlier submissions to the CTC.

The United Nations has proved to be indispensable at the global level as a focal point for integrated action and as the architect of an extensive body of international anti-terrorist legislation. The universal criminalization of terrorist-related acts is the first step towards their eradication. However, relevant international instruments have no value without universal participation and full implementation.

In addition to a number of regional and sectoral agreements, Croatia is party to six key United Nations conventions on suppressing terrorism and is taking steps to expeditiously become party to the remaining legal instruments. In view of next month's meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, charged with the elaboration of a draft comprehensive convention on combating international terrorism and a draft convention on the suppression of nuclear terrorism, my delegation hopes that Member States will find the critical political will to finalize these negotiations.

Regional and subregional cooperation complements and enhances our global efforts. We therefore welcome the forthcoming meeting between the CTC and representatives of the relevant international and regional organizations, hoping that it will deepen that synergy.

Croatia plays an active part in various regional counter-terrorism initiatives. As a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Croatia has implemented obligations set out in the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism as well as those stipulated by five anti-terrorism conventions of the Council of Europe. The Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, adopted at the Warsaw Conference of the Presidents of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, has initiated further measures aimed at strengthening cooperation within the region.

Within that framework, in September 2002 Croatia hosted an international symposium on "Terrorism and security in the twenty-first century: South-Eastern Europe and the world". A number of additional projects are being realized within the framework of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, the Central European Initiative, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, the Budapest process and the South-Eastern European Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime, or in direct collaboration with neighbouring countries.

At the bilateral level, Croatia has concluded agreements on cooperation in the fight against

terrorism, organized crime and drug abuse with 18 countries, while 32 additional agreements are under way. By focusing on controlling migration and borders, harmonizing legislation, sharing information and fighting organized crime and money-laundering, those initiatives are important in preventing and eliminating terrorism.

Ultimately, it is implementation at the national level that remains crucial for eradicating terrorism. Following the adoption of resolution 1373 (2001), the Croatian Government established an inter-agency working group charged specifically with its implementation and mandated all relevant governmental agencies to examine the implementing legislation and to initiate possible amendments. Subsequently, the criminal code was amended in accordance with resolution 1373 (2001), while the law on foreign currency transactions, the anti-money-laundering law, the law on legal assistance and the asylum law are currently being revised. The ratification of several anti-terrorism treaties is under way. Croatia has also implemented 98 per cent of the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, which have been incorporated into national legislation.

The fight against international terrorism is multilevel and multifaceted and has many fronts, which were addressed in the declaration that the Council adopted on 20 January as an annex to resolution 1456 (2003). We find it encouraging that development issues and conflict prevention have been integrated into the Council's campaign against terrorism. The interdependence of socio-economic, security and peace-building issues was itself the focus of the Croatian presidency of the Economic and Social Council in 2002. The need for a holistic approach calls, in turn, for tight cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. We believe that collaboration between those two bodies should be given due consideration in our efforts to eradicate international terrorism.

Success in combating international terrorism ultimately depends on the ability of our Governments to work together through international cooperation mechanisms. By virtue of its worldwide membership, the United Nations provides a unique institutional framework to do this. We therefore welcome the sustained comprehensive approach outlined in the ministerial declaration and consider it our common responsibility to cooperate fully with the Council in this fight.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Israel, on whom I now call.

Mr. Gillerman (Israel): At the outset, please allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on assuming the presidency for the month of February. I would also like to congratulate your predecessor, the Ambassador of France, for his handling of that very difficult position.

I must tell the Council that I find it very symbolic that my first statement to the Council should be on an issue that has particular resonance for the people and Government of Israel. Since the very moment of its establishment, Israel has been the target of terrorism, perpetrated with the support and sponsorship of extremist elements and regimes operating in various countries in our region. Even after 54 years of independence, the threat of terrorism has hardly abated. On the contrary, terrorism continues to be a daily fact of life for Israelis. The Palestinian campaign of terror persists. It has so far included literally hundreds of attacks and suicide bombings, including the Passover massacre in Netanya and the bombings of a discotheque in Tel Aviv, public buses and shopping centres.

Let me be personal for just one moment and tell the Council about my little grandchild, Ron, who is four years old and attends a kindergarten in the heart of Tel Aviv. Being a very devoted and crazy grandfather, I sometimes chuck everything aside and go to pick him up. Every time I do that, my heart breaks at the sight of the armed guard who stands outside my innocent little four-year-old grandchild's school to protect him and his fellow children. Israel is the only democracy in the world whose kindergartens, schools, universities, cafes and restaurants have to be protected by armed guards. I take the liberty to say that I am probably the only Ambassador in this room today who confronts an armed guard when he goes to pick up his little grandchild from kindergarten.

For countries blessed to have terrorism remain an abstraction, my country today offers a glimpse into what might be in store if terrorism is not confronted resolutely, with a united front and without fear. In the face of all this, the people of Israel have demonstrated their strength and their resilience by continuing to live their lives and by refusing to succumb to fear. Our real heroes are the bus drivers, students, shoppers and

commuters who, while taking all necessary precautions, continue to lead full and vibrant lives.

It is as a result, unfortunately, of Israel's long experience confronting terrorism that we consider ourselves a natural partner in the intensified campaign to rid the world of the scourge of terrorism undertaken by this Council in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001. In this connection, I am pleased to inform the Council that the Israeli Government has recently ratified two important anti-terrorism treaties: the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997 and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999.

Israel supports the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and I would like to commend Ambassador Greenstock for the wonderful and very devoted work he is doing. We believe that intensive international cooperation is a critical weapon in the counter-terrorist arsenal. Israel stands ready and willing to share its knowledge and expertise — and is already doing so with many countries in the world — and to collaborate in joint efforts aimed at coordinating and strengthening our collective response.

At the same time, we would like to see the CTC take a more proactive role beyond the technical work of collecting and analysing country reports. We would like to see the CTC organize discussions on particular issues related to the counter-terrorism effort, including aviation security and the threat of non-conventional weapons. We would further like to see more transparency in the work of the CTC. We believe that more comprehensive information should be made available to the international community to ensure that every Member State has the ability to make a contribution.

We must battle terrorism on all fronts. This means more than using the full range of economic, military, legal and diplomatic tools at our disposal. It also means making no distinctions between so-called bad terrorism and good terrorism. Terror is terror is terror. Despite the seeming universality of this fight, there remain those who persist in drawing distinctions between varieties of violence deliberately targeted against civilians. The international community must stand firmly by the principle that the use of violence against civilians for political means is completely and utterly unacceptable, regardless of cause or motive.

This position was made explicit once again last month when the Security Council, meeting at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, affirmed in resolution 1456 (2003) that

> "any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever committed and are to be unequivocally condemned". (*Resolution 1456 (2003), annex*)

Israel believes that such a declaration and a matching commitment to action are essential to our fight against terrorism. Concessions in the face of terrorism anywhere are an invitation to terror everywhere.

We can never allow the apologists for terrorism to invoke the mantra of root causes to justify murder while laying the moral foundation for future attacks. Terrorism is not the product of poverty or despair, as certain representatives, cynically motivated by their own narrow political interests, would like us to believe. To draw on an example from close to home, Palestinian prosperity and political aspirations have only ever been advanced through negotiations and the rejection of terrorism and violence. The resort to terrorism is what has brought despair. Let me make this very, very clear: It is not poverty that breeds terror; it is terror that breeds poverty.

If the battle against terror is to succeed, groups that use it cannot be allowed to reap political gains and be honoured with central roles on the world stage. Those who kill themselves in order to kill others are murderers, not martyrs, and we cannot permit their crimes to be sanitized with such terms as "martyrdom" and "resistance". Terrorism should harm the political ambitions of those who engage in it, not invite appeasement and concessions from those too frightened to confront it. Political advances won through terrorism are the surest guarantee of more terrorism.

I therefore call on the Security Council to implement a policy of zero tolerance for terrorism. The time has come to stop talking and to start acting. Terrorism is evil and evil cannot be appeased, it cannot be assuaged; it must be fought and defeated.

The fight against terrorism must begin at home. Our efforts will be successful only if every single State undertakes a sincere and irrevocable commitment to eradicating terrorism from its soil. In the past 18 months, Israel has updated and improved its already

expansive body of domestic legislation, counter-terrorist measures and cooperative partnerships.

If the events of 11 September have taught us anything, it is that even one State continuing to support and provide safe harbour to terrorists constitutes a threat of unimaginable proportions. It is therefore essential that all States make ironclad commitments that are manifest in real practical measures, including intense cooperation with the international community and the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The problem in this area may be less with those States that lack the capacity to fight terrorism than with those rogue regimes that lack the will to do so, or worse, actively use and support terrorism to further their subversive agenda. Of highest concern are those rogue regimes with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons that can be transferred to terrorists who have no compunctions regarding their use.

In this connection, we note the irony of the remarks made on Friday in this Council by the Foreign Minister of Syria, the representative of a State that is among the world's foremost sponsors of terrorism. The Syrian delegation rarely foregoes an opportunity to launch one of its ritual diatribes against Israel, regardless of the issue on the Council's agenda. I need hardly point out the appalling contradiction between Syria's membership on this Council and its continued, extensive and unapologetic support for no fewer than 10 separate terrorist organizations. In flagrant violation of resolution 1373 (2001) and basic norms of international law, the Government of Syria continues to provide financial and logistical support and safe harbour to known terrorist groups that operate freely and openly in Syrian-controlled territory.

The international community must not allow Syria to abuse its position on the Council, as it has done repeatedly, to divert attention from its failure to comply with resolution 1373 (2001). Of what use is the campaign against terrorism if others see that States that manifestly fail to live up to their obligations escape condemnation and are even elevated to positions of prominence at the United Nations?

As the body charged with monitoring the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), the CTC can make a vital contribution to our efforts, provided that it is focused and substantive and is prepared, in addition to its other activities, to identify and exert pressure on those States that are failing to fulfil their responsibilities. The CTC must have the courage to name and shame those States that continue to support terrorism even as the world unites to confront it. Yes, the time has come to name them and shame them.

We also must acknowledge the role of incitement in encouraging and legitimizing acts of terrorism. No child, anywhere, is born wanting to be a suicide terrorist, and in our region we are faced with constant reminders of how these children and these suicide bombers are created. The mass media, educational institutions and religious and political figures of the Palestinian Authority inculcate and glorify hatred and offer the moral sanction of both man and God for acts of mass murder. Terrorists must hear not just from this Council, but also from their own people, from their own societies and from their own spiritual and political leaders that the indiscriminate murder of innocents is always wrong and unjustifiable.

We must confront the poisonous well of incitement from which future terrorists are nourished and sustained. Resolutions adopted by the Council in the future should clearly refer to the role of incitement in glorifying and promoting terrorism. We further hope that the CTC will place the fight against incitement at the forefront of its efforts.

Finally, the fight against terrorism is not for the faint of heart. We cannot afford to tire or grow complacent. Those seeking to murder innocent civilians, precisely because they are innocent, and to give up their own lives in the process, are not easily deterred or dissuaded. We are locked in a battle of endurance, one that requires sustained political will to see it through to its conclusion.

The world is now engaged in a harsh battle against the forces of terrorism. We face a difficult road ahead, but great struggles have always yielded great rewards. The defeat of terrorism will be the defeat of those who wish to turn history backwards, to stop the march of human progress. Defeating terrorism will throw open the door to a bold new future and to an era of peace and prosperity, not only in the Middle East but also around the world.

Even in these dark days, the people of Israel have never lost their hope and their desire for peace. Even with the threat of terrorism a constant and pervasive presence, we continue to believe that the day will come when children like my grandchild Ron will no longer need armed guards to protect them at school. It is

precisely the belief that a peaceful future must ultimately arrive that gives us the strength to endure.

The day will yet arrive when discussions like these will seem anachronistic, a relic of a past that has been supplanted by a peaceful present and a limitless future. It is my belief that with proper leadership and sufficient resolve that day may not be far off.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Cuba, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Rodríguez Parrilla (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): In order to save time I will read a condensed version, and I wish to place on record the full version of my statement.

The series of terrorist attacks in the most diverse parts of the world that followed the criminal acts of 11 September, the State terrorism against the Palestinian people and the spiral of violence that this generates, and the terrorism against Cuba, inter alia, demonstrate that a comprehensive and collective solution can be found to this ancient and terrible scourge only through harmonious cooperation and consensus, and not by means of war.

Hegemonic unilateralism and double standards have prevented the United Nations from recovering its prerogatives and discharging its peace functions. Unilateral acts or pre-emptive war by a State or a group of States however powerful they may be, on the pretext of combating terrorism are totally unacceptable.

For several decades Cuba has struggled in an exemplary fashion and taken effective measures against international terrorism. It has never carried out, financed, tolerated or permitted a terrorist act, not even in legitimate defence against the direct perpetrators or the masterminds of heinous crimes committed against our people. It has never allowed its territory to be used for terrorist acts against any State, without exception, and it has declared that it will do everything in its power to prevent this in the future.

I categorically reject the slander by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Mr. Robert Mueller, before the Senate Intelligence Committee on 11 February 2003, which sought to present Cuba as a threat to the United States, and I challenge him to present the slightest evidence in this regard.

On the contrary, on 29 November 2001 Cuba proposed to the United States Government, without any condition and in keeping with Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, three draft bilateral agreements. The first is a programme of bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism, with measures to prevent and suppress the planning, organization, execution, support for or collaboration in, and financing of any terrorist act against the other party; and proposals concerning exchange of information and investigative and judicial cooperation. The second is a cooperation agreement to combat illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The third is an agreement on illegal trafficking in persons. Although the United States, on the slightest pretext, has refused even to consider them, Cuba still hopes that there will be a change in that policy.

In the midst of the anthrax crisis, in October 2001, the United States Government was offered 100 million tablets of ciprofloxacin, and in November it was offered a supply of equipment for rapid low-cost typing of strains and spores. In August 2002, Cuba proposed joint investigation and research into the West Nile virus.

It is impossible to eliminate terrorism if some terrorist acts are condemned while others are concealed, tolerated or justified. For ethical reasons, the use of the veto to block international action to protect the Palestinian people from Israeli State terrorism must end. There must also be an end to the American supplies of aircraft, helicopters and other means whereby that terrorism is carried out.

Terrorism against Cuba continues to be carried out with absolute impunity from United States territory. In Havana on 16 June 1998, Cuba officially handed over to two high-ranking FBI officers incontestable, abundant and detailed evidence of those activities, which included 331 pages, record sheets of 64 known terrorists, 4 hours and 38 minutes of secret filming and 21 telephone interceptions. On 12 August, in Havana, *The New York Times* was exclusively provided, at its request, essentially the same information provided to the FBI two months earlier. Interviews with detained terrorists were allowed, and access was given to a Cuban agent who had infiltrated the Cuban American National Foundation and was living under cover.

The only response from the FBI was to detain, on 12 September 1998, Gerardo Hernández, Ramón Labañino, Fernando González, René Gonzalez and Antonio Guerrero. As has been clearly shown, they

were, with lofty altruism and courage, trying only to obtain information about terrorist groups based in Miami with a view to preventing their violent acts and saving the lives of Cuban and United States citizens.

A civil court in Miami sentenced them to the maximum penalty, without the safeguards of due process, on false charges — including charges that the District Attorney asked to be withdrawn due to lack of evidence — and with a jury that was subjected to threats by terrorist groups and exposed to the intolerance of radical organizations and the anti-Cuban press. A number of known terrorists, called by the defence to testify, were protected by the Fifth Amendment.

At the request of the United States Attorney General, the sentences of two of those men, who are United States citizens, include the following unusual paragraph, which insults the memory of the victims of 11 September, only three months after that crime was committed. It states:

> "As a further special condition of supervised release the defendant is prohibited from associating with or visiting specific places where individuals or groups such as terrorists, members of organizations advocating violence and organized crime figures are known to be or to frequent".

The President of the United States has emphatically stated:

> "Justice demands that those who helped or harboured the terrorists be punished — and punished severely. ... One of the things we will do is enforce the doctrine, part of the doctrine that says, 'If you harbour a terrorist, you're just as guilty as a terrorist'."

And he launched a war on that premise.

On 20 May 2002, President Bush made an offensive anti-Cuban speech in Miami. A photograph taken by United States television on that occasion shows the presence, on the podium a few feet away from the President, of Sixto Aquit Manrique, who was convicted in 1995 of carrying out an act of terrorism in Miami. In 1992 he took part in a plot to assassinate the President of Cuba. In 1993, he attacked the Maltese vessel *Mykonos*. He is associated with an armed infiltration of Cuba on 17 October 1996. In 1998, the FBI was given a great deal of evidence relating to that individual.

In another photograph taken at the same ceremony, Orlando Bosch Ávila can be seen in the front row. On 23 January 1989, the Acting Associate Attorney General of the United States, Joe Whitley, wrote, in a confidential decision to deny asylum to and deport Orlando Bosch after his illegal entry into the United States and his imprisonment in 1988, that the United States Government had confidential information confirming that "the bombing of a Cuban airlines aeroplane on 6 October 1976 was a CORU operation under the direction of Bosch". However, the order to deport Bosch, was cancelled, despite the fact that a court had endorsed the Department of Justice decision. He was pardoned by President George Bush in 1990 and granted residency in the United States.

In a radio broadcast, on 6 June 2002, and then on 16 June in *Diario de las Americas*, Orlando Bosch reiterated his call for the use of terrorism against Cuba. On 5 December 2002, the *Miami New Times* quoted Bosch, stating "All the people on the aeroplane were henchmen", in reference to the Cuban aeroplane that was bombed.

Roberto Martín Pérez also appears in photographs of the 20 May ceremony. He is the head of the paramilitary group of the Cuban American National Foundation and one of the organizers of the plan to assassinate the Cuban President during the Ibero-American Summit on Margarita Island in November 1997. He was also an organizer of another, aborted, assassination attempt that was to take place during the CARIFORUM Summit in the Dominican Republic in August 1998.

The terrorist Rodolfo Frómeta Caballero, head of F-4 Commandos, issued a statement on 9 January 2003 in a Miami newspaper called *La Verdad*, declaring, "In 2003 we are still at war". Earlier, on 31 December 2002, the *El Nuevo Herald* had confirmed that his group had participated in an attack allegedly undertaken in Cuba. As if that were not enough, on 29 January 2003, *The Wall Street Journal* referred to the alliance of that organization with Venezuelan groups resident in Miami, which organize and carry out military training with a view to confronting the constitutional Government of Venezuela. Information on that terrorist was likewise provided to the FBI.

Posada Carriles, one of the perpetrators of the Cuban aeroplane bombing, was a CIA agent for many years. He escaped from a Venezuelan prison in an operation organized and financed by the Cuban American National Foundation. According to United States Senate records, he reappeared as one of the "Contra-gate" operators, receiving a salary from both the CIA and the United States Department of State. He travelled freely to Miami in 1997 and 1998. He was responsible for the bombing campaign against Havana hotels in 1997 that killed an Italian tourist and injured 12 Cubans. He also organized an assassination attempt against the Cuban President on the occasion of the Ibero-American Summit in Margarita Island. Now he is in prison in Panama, awaiting a trial on charges of trying to blow up, using 20 kilogrammes of C-4 and 50 packets of Semtex, a university auditorium during a speech by President Fidel Castro on 16 November 2000, in the presence of thousands of professors and students from Panama, on the occasion of another Ibero-American Summit.

Dionisio Suárez was one of the most eloquent speakers to take part in a ceremony in Miami on 15 November 2002 to pay tribute to the terrorists detained in Panama. He served a 12-year prison sentence for the murder of a Chilean diplomat, Orlando Letelier, and the American citizen Ronnie Moffit. Referring to the acts that those terrorists had planned to carry out in Panama, Dionisio Suárez said, "They deserve respect; they deserve applause". Suárez, too, was invited to the presidential ceremony that took place on 20 May 2002.

On 11 November 2002, a Cuban AN-2 aircraft was hijacked and taken to United States territory. Instead of being put on trial, the eight hijackers were given asylum. Instead of being returned, the aircraft was auctioned off.

Two weeks ago, on 7 February, during the "orange" antiterrorist alert in the United States, a military vessel from the Cuban coastguard service arrived at Key West without being intercepted and docked there. The vessel was carrying four armed men wearing camouflage fatigues. Although the vessel was returned, the hijackers have not been returned to Cuba and have not been charged.

With complete impunity and with the complicity of United States authorities, funds are being collected in Miami for the purpose of financing terrorist acts. Bank accounts that finance terrorism are operating openly and normally; terrorists are being recruited; weapons supplies are being produced; safe haven is being provided. The territory is being use by those who finance, plan and carry out terrorist acts.

Cuba expects the Security Council and the Counter-Terrorism Committee to take action. Does resolution 1373 (2001) not apply to the terrorism that, on an ongoing basis and with manifest impunity, is being undertaken from United States territory against Cuba?

The President: Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I again appeal to speakers not to exceed the agreed time of seven minutes for a statement. The matter is one of fairness to the speakers who follow. If we stick to our timetable, everybody will have a chance to make a statement to the Council.

The next speaker is the representative of Bahrain, on whom I now call.

Mr. Almansoor (Bahrain) *(spoke in Arabic)*: I should like at the outset to place on record my delegation's appreciation to you, Sir, for having convened this open meeting on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. We believe that the convening of these open meetings, with the participation of non-members of the Council, serves to support efforts to increase transparency in the work of the Council by engaging non-members in the deliberations.

The subject under discussion today is a priority item in our work. Terrorism is a dangerous phenomenon that we must combat collectively. This phenomenon has recently intensified, and now commands the attention of the international community — which has made strenuous efforts to fight it and to limit its catastrophic consequences, particularly the grave loss of life and property it causes.

In that respect, we note that efforts at the United Nations to arrive at a definition of terrorism have yet to yield any results. We believe the time has come to step up international efforts to overcome the differences preventing us from arriving at a definition of terrorism.

The events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America represented a dramatic turning point that shed light on the phenomenon of terrorism, which directly threatens the stability and security of States and international economic stability. The tragic events

in Bali and Moscow, and Israel's acts of terror in the occupied Palestinian territories, are but links in the continuous chain of the acts of international terror that the international community must step up its efforts to combat.

Bahrain, which is eager to see the international community engaged in combating this dangerous international phenomenon threatening peace and security and the stability of States, has extended its cooperation to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) since it was established by resolution 1373 (2001). We have provided the Committee with the reports required under paragraph 6 of that resolution. Bahrain submitted its national report on time and was among the first States to do so, because we believe that cooperating with the Committee will enhance international efforts to combat this phenomenon, which threatens the world and kills innocent people worldwide. The Kingdom of Bahrain also recently submitted the supplementary report required by the Committee. My country has taken every measure necessary to combat and stop the phenomenon of international terrorism. It has also ratified most of the international conventions pertaining to the fight against international terrorism.

The most important component of international terrorism is State terrorism, which we have witnessed in the Balkans, in particular in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. State terrorism continues in the occupied Arab territories. Such terrorism includes the Israeli Government's deliberate demolition of Palestinian homes, its displacement of Palestinians, its usurpation of their lands and the looting of their property. In that regard, my country calls on the international community to firmly and resolutely address this dangerous phenomenon, put an end to those inhumane practices and bring the perpetrators to international justice so that they may be duly punished.

Israel continues to defy United Nations resolutions and to reject every peace initiative that would bring an end to its occupation of territory, which is, after all, a form of international terrorism. Israel has also rejected the peace initiative that was recently put forth by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz and adopted at the Arab Summit held in Beirut last March. Israel has also continued its policy of settler colonialism and population transfer, its terrorism against defenceless Palestinians, who are armed only with the determination to defy and resist Israeli terror. My country is gravely concerned about the policies being pursued by the Government of Israel against the Palestinian people in defiance of international humanitarian law, human rights law and international law and norms.

There are many obstacles that stand in the way of international efforts to combat international terrorism, the most significant being the absence of a standard legal definition of this phenomenon. There are numerous differences on this matter, which are also blocking the adoption of a comprehensive international convention to combat international terrorism. We would like to stress the need to arrive at an accurate and comprehensive definition of terrorism. We also wish to highlight the need to distinguish between terrorism, which we condemn and oppose in all its forms and manifestations, and a people's legitimate struggle for independence and freedom. Short of that, our efforts will be incomplete, and our task extremely difficult. We would also like to stress that the phenomenon of terrorism is not linked to a given religion, culture or race. It is a global phenomenon that has recently taken on many forms and dimensions.

In conclusion, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation for the efforts made by Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock as Chairman of the CTC, as well as for his unique and outstanding ability to reconcile his chairmanship with the duties entrusted to him as the Permanent Representative of his country to the United Nations. While stressing the need to discuss and address the root causes of terrorism, we would also like to reiterate our keen interest in cooperating positively with the Committee in order to bring about effective coordination among its members and adopt the measures necessary to put an end to this phenomenon.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Myanmar.

Mr. Swe (Myanmar): I have the honour of speaking on behalf of the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and my own country, Myanmar.

I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for taking the initiative to convene this public meeting on the important topic of terrorism. My appreciation also goes

to France for having convened, on 20 January 2003, a high-level meeting of the Security Council on the subject of combating terrorism.

On 4 October 2002, to mark first anniversary of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), we met in an open meeting of the Security Council. Barely a week after we met, on 12 October, another dastardly terrorist attack took place, in Bali, killing almost 200 persons, tourists and Indonesians alike. That struck at the heart of the ASEAN region, and we are particularly devastated by that cowardly attack.

The tragic loss of life in Bali, as well as in Moscow and Mombassa, is a reminder that although we have made great efforts to combat terrorism through the adoption and implementation of far-reaching resolutions, success in combating international terrorism is still not fully ensured. Greater efforts are needed at the international, regional and country levels to intensify our fight against terrorism.

Allow me to give a further update on ASEAN's ongoing efforts to combat international terrorism. The devastating Bali attack came just one month before the ASEAN Summit that took place last year in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Combating terrorism remains high on the agenda of ASEAN members, both individually and collectively. The Phnom Penh Summit adopted a declaration on terrorism, in which ASEAN leaders expressed the determination of the Association to build on measures announced last year at its Summit in Brunei Darussalam to intensify its efforts to prevent, counter and suppress terrorist activities in the region. At the summit, ASEAN called on the international community to avoid indiscriminately advising their citizens not to visit or otherwise deal with ASEAN countries in the absence of established evidence to substantiate rumours of possible terrorist attacks, as such measures could help achieve the objectives of the terrorists.

Cooperation among members of ASEAN to counter terrorism was further strengthened last year through increased intelligence sharing, as well as through workshops related to countering terrorism and other transnational crimes. ASEAN members had already planned on expanding their individual and collective efforts. Following the summit, ASEAN countries undertook the following activities. The International Conference on Anti-Terrorism and Tourism Recovery was held in Manila, the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism was established in November 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, and the regional conference on combating money laundering and terrorist financing took place in Bali in December. In January 2003 a workshop on terrorism was held in Jakarta, and Singapore hosted a workshop on counter-terrorism financing.

Cooperation in countering terrorism has also been extended through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which has continued to be an important mechanism in considering security-related issues in the region. Last year, ARF participants discussed measures against terrorism, as well as its financing. In March this year, an ARF intersessional meeting on counter-terrorism and transnational crime will be held in Malaysia. The ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, with ministerial counterparts from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, is to be held in Bangkok in October 2003.

On 1 August 2002, ASEAN and the United States signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. It provides a framework for cooperation in the prevention, disruption and combating of international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building. The Declaration also provides for cooperation to enhance efficacy in the efforts to combat terrorism.

Recently, at the ASEAN-European Union ministerial meeting in Brussels, the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism was adopted. The ministers agreed to enhance cooperation in areas including the exchange of information, strengthening links between law enforcement agencies of the European Union and ASEAN, and capacity-building to assist ASEAN members in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and to address the impact of terrorist activities.

Evidently, countering terrorism remains high on the agenda of ASEAN, both individually and collectively. At this juncture, I would like to reassure the Council of ASEAN's commitment to the global fight against terrorism and specifically to the implementation of resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1456 (2003). I wish to inform the Council of ASEAN's intention to participate in the forthcoming special meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee with international, regional and subregional organizations,

scheduled for 7 March 2003. ASEAN takes note of the various proposals that were put forward at the last high-level meeting of the Council, including the French proposal to establish a cooperation and assistance fund.

We find the open meetings of the Security Council, including this one, extremely valuable. Member States can learn what works in one particular country or region and have the option of adapting it to suit their unique environments and situations. It has helped us to identify and address inadequacies, including in terms of national legislation.

We are also pleased with the latest efforts of the CTC, including the directory of assistance that is currently published on the web. The cooperation that the CTC is promoting is one of the many valuable ways in which it has helped to further the cause of our fight against terrorism.

Finally, I pay tribute to the Chairman of the CTC, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, and the CTC as a whole for their tireless efforts and their commendable achievements. The work of the CTC has been, indeed, a great contribution to efforts in countering terrorism.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

Mr. Aboul Gheit (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): There is no doubt that today's meeting of the Council to follow up on the ministerial meeting of 20 January on combating terrorism is an affirmation of the increased importance the Council gives to international efforts to combat international terrorism. It is a question that imposes itself forcefully on the international agenda. We are convinced that stepping up and coordinating these efforts within the framework of the United Nations is the only guarantee of their success. Terrorism cannot be eradicated nor can terrorists be controlled except through coordinated efforts by all countries of the world to achieve effective and concrete results.

Given that, we were keen to participate in today's meeting to enrich the dialogue on this very important question. This meeting also affirms our belief in the importance and centrality of the role of the United Nations in the war against terrorism. We are convinced that the greater the international participation in this war, the closer we will be to achieving its objectives.

This war must be viewed as a process that would unify the countries of the world and preserve the security and safety of their citizens — not the opposite. It must be collective, coordinated and balanced. It should avoid taking unilateral measures or antagonizing cultures, civilizations or religions merely because they are different. We should not be lacking in our enthusiasm to recall that the objective of all terrorism is to sow panic, terrorize people, destabilize countries and spread enmity. It is imperative that we not fall into the trap laid by terrorist elements by creating tension and disagreement in the international community. Therefore, we have to pay close attention soon to the importance of solidarity at this very delicate juncture. It is very important not to confuse terrorism with other political questions.

Terrorism, as with all diseases faced by humankind throughout history, requires of us the following for its defeat: to define terrorism, distinguishing it from other phenomenon; to identify its causes and how to deal with them; and to choose the best means to combat terrorism. The best guarantee of that outcome is to carry out those tasks within a framework that affirms the primacy of international law and our commitment to the provisions of international law and international legality, foremost among which are the relevant United Nations resolutions and the provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights — and, at the national level, to show commitment to national laws, legislation and the decisions of national courts.

Allow me to comment briefly on some of the proposals contained in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 February (S/2003/191). Let me start with one proposal of special importance, which, if we agree to it, will have a positive impact on the international war against terrorism: the international community must develop interaction and dialogue among civilizations and religions. The United Nations must take an effective, leading role in such a dialogue, as it is the mother organization with the greatest ways and means to achieve concrete results in that respect.

Among the proposals from the international community, we note that more than one member proposed that an international conference be convened under the auspices of the United Nations to define terrorism and to determine the common response of the international community to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Another member proposed the convening of a special session of the General Assembly to adopt new measures in the fight against terrorism.

Perhaps we should recall here that Egypt was the one that years ago called for the convening of an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations, to discuss terrorism-related issues. In this context, we would like to renew this call, and we hope that we can make progress and convene such a conference as soon as possible.

Egypt also proposed that an international conference be convened to declare the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction. Egypt deems this extremely important and believes that it must be achieved as soon as possible, as a key element of international peace and security and a factor in promoting the stability of the region.

The CTC proves daily and undoubtedly that it is a vital and effective mechanism in the war against terrorism. It affirms the role of the United Nations as a successful instrument for the coordination of international efforts in this respect.

Egypt maintains close and continuous cooperation and coordination with the Committee. To date Egypt has submitted three full reports to the Committee. The most recent one was submitted on 20 January and contained clarifications relating to Egyptian anti-terrorism legislation.

On this occasion, we would like to express our heartfelt thanks and appreciation for the invaluable efforts made by Sir Jeremy Greenstock, who is working tirelessly, objectively and in a balanced manner. We have full confidence in him and in his work as the head of the Committee.

Egypt is confident that this international Organization, as an effective mechanism representing international will and legitimacy, can assume a leading role in the combat against terrorism. Hence we look forward to the assumption by the United Nations of its responsibilities in this regard.

Egypt will continue to support the efforts of the Organization and to cooperate with it, with a view to successfully combating international terrorism and eradicating its evils.

Mr. Yauvoli (Fiji): It is my honour to address the Security Council on behalf of the members of the Pacific Islands Forum group of countries which are members of the United Nations, namely Australia, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and my own country, Fiji.

This meeting provides a useful opportunity to reflect on the efforts made to combat terrorism and associated transnational crime since the Security Council adopted the now-landmark resolution 1373 (2001) 16 months ago. That resolution brought a new element to the existing multilateral counter-terrorism framework and reflected a recognition of terrorism as a global problem which, if it is to be eliminated, requires cooperative action at the national, regional and international levels.

The declaration adopted by Security Council Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 20 January 2003, under resolution 1456 (2003), further highlights the steps to be taken by States and organizations to strengthen international efforts to combat terrorism. It helpfully highlights those areas which require particular focus since the commencement of the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). We welcome also the way in which the declaration recognizes the many threads that will contribute to effective action against international terrorism - including the implementation of Security Council resolutions and other legal obligations; cooperation with the CTC; mutual assistance and capacity- building; and the role of international and regional organizations. We also support the recognition given to ensuring that measures to combat terrorism comply with international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.

Member States, including the members of the Pacific Islands Forum, have worked — despite many constraints — to give effect to the obligations of resolution 1373 (2001). The Counter-Terrorism Committee has played an important part in those efforts. The role of the CTC in monitoring implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) has undoubtedly assisted in prompting and focusing Government action. It has assisted States in identifying and defining the standards for action. The CTC's efforts in placing States in contact with available sources of assistance have contributed to the critical task of enhancing the capacity of States to take such action.

We commend the Chairman of the CTC, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, for his continuing leadership in the establishment of an open dialogue between Member

States and the CTC. We also strongly support the CTC's initiative to meet with relevant regional and international organizations as a constructive way of establishing the dialogue necessary to "connect the dots". Our region will be contributing to that special session.

We are grateful also to the team of experts assisting the CTC, and we appreciate in particular the CTC's decision to appoint Ambassador Ward as a special expert to facilitate the provision of assistance as required. As the work of the CTC continues to evolve, we look forward to its continuing efforts to engage directly with States on the basis of their identified needs.

Much work has also been done at the regional level to give effect to the objectives of resolution 1373 (2001). The leaders of the Pacific expressed their political commitment to global counter-terrorism efforts through the adoption of the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security in August last year. The Nasonini Declaration was not simply an expression of political intent. It also recognized the need for the Group to take concrete, practical measures to give effect to that intent, through law-enforcement cooperation and national strategies, to combat serious transnational crime, backed by a strong legislative base.

In the six months since the Nasonini Declaration was issued, our members have continued to work to ensure that those practical measures are put in place. Using the resolution 1373 (2001) reporting requirements as a starting point, the Forum secretariat has now completed a regional review of national counter-terrorism, transnational crime and law-enforcement legislation and institutional frameworks. Model laws will now be prepared with the assistance of a regional expert working group, which will hold its first meeting next week, from 24 to 28 February, at the Forum secretariat in Suva, Fiji. Teams of expert drafters will make in-country visits to assist with adapting those model laws as required. Once completed, this project will see a robust and consistent framework of anti-terrorism legislation in place across the region.

The Pacific Islands Forum is part of the Pacific Financial Intelligence Unit project. In that connection, the Forum secretariat, assisted by the International Monetary Fund and the secretariat of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, hosted a seminar on "Legislative Drafting for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Measures" in Fiji last month, from 27 to 31 January. Representatives from the 13 participating countries that attended the seminar included legislative drafters, prosecutors, financial intelligence unit officials, police officers and financial regulators. The seminar covered international standards and legislative drafting issues in the following areas: confiscation and provisional measures such as freezing and seizing property; international cooperation and mutual assistance; customer due diligence; financial intelligence units; suspicious-transactions reporting; and combating the financing of terrorism.

Such regional cooperation is critical in regions such as ours, where capacity limitations present a major challenge to many of our members. The reality experienced by small island developing States, particularly those scattered across such a large geographic expanse as ours, is something that we must work around. Several of our members are in dialogue with the CTC, and with Ambassador Ward in particular, but we are also looking at what more can be done regionally and bilaterally. We are conscious that there are some areas, such as vulnerability of banking and financial systems and transport infrastructure, particularly international airports, which require more work. Forum Island countries with a capacity to assist others recognize their special responsibilities in this regard.

We in the Pacific recognize that there can be no standing still in the fight against terrorism. As recent events all too sadly show, no region is truly pacific when it comes to the threat of terrorism.

As we face the evolving challenge of terrorism, and as we work to implement the letter and the spirit of resolution 1373 (2001), the Security Council can be assured of the fullest support of the members of the Pacific Islands Forum group.

The President: I call next on the representative of Liechtenstein.

Mr. Wenaweser (Liechtenstein): We became aware only this morning of your seven-minute time limit, Mr. President, but we have made every effort to shorten our speech; a fuller version will be distributed to members of the Council.

We view this meeting in conjunction with the high-level meeting of the members of the Council of one month ago and, of course, against the background of the declaration adopted on that occasion, annexed to resolution 1456 (2003). That declaration calls on all States to take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active and passive support for terrorism, and to comply fully with the relevant resolutions of the Council, in particular resolution 1373 (2001). We agree with the Council that efforts at the national level have to be redoubled. We also believe that such efforts have to build on global leadership, as provided by the Security Council and especially by the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).

The declaration annexed to resolution 1456 (2003) also states that the CTC must intensify its efforts to promote the implementation by Member States of all aspects of resolution 1373 (2001). After almost a year and a half of effective and transparent work under the most able guidance of Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the CTC today finds itself at a crucial juncture. The vast majority of States have cooperated with the Committee in its endeavour to monitor the adoption of legislation covering all aspects of the resolution, and to monitor national efforts in preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorist acts. Liechtenstein, by way of example, has already submitted its third written report to the Committee, thereby proving its commitment to a serious dialogue with the CTC and its experts. As a further expression of its willingness to contribute to the international fight against terrorism, the Government has submitted to Parliament a legislation package on countering terrorism, which will be discussed shortly. That package includes important amendments to the criminal code and will lead to the ratification of the last outstanding relevant international convention, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

It is clear that the CTC has been very successful in helping States identify gaps and shortcomings in their national legislation, thereby contributing to the visibility and acceptance of global standards on combating terrorism. The further the CTC goes in that way, however, the more pressing the question of the actual implementation of those standards becomes. Combating terrorism does not end, of course, with the universal ratification of all relevant conventions. Legislation is a necessary tool, but it can never be sufficient in itself. Therefore, the CTC must address the issue of compliance enhancement, in order to ensure a lowest common denominator of application, and, to that end, it must identify benchmarks that all States must meet.

Transparency has been an important feature of the work of the CTC in the past and a crucial element of its success. Consistent with that approach, the Committee should therefore establish guidelines based on the principle of equal treatment of all Member States, which provide for a gradual and phased approach in ensuring compliance. Such guidelines should also draw from the experience of other international and regional bodies active in the area. The forthcoming special CTC meeting, on 7 March, with representatives of international, regional and subregional organizations will be an ideal occasion to exchange ideas and benefit from the experience of others with regard to best practices.

Liechtenstein stands ready to make its contribution to such compliance-enhancement efforts with our expertise in relevant areas. We would be pleased to see the CTC further strengthen its role in the United Nations system through the innovative and dedicated work which thus far has granted the CTC such an outstanding position in the fight against terrorism.

The Security Council has declared that States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism must comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law. The relationship between the fight against terrorism and the observance of human rights standards remains a high priority for us, and I wish to reiterate our conviction that human rights must never fall victim to the fight against terrorism. Since the Council last met in an open format in October, the General Assembly has pronounced itself on this very matter by unanimously adopting its resolution 57/219, on protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.

That text was drafted under the able leadership of the Mexican delegation, and we were very happy to sponsor that important resolution. The resolution recalls that certain human rights are recognized as non-derogable under any circumstances and that measures derogating from other rights must be exceptional and temporary in nature. It also gives an important role to

the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who has already made a very important contribution in his presentation to the CTC and also through his strong overall commitment to this cause.

The balance that needs to be struck between the enjoyment of human rights and security concerns is certainly difficult to assess in each individual case and is all the more delicate when it comes to dangers of unprecedented magnitude. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that there are existing legal standards that address this dilemma and that there is even extensive legal practice on questions of the protection of human rights in times of terrorism.

As the recent past has made very clear, the United Nations plays a unique role in upholding the rule of law and in providing legitimacy to action taken with regard to situations that threaten international peace and security. Given the potential and actual dangers the fight against terrorism poses to established human rights, this Organization is called upon once again to live up to its role in upholding the rule of law in this common fight.

The President: I call next on the representative of Peru.

Mr. De Rivero (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): In my capacity as Coordinator of the Rio Group, I am making this statement on behalf of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, countries members of the main political coordination mechanism in Latin America.

We thank Ambassador Greenstock for his briefing. The Rio Group wishes to convey to him our appreciation for the relevant work done at the head of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). The Committee's achievements, reflected in the high level of cooperation among States, the submission of information concerning national implementation of measures to combat terrorism and the strengthening of technical cooperation in that regard, attest to the very sound leadership of Ambassador Greenstock.

Scarcely two weeks ago, on 7 February, a terrorist attack perpetrated in a social club in the centre of Bogotá again reminded us of terrorism's criminal and aberrant nature and of the serious threat that it poses to the peace and security of our countries. The Rio Group communiqué of 8 February, as well as resolution 837 (1354/03) of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) of 12 February, expressed their most vehement rejection and condemnation of that act and reaffirmed the intention to continue to cooperate to eradicate terrorism. We also endorse Security Council resolution 1465 (2003), which expresses condolences to the people and the Government of Colombia with regard to that that terrorist act.

We must put an end to this scourge through all the means provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and in international treaties and norms, including those specified in the legal structure of the Organization of American States itself. The international community must act firmly, respecting the rule of law, international law and, in particular, human rights and humanitarian law. There is no other solution. The integrity, stability, democracy and freedom of our countries are at stake.

Mindful of that reality, the countries members of the Rio Group have shown a prompt concern to work together to develop policies and actions to defeat terrorism. Evidence of that was seen in the Specialized Inter-American Conferences on Terrorism, held in Lima in 1996 and in Mar del Plata in 1998, which led to the creation of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism within the framework of the Organization of American States. The Committee is carrying out intensive cooperation activities aimed at preventing, combating and eliminating terrorist acts and activities in accordance with work plans that are agreed upon periodically.

Recently, the third regular session of the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, held in January 2003, adopted the Declaration of San Salvador on Strengthening Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism. Moreover, in June 2002, we adopted the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism. The Convention obligates all States of the Americas to prevent, combat and eradicate the financing of terrorism and to engage in effective cooperation to combat it.

The Rio Group supports the declaration annexed to resolution 1456 (2003), adopted by the Security Council meeting at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs on 20 January, as well as the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), established

pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001). All the members of the Rio Group have complied by submitting initial reports and supplementary reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The gravity of the terrorist threat requires constant dialogue as well as intensified international cooperation and assistance in order to enable us to adopt effective measures to prevent, combat and eliminate this evil.

As pointed out in resolution 1377 (2001), in resolution 1456 (2003) and in other relevant resolutions, the fight against terrorism demands resolute cooperation, not only of States but also of regional and subregional organizations and of the relevant agencies of the United Nations system. In that regard, the Rio Group, which has welcomed the significant regional progress made with regard to combating terrorism, looks forward with interest to the convening of the 7 March meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, aimed at improving the flow of information about experiences, standards and practices and at coordinating the activities under way. We trust that that exercise will contribute to a joint plan of action in which each body will exploit its special characteristics to the utmost in the quest for a comprehensive measure to combat terrorism.

It is obvious that terrorism is not limited to the criminal activities of one particular organization or region. In that context, the Security Council — which has affirmed that acts of terrorism are unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation and of who commits them — must bear that consideration in mind in its efforts to identify, deter and punish those responsible for terrorist acts.

In addition, the Rio Group believes that the draft comprehensive convention against terrorism cannot be further delayed. The difficulty we have encountered in finding a comprehensive and precise definition of terrorism does not justify its postponement. Rather, it is a challenge facing the international community, which must respond to that challenge in a responsible and timely way. Therefore, we remain hopeful that dialogue and understanding will enable us to conclude the work on the draft convention in the near future.

The new demands of international cooperation require all Member States to maintain a constant attitude of vigilance and prevention, identifying and punishing activities that promote and defend violence within their jurisdictions as early signs of the knitting together of terrorist networks and of possible preparations for terrorist attacks. We cannot remain indifferent to the activities of persons or groups who obviously support terrorist organizations or who use the openness of free societies to support terrorist activities financially, politically or publicly. For that reason, we in the Rio Group welcome the legislation adopted by various countries that applies strict monitoring, tracking and punishment measures against those responsible for terrorist acts, as well as against those committing any act, of collaboration or fund-raising on their behalf.

We must adopt a zero tolerance policy against terrorism and redouble international cooperation in all fields in order to counter terrorism.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Ukraine.

Mr. Kuchinsky (Ukraine): I should like first of all to thank the German presidency for organizing today's meeting. I wish to extend our gratitude to the delegation of France for its important initiative of holding the ministerial meeting on this issue last month, which in fact gave new impetus to our common endeavours.

Despite the fact that the world's attention is focused today on the Iraqi issue, the question of combating terrorism remains a top priority on the international agenda. Moreover, under the present circumstances, it is of critical importance to take further steps towards achieving the unity and coherence of the global anti-terrorism coalition.

Terrorism continues to be a major threat to international peace and security. After the events of 11 September 2001, the outbursts of terror in Moscow, Bali, Mombasa and Bogota reminded us that the problem of terrorism requires sustained, long-term and global action. In our view, the Security Council should continue to play a central role in promoting cooperation between Governments in the fight against terrorism, as was reiterated in the recently adopted ministerial declaration of the Council.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), for its part, is making an extremely important practical contribution to the strengthening of anti-terrorism capabilities at the national, regional and global levels. We are pleased that the CTC has established constructive dialogue with Member States, first of all,

in the spheres of strengthening national legislations and of combating terrorism financing. I should like also to express the full support of Ukraine for the efforts of the Committee to help countries to improve their counter-terrorism capabilities, specifically by developing the directory of sources of advice and expertise in the areas covered by resolution 1373 (2001).

However, this is only one part of the complex task confronting the Organization in its multifaceted undertaking. Others include addressing such global afflictions as arms smuggling, drug production and trafficking, and money-laundering. Every effort should be exerted to eliminate hatred and ethnic and religious intolerance, which continue to constitute a breeding ground for numerous conflicts. Recent developments in the world have underlined the importance of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related technologies. The delegation of Ukraine welcomes the fact that these issues were underlined in the recently adopted ministerial declaration of the Security Council. We consider it to be an important step towards ensuring the universality of all our endeavours in these directions.

As terrorism is a threat of a complex character, the issue of combating the legalization of proceeds from crime — which constitute one of the major sources of terrorism financing — has become especially vital. In this regard, the high requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund represent a strong contribution to the consolidation of the efforts of the world community to prevent and rebuff these socially dangerous phenomena.

The Government of Ukraine fully supports the international measures in this sphere, demonstrating its openness and readiness for cooperation. Paramount attention is being paid to the establishment of a comprehensive national system of combating money-laundering and terrorism financing. Most recently, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a set of laws on the prevention of and counteraction to the legalization of the proceeds from crime. The Government has approved a programme of counteraction to the legalization of proceeds from crime for 2003. Today, the main task for Ukraine is to implement effectively its new anti-money-laundering legislation in order to eradicate any kind of possible support for terrorism.

In our view, the exchange of information and sustained interaction between States, first of all on the regional level, has great potential for strengthening the global anti-terrorism coalition. In this context, various international conferences, forums and symposia greatly help to facilitate inter-State cooperation. One such international conference, of the Central and Eastern European States' experts on illegal immigration, was recently held in Kiev. It worked out a set of proposals for an international strategy to limit the spread of terrorism by strengthening immigration regimes. We believe that the conclusion of this and many other conferences will further deepen and contribute to our struggle against terrorism and deepen regional interaction aimed at combating terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration and other threats.

I will not focus on our national reports, which were submitted to the Committee, but let me stress one point. With the entry into force for Ukraine of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in January this year, my country has become a party to all universal conventions and protocols on international terrorism.

Finally, I should like to express our gratitude to the Committee and to Ambassador Greenstock for his outstanding contribution to its work. I also wish that important body and its new Bureau every success in their future work. Let me reiterate Ukraine's readiness to continue closely cooperating with the CTC for the benefit of our common cause.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of Colombia, on whom I now call.

Mr. Giraldo (Colombia) (*spoke in Spanish*): Colombia welcomes and fully subscribes to the statement made by the Permanent Representative of Peru on behalf of the Rio Group. However, the Government of Colombia has decided to make a statement in this open debate of the Security Council in connection with the item "Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts" because the terrorists acts that my country has suffered in recent months demonstrate the international dimension of the Colombian internal conflict.

In the name of the people and the Government of Colombia, allow me to extend our gratitude to this Council for the adoption last Thursday of resolution 1465 (2003) condemning the terrorist attack in Bogota

on 7 February, in which 35 persons, a number of children among them, were killed and close to 200 were injured.

Unfortunately, last Friday, the day following the adoption of that resolution, we had to lament not another car-bomb attack, but this time a house-bomb attack in the city of Neiva, in southern Colombia, that left 15 dead, several children among them, and more than 50 wounded and destroyed more than 70 homes belonging to poor people. Our country has undergone a surge in terrorism owing largely to the guerrillas of the so-called Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who have announced that there will be more terrorist acts of this kind.

The Government of Colombia wishes to offer a few thoughts in this open meeting of the Security Council on terrorism. In our already protracted conflict, there are nowadays two inseparable aspects: the internal and the external. Generally speaking, only the first is considered: killings, attacks, terrorism, bombs, anti-personnel mines, kidnappings, extortion and illicit drug trafficking are all committed by armed illegal perpetrators and are carried out within our territory.

With regard to this aspect, the Government of Colombia recognizes the obligations incumbent upon it. Taking as a paradigm respect for the constitution, the law, international treaties, human rights and international humanitarian law, my Government is stepping up the State's presence with larger numbers of better-trained soldiers and police officers with the mission to protect all Colombians. We seek to provide democratic security for civilians, unionists, human rights defenders, businesspeople and workers. This aspect, the internal one, is a variable that we Colombians must tackle and control.

But there is another aspect of which little is spoken, namely the external aspect. The attacks to which I have referred were made possible by the deadly alliance between drug traffickers and the guerrillas, who finance themselves through that activity. The death-dealing explosives were negotiated for and acquired abroad and were paid for through external bank accounts fed by the drug trafficking. The chemical precursors that are essential to produce the illicit drugs reach Colombia through similar procedures. Generally speaking, the same process is used for the weapons that fuel our conflict.

That is why Colombia cannot stand alone in its fight against terrorism and its inseparable ally within and outside of the country: the worldwide problem of illicit drugs. Without the cooperation of the international community, not only in terms of money, but also in terms of legal and police activities such as those required by resolution 1373 (2001), we shall not be able to combat this terrorism and its sponsor: drug trafficking.

For this reason we turn to the United Nations so that, in keeping with its role in difficult times, as far as the international aspects of the Colombian internal conflict are concerned, it may indicate a course to follow and induce the international community to support peoples and States that are striving to preserve the lofty principles of the Organization and that daily struggle to protect the dignity of individual human beings.

In reaffirming the support we expressed as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the work of the Council and its Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), under the wise leadership of Ambassador Greenstock, to combat this universal scourge, I wish to state our certainty that the Security Council will be able to meet the expectations of our peoples concerning its historic role in countering terrorism in all regions of the world.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Turkey, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Cengizer (Turkey): Only two days before the convening of this Security Council meeting, which deals with the international implications of modern forms of terrorism, a gruesome terrorist attack took place in the Republic of Korea. At the outset, therefore, I would like to extend our heartfelt condolences to the victims and convey the deepest sympathies of the Turkish people to the bereaved people of that friendly nation.

I also wish to congratulate our close friend Germany on successfully guiding the work of the Security Council during a very critical period, when diplomacy must show itself to be the art of conciliation that it in fact is and when we must all bring to the fore our best traditions.

Unfortunately, acts of cowardice like the most recent one that took the lives of more than 120 innocent people resonate throughout the world, and, in

a much undesired and equally twisted way, increase our awareness that, regardless of the many shapes that it cleverly assumes, terrorism in our time has indeed become a burning global issue that urgently requires greater and more effective international cooperation.

In this last incident, for instance, we witnessed how easy it has become to acquire lethal weaponry and carry it into the midst of hundreds of people. While the Korean authorities were not able to readily connect the motivations of the terrorist to yet another "higher cause", what he achieved laid bare the deadly degree of sophistication that terrorists have reached today, whether they act individually or as part of a group.

I am sure that every sane person in the world is wondering what ominous developments can possibly be taking place right now in many a clandestine quarter at a time when modern technological devices could end up in the hands of individuals or groups with terrorist intentions.

Let me say at this juncture that Turkey has aligned itself with the European Union statement to be made shortly by the representative of Greece. Yet, given the relevance of the Turkish experience, and also the imminent bearing that this matter has on current events, I am taking the floor with a view to further stressing a number of points.

I have already stressed one, namely that we urgently require greater and more effective international cooperation in combating terrorism. Indeed, we are dismayed to see that there are those who still equivocate when it comes to fully and completely denouncing terrorism. Whatever the merits of the need to address the so-called root causes of terrorism, it should be amply clear beforehand that we cannot start to grade and arrange in some neat order the forms of terrorism; nor can we rightfully grasp the motivations behind terrorism. We cannot come up with degrees of leniency towards terrorism. We cannot sensibly talk about "better terrorisms", because terrorism presumes violence, and terrorists are prepared to do everything in their power to achieve it. We have been saying that all along.

Today, Turkey does not doubt that the nature of the threat faced by the world remains unchanged. The terrorist attacks in Bali, Mombassa and Bogotá confirm that sustained long-term action, solidarity among nations and concerted international action are only a few of the basic ingredients that we continue to require today in our fight against this scourge.

Ultimately, let us not temper our resolve with grief and regret. Let us not allow endless theorizing to hijack the practicalities of our common defence against this enemy of mankind and civilization. We have been saying that all along. Let us now see the need for strengthened mutual respect so that we can in all sincerity pool the timeless wisdom of the East and of the West. Let us understand, and help everyone comprehend, that no higher cause can benefit from acts of terrorism.

No longer does terrorism only strike at the very core of democracy and civil society; no longer does terrorism only hamper social and economic development. It does more than that. It has started to kill the very essence of civilization. It has started to repudiate the fundamental tenets and founding principles of civilizations the world over. Terrorists, in fact, disown the causes for which they purport to speak and act. In effect, they make their so-called higher causes ignominious causes.

The world has had more than enough. The world has also had enough shoddy intellectualism. The world has had enough swayers, false prophets and spin doctors, all condoning, in one way or another, the inducement of fear and revulsion in masses of innocent people as a viable and genuine political method — and more often than not influencing States in that regard.

When we look into the history of terrorism, we clearly see that whenever political considerations exalt the idea of righteous murder, the basic truth of cold-blooded murder is immediately adulterated. Such was the case yesterday; it still is today. There is no way of getting around that basic fact — especially when confronted by a slain body.

That is why States should refrain from encouraging, assisting, facilitating and tolerating terrorist activities in their territory. Given the technical prowess of modern-day terrorists, and the capabilities of modern technology, as well as the relative ease of communications, transportation and border crossings, abetting terrorist groups has now become tantamount to knowingly organizing terrorist groups.

In a world where terrorists can plan and operate on a global scale, establishing institutionalized cooperation among States and ensuring the smooth

working of the relevant international conventions are stark priorities. Likewise, States should reinstate mechanisms to follow the flow of funds that are often coercively generated and controlled by suspected or overtly radical groups. Indeed, the nexus of money-laundering, arms trafficking and drug trafficking, which we so often encounter whenever we delve into the intricacies of worldwide networking among criminal and terrorist groups, cannot be allowed to fester so as to form part of yet another culture of impunity.

There is every reason for strengthened international cooperation, and we should take forthwith the necessary steps in that direction. No longer should terrorists groups be able to have such easy access to logistical means and instruments.

Last but not least, Turkey attaches the utmost importance to current work at the United Nations and supports the full and complete implementation of Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001), 1373 (2001) and others, which together constitute a solid framework for our Organization to play a role befitting its ideals and its unique universality. They should be recognized in their totality as an important breakthrough in our common struggle against terrorism. We also welcome the declaration annexed to Security Council resolution 1456 (2003) of 20 January, reaffirming the seriousness of the threat posed by terrorist acts and calling for further cooperation.

We highly commend the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and welcome its initiative to hold a special meeting with international, regional and subregional organizations on 7 March. We are grateful to its Chairman, Sir Jeremy Greenstock.

Turkey, a party to all 12 international United Nations conventions on this subject, looks forward to further progress in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly with regard to a draft comprehensive convention against international terrorism and on a draft international convention on the suppression of nuclear terrorism. They will complement the legal infrastructure that is in the making today.

I wish to conclude by calling upon all States to fully implement the bilateral, regional and multilateral anti-terrorist conventions to which they are parties. I also call upon those States that have not yet done so to become parties to the anti-terrorist conventions adopted under the auspices of this Organization.

Indeed, we must ensure that there is no safe haven for terrorists and resist all tendencies to entertain any remaining temptation in that regard.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of Yemen, on whom I now call.

Mr. Alsaidi (Yemen) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to take this opportunity once again to express our admiration to you, Mr. President, for the way in which you have been guiding the work of the Council. We would also like to thank your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of France.

When we review the actions of the Council in implementing its resolutions to combat international terrorism, we feel a sense of optimism with regard to the consensus within the Council and the United Nations as a whole in opposing that serious phenomenon. The declaration annexed to the recent Council resolution on this subject — resolution 1456 (2003) — provides for specific procedures and measures whose implementation is designed to provide significant impetus for concerted action in that sphere.

The position of the Republic of Yemen on international terrorism is well known; we have made it clear on many occasions. However, it is always important to reaffirm that the phenomenon of international terrorism remains one of the most serious issues facing the international community. Terrorism is a criminal act that is not directed at a specific culture, religion or race. It does not stop at the borders of States. It is a scourge that can strike all of us. It thus requires the coordination of efforts with a view to providing guidance based on a clear analysis of the causes of the phenomenon and an understanding of its underlying roots and of the remedies needed to combat those symptoms.

The Republic of Yemen is gratified that the international community is aware of the seriousness of the problem. We welcome the international consensus on the need to combat the scourge of terrorism with a view to its elimination. The Republic of Yemen was among the first States to draw attention to this phenomenon for one simple reason: the State of Yemen suffered from that scourge two years after its establishment. Terrorism is increasing in my country; 17 acts of terrorism have taken place there to date. There is no doubt that those acts were designed to destabilize the State, endanger peace and political security and hamper development efforts. We estimate

that the material damage resulting from that phenomenon is costing us $1.8 billion annually.

Aware of the seriousness of such destructive acts, the Government of the Republic of Yemen attaches priority to combating terrorism. We have adopted measures and procedures aimed at containing and eliminating terrorism. We will not list all of them here, but some of the measures have been described in the national report submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee in document S/2002/240, following the terrorist acts of 11 September 2001. The measures have also been described in the answers and clarifications provided to the Committee. The Government of the Republic of Yemen is working at the national level, in coordination with other States, including the United States, to implement further measures for the future. We will also be describing those to the Committee in future reports. We have also notified most regional and international conventions on terrorism. We are currently working on enacting further legislation on this subject.

With regard to the recent Council resolution in this area, we feel that international efforts lack the legal framework that should underlie policies and practices undertaken by States alone or collectively. We would like to reaffirm that the delegation of Yemen will spare no effort to achieve agreement on draft international convention, and we would like to thank India for its work on the draft text.

In this context, we associate ourselves with the view expressed by a number of delegations that an international convention must give equal emphasis to all terrorist acts, whether waged by individuals, groups or States. As a matter of principle, we will not be able to accept language that deprives peoples of their legitimate right to resist occupation, and we are committed to the principle that a distinction must be made between terrorism and legitimate resistance.

The international positions on the need to fight terrorism after the 11 September 2001 attacks give us cause for optimism. Specific and coordinated measures have been adopted, and affected and interested States have begun to implement those measures to bring an end to this scourge. However, certain practices do not in fact serve the cause that they are designed to serve and threaten international consensus on this issue. We have noticed that there is a ferocious campaign under way to falsely identify Islam with terrorism. This is slander intended to achieve insidious goals alien to our joint campaign against terrorism.

Many of us have warned of the danger of selectivity and double standards in the implementation of international resolutions, in particular those pertaining to the Middle East. We do not believe that Palestinians can be deprived of their legitimate right to resist occupation and settler colonialism. There are those who in effect endorse the crimes of the Israeli settlers and Israel's colonization policies.

In conclusion, I wish to express our gratitude for and acknowledgement of the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the efforts and wise leadership of its Chairman, Sir Jeremy Greenstock. I also wish to reaffirm our readiness to do everything we can to strengthen international cooperation and further develop the efforts to eliminate the scourge and evil of terrorism.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Greece.

Mr. Vassilakis (Greece): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union. The acceding countries Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the associated countries Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, and the European Free Trade Association member of the European Economic Area Norway have aligned themselves with this statement.

The European Union welcomes this new opportunity to hold an open debate on the issue of terrorism and to review the important task undertaken by the Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).

The crime of terrorism is one of the most serious common challenges facing the international community today. Terrorism constitutes an acute threat to internal and external security, to peaceful relations between States and to the development and functioning of democratic institutions and principles. The European Union categorically condemns all acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motivation, form and manifestation, and firmly believes that those who perpetrate, organize and sponsor terrorist acts must be brought to justice and duly punished.

The horrific terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 made it clear that terrorism is a global challenge and that the fight against it requires concerted global action. The fight against terrorism has been, and continues to be, a top priority for the European Union and its member States. The Union believes, however, that the fight against this scourge must be carried out in accordance with the rule of law and international law, including human rights law and, in the case of an armed conflict, humanitarian law.

The European Union recognizes the central role of the United Nations in this respect and remains committed to support the Organization in its endeavours in this field. Universal implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and other Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism is a matter of continuing priority and urgency to the Union and to its member States.

The European Union wishes to congratulate the CTC on carrying out its work with determination, dedication and transparency, and to offer to it its full support and cooperation. The Committee represents a milestone in the fight against terrorism, as it provides the Security Council with an effective follow-up mechanism to thoroughly monitor the universal implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). We would also like to pay tribute to the Chairman of the CTC, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, for the excellent job he has done. Under his guidance and advice the Committee has found its way to successfully deal with the many challenges it has faced and to chart a sure course for the future.

The European Union supports the confidential dialogue that the Committee has established with interested States, as well as the advice and guidance that it offers them with a view to implementing resolution 1373 (2001). That dialogue also allows the Committee to identify the need for technical assistance to those States and to communicate to donor States the needs for such assistance. As Sir Jeremy Greenstock pointed out at the Security Council ministerial meeting of 20 January, the majority of Member States throughout the world have begun to respond to the challenge laid down in resolution 1373 (2001). The European Union would like to urge Member States that have not yet submitted a report to the CTC to fulfil their obligation within the allocated time frame.

In that connection, the European Union welcomes the declaration annexed to resolution 1456 (2003), which was adopted by the Security Council at its ministerial meeting of 20 January and which reaffirms the severity of the threat posed by terrorist acts and calls on all States to take urgent action to prevent and suppress such acts. The declaration also calls upon the Counter-Terrorism Committee to intensify its efforts to promote the implementation by Member States of all aspects of resolution 1373 (2001).

The European Union also recognizes the role of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the Centre for International Crime Prevention to strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations in the prevention of terrorism and to offer advice on the implementation of both the pertinent Security Council resolutions and United Nations legal instruments against terrorism.

The European Union, for its part, is playing an important role in providing assistance to third countries in their efforts to better implement resolution 1373 (2001). In that respect, it has identified a number of pilot countries for the purpose of launching new assistance projects in the field of counter-terrorism. The criteria applied in the identification of those countries are relevance to the fight against terrorism, significance to European Union foreign policy, technical assistance needs, readiness to cooperate and the existence of European Union comparative advantages.

The European Union and its member States are fully committed to the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). The Union has already submitted three reports to the CTC, the first two of which are contained in documents S/2001/1297 and S/2002/928. The latest one was submitted last month with a view to the upcoming special meeting scheduled for 7 March 2003. Those reports detail specific action undertaken to implement resolution 1373 (2001). The latest report lists the recent legislation adopted by the Union in the areas covered by resolution 1373 (2001), as well as the regulatory measures that provide for the freezing of the funds, financial assets and economic resources of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorism and for the prohibition of the provision of financial services to them.

The European Union has also established an executive mechanism to prevent and suppress terrorist financing, through which it develops and reviews, on a

regular basis, a common list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts. In addition, plans are being developed to improve police cooperation and enhance judicial cooperation in member States. The European arrest warrant, which provides for simplified surrender procedures between judicial authorities of member States based upon the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions, also covers terrorist offences.

The European Union has also developed close cooperation with third countries in the field of counter-terrorism, particularly through an expanded structured dialogue. In that respect, anti-terrorism clauses have been included in the Union's contractual relations with third countries. Close cooperation on these issues has also been established between the European Union and regional bodies.

The European Union is of the view that the 12 United Nations conventions and protocols and their implementation play a pivotal role in the fight against terrorism, and its member States are committed to the ratification and rapid implementation of all those conventions through the adoption of Common Position 930 of the Council of the European Union, of 27 December 2001.

The European Union also supports the early conclusion by consensus of negotiations on the draft comprehensive convention on terrorism and the adoption of the draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, in particular in view of the risk posed by certain terrorist groups that have gained access to weapons of mass destruction.

The European Union wishes to express its full support for the statement made by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2002/38) on behalf of the Council on 17 December 2002, in which the Security Council notes the key role played by international, regional and subregional organizations in supporting Government capacity-strengthening on counter-terrorism and in furthering the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). In the same statement, the Security Council encourages the CTC to build a dialogue with international, regional and subregional organizations in areas covered by resolution 1373 (2001). The Council also requests the CTC, with a view to improving the flow of information on experiences, standards and best practices and to coordinating ongoing activity, to invite all relevant international, regional and subregional organizations to a special meeting on 7 March 2003.

The European Union is also of the view that regional, international and subregional organizations play an important role in the fight against terrorism and that closer cooperation with the CTC would enhance their efforts and would contribute to a better implementation by their member States of their obligations in this field. The European Union welcomes the convening of the special meeting of the CTC and believes that the meeting will provide a good opportunity for those participating in it to explore the matters that are covered by the declaration of the Security Council of 20 January 2003 (resolution 1456 (2003), annex), as was also requested by the Security Council.

The European Union also noted that some proposals were made during the Security Council's ministerial-level meeting dedicated to counter-terrorism held on 20 January in order to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the fight against terrorism. It is the wish of the European Union that follow-up be given to those proposals in the competent organs of the United Nations.

With respect to the latter aspect, on 10 December 2001 the European Union launched a targeted initiative aimed at reducing the risk of non-State actors gaining access to weapons of mass destruction, radioactive materials and means of delivery. That initiative, which was supplemented by a list of concrete implementation measures adopted by European Union foreign ministers on 15 April 2002, encompasses the following four main elements: strengthening the relevant multilateral instruments in the field of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation; improving export controls; strengthening disarmament cooperation; and enhancing political dialogue with third States.

The President: I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina.

Mr. Cappagli (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Argentine Republic associates itself with the statement made by Peru on behalf of the Rio Group. We are grateful for this opportunity to continue the debate on international terrorism, which the foreign ministers of countries members of the Security Council began on 20 January. In Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya and Russia, among other places, there have recently

been terrible attacks of horrifying brutality, which make this debate all the more relevant.

In 1992, international terrorism attacked the Argentine Republic, destroying the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires. In 1994, the attack on Argentina was repeated with the destruction of the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina, the most important organization of the Jewish community in Argentina. Those two attacks left more than 100 dead. The organization that carried out those attacks was mistaken if it thought it was attacking only the Jewish community in my country. They were an attack on the entire community of Argentina, and Argentina understood them as such.

More than a decade ago, referring to the 17 March 1992 attack, the Foreign Minister of the Argentine Republic, Guido di Tella, stated in the General Assembly that,

> "As for terrorism, there can be no questions, only an answer in the form of the strongest, most determined and implacable commitment of each State to struggle against it until it is eradicated." (*A/47/PV.5, p. 77*)

On 27 July 1994, after the second terrorist attack to which I referred, my country sent a letter urging the Security Council to step up cooperation to counter such crimes (S/1994/890). The Council echoed that request in its presidential statement of 29 July of that year (S/PRST/1994/40).

Argentina has always maintained, and repeated during its recent term on the Security Council, that it regards all terrorist acts without exception to be criminal and unjustifiable. The criminal character of terrorism is independent of whatever motivation or justification is invoked. Nothing excuses it. Terrorism is a grave threat to international peace and security. My country condemns unreservedly all acts of terrorism and reaffirms the need to step up international cooperation to prevent and combat them. In the view of the Argentine Republic, this struggle should be legally legitimate and grounded in respect for international law, human rights and the United Nations Charter, as is stated, inter alia, in General Assembly resolution 48/122 on human rights and terrorism.

In order to maximize its strength, terrorism joins forces with transnational crime, uses new technologies, obtains weapons of mass destruction and exploits loopholes in the world financial system. That trend can be seen, for example, in the case of Colombia, where terrorism has allied itself with drug trafficking.

Just as this crime transcends the borders of a given country, the response to it must necessarily also transcend borders. As the Secretary-General affirmed, the United Nations enjoys a unique position for building a universal coalition to guarantee global legitimacy in the long-term response to terrorism. Its role is therefore essential, and Argentina supports it unreservedly.

Terrorism is an assault on human life and seeks to destroy principles, rules of civilization and values that are common to all humanity. It is a murderous, pitiless, inhuman and ferocious phenomenon that disrupts the coexistence of human beings. For that reason, it is one of the most serious and certain threats to the peace of the planet. The Security Council, the General Assembly, the specialized United Nations agencies and regional organizations have long recognized that.

Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Security Council set up the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which has demonstrated its effectiveness under the intelligent leadership of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, to whom we pay tribute for his work.

Argentina has supported all provisions of resolution 1373 (2001), and from the outset it has cooperated with the Committee, which is a vital tool for coordinating counter-terrorism activities. My country has submitted the report required under paragraph 6 of the resolution and a second, supplementary report.

We feel that, in addition to help States improve their legislation, the Committee should cooperate in monitoring their practical implementation. Cooperation with regional organizations is also important, in our view, and should be expanded. We therefore welcome the initiative of increasing such contacts and of holding a meeting with those organizations on 7 March.

Successful global cooperation to counter terrorism must be based on a universally valid legal framework. For that reason, we urge States to ratify existing conventions. We agree that there is a need to redouble efforts to reach consensus on the draft comprehensive convention and the convention on nuclear terrorism.

There is another aspect of the combat against terrorism that we should not overlook. The Secretary-General, on 20 January, reminded us that, just as terrorism cannot be justified, neither we ignore the injustices that criminals use as a pretext for it — injustices such as extreme poverty, for example.

Underlying all these problems of insecurity are the tremendous injustices and inequities besetting the international community at this time. Only two years ago, we adopted the Millennium Declaration, a text that now has more force and validity than ever. Its purposes and goals should have assisted us in taking broader approaches to defeating groups that feel themselves to be marginalized and desperate and that use those root causes as an excuse for terrorism.

However, since the Millennium Declaration, much has happened, and many new factors have emerged that are causing fear, mistrust, poverty and despair. We must understand that the concept of security is now broader than it was traditionally.

We note with gratification that the Security Council has begin to consider these problems expressly. The declaration on combating terrorism of 12 November 2001 affirms that development-related issues must be addressed in order to wage a broader war against that scourge. Extreme poverty and the internal and external causes that contribute to causing it are not, therefore, irrelevant to the agenda of the Council, in that they serve as a pretext for serious threats to security.

The countries of the Group of Seven — a number of which are represented here on the Council — will understand that this is something they must see and that they can do something in the effort to resolve these problems, which, to a large extent, stem from unjust trade barriers and the failure to meet targets for official development assistance, technology transfer and investment.

We should not overlook the climate of despair that generates insecurity and terrorism. The industrialized countries and the developing ones will one day have to form a coalition for prosperity and justice, the two most effective instruments to free the world of insecurity, thereby depriving of their arguments those who so perversely exploit the needs and the despair of the peoples of the developing countries.

The President: The next speaker is the representative of South Africa, to whom I give the floor.

Ms. Ndhlovu (South Africa): Mr. President, I would like to convey my delegation's appreciation to you for convening this important follow-up discussion to the 20 January ministerial-level debate on combating terrorism. I would like also to thank Ambassador Greenstock of the United Kingdom for the exemplary manner in which he has chaired the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). Under Ambassador Greenstock's chairmanship, the Counter-Terrorism Committee has set new standards of transparency for the Security Council and has established effective dialogue with States Members of the United Nations on how best to enhance our collective capacity to combat the scourge of international terrorism.

South Africa and other African countries have fully engaged in the process of self-assessment of our legislative and executive machinery, initiated by resolution 1373 (2001). With the assistance of the CTC's counter-terrorism experts, we have identified areas that need to be strengthened in our legislative framework for combating terrorism, and we are taking the necessary corrective actions. South Africa has submitted three comprehensive national reports pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) and will continue to work closely with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Security Council in order further to refine and improve national and regional counter-terrorism capabilities. South Africa has also seconded one of its experts in drafting counter-terrorism legislation to serve in the CTC's core group of experts.

The ministerial-level debate in the Security Council on 20 January highlighted the importance of preserving the remarkable and unprecedented level of international cooperation that has existed in fighting terrorism since the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and the recent terrorist attacks carried out in Indonesia, Colombia, the Russian Federation and Kenya. Some speakers rightly stressed the fact that we should not allow ourselves to become divided by new and controversial military campaigns that would only distract our focus from the fight against terrorism.

The message that clearly emanated from the ministerial debate is that no individual Government can hope to unilaterally defeat non-State terrorist actors that operate with sophisticated technologies,

communications and resources on a global scale, virtually oblivious to State boundaries. It is equally apparent that multilateral cooperation and respect for international law, human rights and global norms regarding the protection of civil liberties should constitute the bedrock of our collective effort to eradicate the scourge of terrorism.

As the Council correctly stated in the declaration annexed to resolution 1456 (2003),

> "terrorism can only be defeated, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, by a sustained comprehensive approach involving the active participation and collaboration of all States, international and regional organizations, and by redoubled efforts at the national level."

Such a comprehensive approach necessitates addressing the root causes of terrorism, such as poverty, human rights abuses and foreign occupation. Terrorists take advantage of the sense of despair and frustration that breeds wherever people are forced to live without hope and without freedom. No legislative measures and no amount of police action, intelligence-gathering or military force can ever guarantee our safety as long as the basic needs of millions of disaffected and marginalized people across the world continue to be overlooked.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East, where the Palestinian people have been subjected to the devastating impact of more than 30 years of illegal occupation and the daily humiliations and sufferings associated with Israel's violent policy of settlement expansionism. The success or failure of the Security Council's counter-terrorism efforts largely depends on how it addresses crises such as those in Palestine and other occupied territories.

Terrorism is but one of a number of often interrelated threats to our security. In southern Africa, as in many other parts of the world, millions of people are still threatened by starvation and poverty. State resources that are already stretched to breaking point in some countries to address the issue of food security are ill-equipped to handle the complexities of counter-terrorism. It is therefore important that the Security Council harbour realistic expectations of Member States and intensify its efforts to make counter-terrorism assistance available to those in need. I make this point because the CTC will soon expect States to take more substantive measures to combat terrorism.

One specific issue South Africa would like the Security Council and the CTC to consider relates to public perceptions with regard to terrorism. Many countries, particularly in the developed North, issue vague, non-specific and unsubstantiated statements or advisories warning their citizens of the potential threat of terrorist attacks abroad. Such unsubstantiated and selective statements have a negative impact not only on a country's standing, but also on its security situation. Furthermore, such advisories could cause immense damage to the economies of the developing nations of the South by adversely affecting foreign investment and tourism.

The reality, however, is that the threat of terrorism is as great, if not greater, in the cities and tourist resorts of the North. It is my Government's view that, in instances where credible intelligence concerning potential terrorist attacks is obtained, that information should be handed over the to the relevant foreign authorities so that preventive action may be taken.

South Africa and other African countries remain firmly committed to the fight against terrorism and look forward to increased interaction and ongoing cooperation with other States, the Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Security Council on this issue.

The President: I call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Zarif (Islamic Republic of Iran): Allow me to begin by expressing my appreciation to you, Mr. President, for having convening this meeting, to the Secretary-General for his thoughtful remarks on 20 January and to Ambassador Greenstock for his able leadership and his briefing to the Council.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a country that has suffered immensely from acts of terrorism, has a strong interest in the subject and is determined to leave no stone unturned in achieving the objectives set out in Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). In this process, we have thus far submitted our initial and supplementary reports to the Committee. With a view to implementing the resolution, my Government has established a National Coordination Committee to facilitate the implementation of the resolution. As a result, while many existing laws make terrorist acts

punishable, two pieces of comprehensive draft legislation, namely the Anti-Terrorism Act and the Anti-Money-Laundering Act, are under consideration in the Cabinet and the Parliament. The latter, in accordance with Security Council resolutions, aims at setting out a legal and practical mechanism to effectively halt financial and other support to terrorist organizations and groups, while the former addresses the issue in all its other aspects. Pending their adoption, and in conformity with existing laws, practical arrangements have also been made to increase security in sensitive areas and to enhance the anti-money-laundering mechanisms of the banking system.

Special measures adopted along Iran's long and porous eastern border, right after the tragedy of 11 September 2001, with a view to interdicting Al Qaeda infiltration, continue consistently. Iranian law enforcement agencies are also engaged in extensive operations to arrest any suspected terrorists that might have entered Iranian territory from neighbouring countries. As a result of such activities, thus far several hundred foreign nationals suspected of being involved in terrorist activities have been arrested and then handed over to the Governments of their countries of origin.

Terrorism is a persistent menace that requires a continued global response. The tragic loss of life in terrorist attacks such as those committed in the past several months clearly demonstrates that success in countering the threat remains elusive. It underlines the need for continued and more extensive cooperation at the international level, which can be possible and effective only if the United Nations plays a central and coordinating role by setting effective international norms and issuing a clear message about the unacceptability of acts of violence targeting civilians.

Undoubtedly, more cooperation on combating terrorism requires more understanding among nations and less tension and conflict. As the Secretary-General emphasized in the Council on 20 January 2003,

> "we must never lose sight of the fact that any sacrifice of freedom or the rule of law within States — or any generation of new tensions between States in the name of anti-terrorism — will hand the terrorists a victory that no act of theirs alone could possibly bring". (*S/PV.4688, p. 3*)

I should also caution against some attempts aimed at seeking to misuse the campaign against terror by denigrating and suppressing the legitimate rights of peoples, particularly the people of Palestine, to self-determination. Undoubtedly, such misuse does not help advance the fight against terrorism.

Before concluding, I would like to underline the necessity of addressing more seriously and in an institutionalized framework the strong links among terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational organized crime. The Islamic Republic of Iran has suffered tremendously in combating drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan. Today, in spite of the efforts of the Afghan Government, drug trafficking continues to provide the financial backbone of terrorists and forces of instability in Afghanistan, threatening the impressive achievement of the international community and the Afghan people.

Given the fact that drug trafficking is inseparable from terrorism and is being carried out by well-organized and well-equipped international gangs that enjoy connections in various continents, there should be no doubt that combating it goes beyond the resources of individual countries. In that context, we view as welcome developments the reference, in paragraph 4 of resolution 1373 (2001), to "the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs..." and other things, and the emphasis in the same paragraph on

> "the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security".

We note that the CTC has yet to take action with a view to implementing that paragraph of the resolution. It is our hope and expectation that the Committee will consider measures to address that important aspect of global terrorism as well.

The President: I call next on the representative of Albania.

Mr. Dilja (Albania): Let me state at the very beginning how appropriate my delegation finds this open debate on the very important issue of combating terrorism. We thank you for this, Mr. President, and feel deeply motivated to make our contribution here.

Let me also pay tribute to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and to its Chairman, Ambassador Greenstock, for the excellent stewardship and excellent work in ensuring implementation by all Member States of an effective counter-terrorism strategy. The CTC has really become an important and respected agent for international consensus on counter-terrorism. I would like to reiterate that my delegation shares the determination of the Security Council to keep up the momentum of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and fully supports the ministerial declaration recently adopted by resolution 1456 (2003). We consider it to set the agenda for a further thrust in the fight against terrorism, and we agree with its messages and recommendations, and intend to comply with them.

Terrorism is global. We have all agreed to simply translate that as global responsibility for fighting it — as the responsibility of any one of the members of the global community. Our delegation is aware of that responsibility and, with precisely that awareness, comes here today to reconfirm its active membership in the international coalition against terrorism.

The memory of the victims of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and of the victims of subsequent attacks in Moscow, Karachi, Bali, and other places forever inspires us to fight terrorism with the utmost determination. It also reminds us that terrorism threatens all countries and all peoples. From that sad history, we all draw the lesson that in the face of terrorism, we are duty-bound to mobilize collectively and to undertake constant vigorous action — all of us together and each of us separately — in order to fight it with clear goals and positive results. The Government of Albania commends all that has already been done at the United Nations in the fight against terrorism. We appreciate the vital role played by the Security Council, and we acknowledge, in particular, the activity of the indispensable CTC. Albania fully recognizes its obligations as a Member of this international body and firmly declares that it will remain an active participant and collaborator in the global coalition against terrorism.

We are fully aware that much more remains to be done, and that we need to do better. We should mobilize greater resources and should be vigilant and committed, not be tolerant, not content to rest on our laurels. We should be more imaginative. We are fully aware that we should, in particular, redouble our efforts at the national level in any area that is directly or indirectly related to terrorism or that facilitates a terrorist environment and terrorist activity, such as organized crime, illicit drugs, drug trafficking or money-laundering, among other things.

Our awareness is also being translated into action — affirmative action — supported and assisted by any international sources of assistance and guidance available to us. The Albanian Government and Albanian institutions have made counter-terrorism a major priority on their agendas. The implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) is a daily endeavour for us. We have focused on the areas that need to be tackled first. We have worked to adopt legislation covering various aspects of resolution 1373 (2001), and we shall continue to do so. We are constantly working to establish an effective executive mechanism for the prevention of terrorist financing. We have ratified or are in the process of ratifying various international conventions and protocols related to terrorism.

Our delegation urges this international body, the Security Council, and the Counter-Terrorism Committee to continue to keep this issue at the top of their agendas, to continue to recognize and shoulder this special responsibility and to continue to call on any Member State — including my country — for responsible action. We should all help to ensure that the CTC remains — as Ambassador Greenstock nicely and correctly put it — a committee with a continued sense of purpose, direction and momentum. Albania will provide its modest contribution. We shall take our place and shall remain in the front seats aboard the anti-terrorist vehicle that the Committee is driving.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that terrorism is a universal evil and that it calls for a universal fight. We should win that fight; our fate is in our hands. A famous philosopher defined history as the sum total of things that could have been avoided. My delegation's firm conviction is that, together, we shall write the history of this global endeavour against terrorism as the sum total of the good things that did happen: as a history of success.

The President: The next speaker on my list is the representative of Canada, to whom I give the floor.

Mr. Heinbecker (Canada) (*spoke in* French): Canada wishes to express its gratitude to the Security Council for having organized this public debate on threats to international peace and security. We note that this is, in fact, the continuation of a debate begun a

month ago at a meeting that resulted in the creation of resolution 1456 (2003). We should like to take this opportunity to express our opinion on that resolution, as well as on the larger United Nations framework devoted to the fight against terrorism.

Canada believes that resolution 1456 (2003) makes an important contribution to the foundation laid by resolution 1373 (2001) and to the existing international legal counter-terrorism framework.

(*spoke in English*)

An important thread woven throughout this most recent resolution is cooperation. We have all come to understand the interdependence of our current security environment. Where one of our partners is vulnerable to terrorist exploitation, we are all put at risk.

It is in our mutual interest to enhance our cooperation in the fight against terrorism. Canada views the creation of an international framework of linked mutual legal assistance treaties as an important step in the fight against international terrorism and transnational crime. Such treaties allow our respective judicial and law-enforcement agencies access to witnesses and alleged suspects of crime. Other agreements, such as memorandums of understanding, are valuable tools that allow the exchange of security, intelligence and information related to law enforcement between individual agencies.

Canada also supports the Security Council's call for States to assist one another to improve their capacity to prevent and fight terrorism. Canadian federal departments and agencies have provided training, funding and expertise to more than 40 States worldwide to help combat terrorism and fight against transnational crime. We will do more.

As with official development assistance, donor States need to avoid duplication and to ensure that gaps are filled in the provision of counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance. It is important to avoid increasing the administrative burden on recipient States. Canada is working with some donors to this end, but we would encourage other interested donors to join with us in exchanging information.

We have always looked to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) as a focal point for the coordination of counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance, and we hope that that will remain a priority focus for the CTC under the Spanish chairmanship. If anything, we are looking for more guidance from the CTC on priorities and on ways that Canada, as a donor and non-Council-member State, can help. The Counter-Terrorism Committee has, in our view, capably fulfilled its mandate to date, and we wish to congratulate Ambassador Greenstock on his leadership.

As resolution 1456 (2003) notes, there is a need to strengthen controls on nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials. International treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, are key mechanisms to help strengthen disarmament objectives and curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Canada is actively participating in the negotiations on an amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. We look forward to a successful conclusion of negotiations next month. To support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to strengthen the physical protection of nuclear facilities worldwide, the Government of Canada will be making an additional extrabudgetary voluntary contribution of $100,000 to the IAEA's nuclear security action plan. Canada believes that the IAEA has a pivotal role to play in providing assistance to those Member States that may have inappropriate or insufficient levels of physical security at nuclear facilities. We remain committed to supporting the Agency's work in that regard.

Export control supplier regimes — such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group, in which Canada is very active — also help to ensure that materials and technology that can contribute to the spread of weapons of mass destruction do not end up in unwanted hands. In this area, an ounce of prevention has become a ton of cure.

In resolution 1456 (2003), we note the Security Council's emphasis on creating a climate of mutual tolerance and respect as an important component in a holistic approach to combating terrorism. In Canada's multicultural context, it would be impossible to talk about counter-terrorism measures without being intimately aware of the potential implications for minorities. These potential implications were in the forefront of our reflections at the time we drafted Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act. That Act also sends a

clear message not just on terrorism, but also against acts of hatred and discrimination.

Canada subscribes to this holistic approach, which seeks to address situations of conflict and violence as a part of the broader fight against terrorism. We believe that just and equitable societies are best equipped to prevent terrorism. Their populations are less likely to be vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Canadians have long promoted human rights, good governance and democratic development as essential to the development of stable and secure societies. The Government of Canada is resolved to enhance cooperation with our international partners to combat terrorism.

The President: The next speaker inscribed on my list is the representative of El Salvador, on whom I now call.

Mr. Lagos Pizzati (El Salvador) (*spoke in Spanish*): I wish to begin my statement by congratulating you, Sir, on behalf of my delegation for the way in which you are presiding over this very important United Nations organ this month, at a momentous time for the future of international relations and, in particular, for the Organization, the highest expression of multilateralism.

We also congratulate Ambassador Greenstock on his presentation in his capacity as Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. We commend him for all that he has achieved.

While we reaffirm our full support for the statement made by the representative of Peru on behalf of the Rio Group, of which we are a member, we wish to take this opportunity to offer some additional comments on an issue of great interest to each and every member of the international community by virtue of its implications and grave consequences for stability, democratic institutionality and development, as well as for our peoples' effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations represents a global threat, the characteristics of which are so unique that they can be only addressed jointly by means of concerted and united efforts and close cooperation, which we believe should continue to be principally coordinated by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, pursuant to the mandate embodied in resolution 1373 (2001).

We wish to reaffirm that, since the adoption of that resolution, along with those subsequently adopted by the Security Council on this issue, the Government of El Salvador has taken the necessary provisions and steps at the national and subregional levels to fulfil its obligations and responsibilities under those resolutions, offering its cooperation and support at all times to the Counter-Terrorism Committee in the execution of its mandate.

In this respect, on 20 December 2001, the Government of El Salvador, pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), presented its first report on measures adopted or to be adopted to combat international terrorism. The report was followed by the submission of two supplementary reports, one presented in June 2002 and another to be sent today to the Chairman of the Committee. Each contains responses to the comments of the Counter-Terrorism Committee regarding the first reports.

Accordingly, we reaffirm once again the readiness of the Government of El Salvador to make the necessary efforts to cooperate with the Counter-Terrorism Committee in implementing resolution 1373 (2001). I would note that, in order to achieve better results to that end, we are awaiting an opportunity to meet with a member of the Committee to determine the kind of assistance that El Salvador requires to supplement and increase its capacity to combat terrorism.

El Salvador has demonstrated its commitment to the struggle against terrorism at the regional level by serving as the Chairman of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism, which held its third regular session in San Salvador from 22 to 24 January 2003. On that occasion, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of El Salvador, Ms. María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, reaffirmed that

> "El Salvador is absolutely ready to continue to join in efforts aimed at the common objective of preventing terrorism from afflicting our civilization and way of life".

At that meeting, the Committee adopted the Declaration of San Salvador on strengthening cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The Declaration urges the States of the inter-American system that have not yet done so to accede to the United Nations conventions and protocols on terrorism and other related international instruments. It also

reaffirmed our commitment to bolstering cooperation among States and regional and world organizations.

I wish to inform the Council that the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador last week ratified the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, together with the additional protocols. The corresponding instruments of ratification will be deposited in the next few days. Our accession to these important instruments has closed gaps in our legislation, providing us with a legal framework that will further advance national endeavours to combat that scourge to all mankind.

In conclusion, I express our appreciation to the Counter-Terrorism Committee for its work and to the Security Council for convening this open debate, which has enabled us to exchange views on the issue of combating international terrorism.

The President: I now call on the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee to address some of the problems and questions that have been raised in the debate.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock: I will not take long. I wish first to thank Member States for their interventions this morning, which have been interesting and very positive, and to express appreciation to them also for the tremendous amount of hard work that is going into the whole process of the interaction between the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and Member States. What they are doing in their capitals and what they are doing in their delegations matters a tremendous amount to them, and it is nearly all being done very well.

I think there is a sense from this morning of overall support and momentum from Member States, which is extremely important to the CTC. Members of that Committee are very conscious that we have to continue to earn it in the future, but it is vital to us.

I think it was the representative of Fiji who talked about the many threads of our activity in this very complex operation against a nasty threat. In the Committee, we have become increasingly conscious that we have to create a global network. It has to be pervasive and comprehensive, and that, increasingly, is what we are trying to do. I think it is reflected very well in the declaration contained in resolution 1456 (2003). I think it is reflected in the CTC's response to that, which — although it looks quite bureaucratic in the follow-up paper that we have put round behind my remarks this morning — is very comprehensive and becoming increasingly operational. I think Member States are appreciating that.

I want to assure Members of the United Nations that, in that follow-up — I think it was the representatives of Egypt and South Africa who referred to this point — we will take Member States on their merits. There are different capacities and different speeds of work that are possible. So long as every Member State is working to its own full capacity, then it has a willing partner in the Counter-Terrorism Committee. There was an enormous amount of comment — a very encouraging amount of comment — on the regional activity that is going on. Paragraph 5 of the declaration annexed to resolution 1456 (2003) says, "States should assist each other to improve their capacity", and States are beginning to do that.

I want to be invidious for a moment and say that, in my personal view, the Organization of American States is still, in the lead amongst regional organizations for its cohesiveness and for the detail that it is putting into its programmes. But all the regional organizations are way ahead of where they were 18 months ago. I think that that is a very encouraging development. They realize as organizations and as individual States that it is in their interest to keep terrorism out. There are deep economic, social and political disadvantages in allowing terrorism to take place or to grow on one' s territory.

I think that it was South Africa, again, that brought out very clearly the importance of the collective in achieving the interests of each Member State. The fact that that is realized is very valuable. There is a growth of machinery in these organizations. There is a growth of bilateral and multilateral exchange activity and operational coordination. There is a growth of seminaring and conferencing. There is a growth of the exchange of best practice. All of this is tremendously valuable.

I think that it was Fiji that talked also about the areas of vulnerability. There is a growing realization in all States that there are gaps in their performance and

in their makeup against terrorism about which they are learning from participation in the collective activity. I hope that our conference on 7 March will be not just a collection of written and oral information handouts but also an exchange on how these points of vulnerability can most easily be filled by action learned from best practice elsewhere.

My thanks go also to those States that are contributing to the assistance programmes and indeed to the international organizations as well. The European Union is coming up fast now on this front, but the United States, Japan, Australia and Canada, in addition to member States of the European Union, have all made clear how much they are putting into, particularly, their own regions.. Yes, this needs prioritization. And yes, the CTC will help — Canada mentioned this — with developing priorities for the assistance programme. It is something that Ambassador Ward is working on.

Some mention should also be made of the connections with international organized crime and weapons of mass destruction. The Committee is going to get further into this in the near future, but up to, I think, 10 Member States mentioned this this morning. It is my hope — I hope it is not a dream — that the structures that we are beginning to put into place for counter-terrorism in the global network will also prove valuable in the activity against other forms of international organized crime and eventually in providing a much more cohesive and effective structure for keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the wrong hands.

The requests for greater proactivity, transparency and help with guidelines that we heard this morning — Israel and Liechtenstein touched on those points — are being listened to by the Committee. I think that we must be careful as a Committee not to try to do everything ourselves. The right professional organizations should be the ones calling for conferences and operational action on civil aviation, shipping, other forms of communication, customs work and arms control. There are much better bodies than the CTC to do that. But we will be a switchboard for making sure that this activity happens.

As for guidelines on compliance, which was Liechtenstein' s point, the fundamental guideline is the text of resolution 1373 (2001). We will not stop advocating that. But I think that the 7 March meeting will usefully get into global standards as guidelines in each of the main areas. Delegations will find that as the published material of the Committee and its sister organizations increases, that corpus of written work will provide an extremely useful set of guidelines and information to Member States as they devise their own national programmes.

I think that after a further period of time — and we will talk about this in the future — the Committee, under my successor, Ambassador Arias, will eventually need to develop into a more professional body. I think that we should start brainstorming on that, and we will do it over the coming period.

I end with warm thanks to you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting, to the Committee for its continued hard work and increasing professionalism, to our excellent body of experts and to our Secretariat help, which is, as we said this morning, increasing in effectiveness and experience all the time.

I think that we have now discussed, analysed and planned enough. The next period will be for action.

The President: I thank the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, Ambassador Greenstock, for his clarifications.

Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): It is difficult for anybody to take the floor after Ambassador Greenstock' s valuable remarks. However, the statement by the representative of Israel makes it hard for me not to say a few words.

Syria has always been proud of having been among the first countries to combat terrorism, and of having been successful in doing so. It is also very proud that it cooperates with all countries of the world — in the North, South, East and West — to combat and eliminate terrorism. High-level officials in more than one country have affirmed that Syria' s cooperation with them in combating terrorism has saved lives.

The countries of the world elected Syria almost unanimously to membership of the Security Council, in appreciation of Syria' s role in international political life and in the Middle East. For some 14 months, Syria has done everything possible to enhance the work of the Council, especially in combating terrorism. States members of the Security Council are well aware of Syria' s effective and rich contribution in fighting terrorism. Council members and other States Members of the United Nations, contrary to allegations by the

representative of Israel, know full well the effective role that Syria plays in that regard.

Let me caution that the greatest danger to the international campaign against terrorism is the Israeli terrorist approach to combating terrorism. It appears that the representative of Israel' s ignorance of the principles and methods of international action, of Security Council debate, of how the Council discusses the items before it and of the work of its subsidiary bodies has blinded him to the truth. He thus resorted to cheap tricks when we were discussing such a serious issue in the work of the Council. Does the representative of Israel seriously believe that he can mislead Council members and the international community? I do not believe so.

Palestinians in Syria, about whom the representative of Israel spoke, estimated to number more than 400,000, are the victims of Israeli terrorism. The entire world sees and hears about Israeli terrorist practices. In 1948, Israel was founded on terrorist organizations. The records of the United Kingdom Foreign Office are replete with evidence of that. The killing of Count Bernadotte, the United Nations peace mediator, at the hands of Israeli terrorist gangs is well known. Recently, United Nations officials have been killed in the West Bank and Gaza.

It appears that Israel cannot understand that occupation is terrorism. It has killed more than 2,180 Palestinians during the past two years alone. Thirty Palestinians have been killed in the past day and a half — that is one Palestinian killed every hour. An entire army is practising terrorism. What does it mean consistently to demolish the houses of Palestinians, throwing thousands of innocent children into the rain, snow and cold of the winter? What does it mean to demolish a house yesterday while four people were still living in it — killing all of them? Is not that terrorism?

The problem is that Israel thinks only about its own children, its settlements and its occupation and about the need to maintain that occupation. The representative of Israel referred to the Israeli occupation soldiers who escort the poor Israeli children to their schools. But Palestinian children are being killed in cold blood every single day, with Israeli tanks at their doors to stop them from going to school. But killing them is not enough. According to Israeli logic, they are not human beings.

A four-month-old child, Iman Hajjo, was killed when four bullets penetrated her little head, shattering it completely. We all watched as the child Mohamed al-Durra was killed by the Israeli occupation forces. Is that life or death? Is not that terrorism?

Everybody has the right to talk about terrorism except Israel; Israel is the symbol and embodiment of terrorism. Israel must stop its occupation of our territory; it must stop its settlers; it must stop violating our rights. We have said before and will say again that occupation is terrorism — it is the apex of terrorism. Occupation is occupation, and occupation is terrorism.

We support the fight of all people against occupation, even though some have claimed that such fights constitute terrorism. Let me reaffirm that Syria will continue its close cooperation with all countries to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and it will make every effort to support the Counter-Terrorism Committee with a view to fully implementing resolution 1373 (2001) in all its aspects.

I would like to express my gratitude to Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock for all of his efforts as Chairman of the Committee. We promise the next Chairman of the Committee — our neighbour in the Council, Ambassador Arias, Permanent Representative of Spain — that we will continue that cooperation.

The President: There are no further speakers on my list.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4711

Security Council

Fifty-eighth year

Provisional

4711th meeting

Monday, 24 February 2003, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Pleuger	(Germany)
Members:	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Bulgaria	Mr. Vassilev
	Cameroon	Mr. Belinga-Eboutou
	Chile	Mr. Maquieira
	China	Mr. Zhang Yishan
	France	Mr. De La Sablière
	Guinea	Mr. Traoré
	Mexico	Mr. Aguilar Zinser
	Pakistan	Mr. Khalid
	Russian Federation	Mr. Konuzin
	Spain	Mr. Arias
	Syrian Arab Republic	Mr. Mekdad
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Williamson

Agenda

The situation in Afghanistan

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

03-25635 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Statement by the President

The President: At the outset, I should like to explain how we shall conduct our consideration of the Afghanistan issue today. First, we shall hold this meeting, which will include a question-and-answer session. Because our Japanese colleague has come from Tokyo to provide us with information, I think the Council should have an opportunity to engage in dialogue with him and the other briefers after the briefing. Following that, the Council will hold a private meeting, because I understand that one of the briefers has a confidential document, which will be distributed and discussed then. If that is agreeable to the Council, we shall so proceed.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Afghanistan

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Afghanistan, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Farhadi (Afghanistan) took a seat at the Council table.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Guehenno to take a seat at the Council table.

I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 21 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, which reads as follows:

> "I am writing in reference to the open meeting of the Security Council on the item entitled 'The situation in Afghanistan', which is to take place on Monday, 24 February 2003. I have the honour to request that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, Mr. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura, Ambassador of Japan in charge of Afghan Aid Coordination, be permitted to participate in the above meeting and supply the Security Council with relevant information."

That letter has been issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2003/209.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Nishimura.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Nishimura to take a seat at the Council table.

I should also like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 20 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, which reads as follows:

> "I have the honour to request that Ambassador Harald Braun, Special Representative of the German Government for the training of the Afghan police force, be allowed to participate in the meeting of the Security Council on the situation in Afghanistan on Monday, 24 February 2003, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, and that he be granted the right to brief the Council."

That letter has been issued as a document of the Security Council under the symbol S/2003/206.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Braun.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Braun to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

The Security Council will hear three briefings: first by Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, followed by Mr. Mutsuyoshi Nishimura and then by Mr. Harald Braun. After the three briefings, I shall open the floor to Council members who may wish to address questions to Mr. Nishimura and to the other two briefers, as Mr. Nishimura will not be joining us in the private meeting of the Council.

I now give the floor to Mr. Guéhenno.

Mr. Guéhenno (*spoke in French*): As the focus of this meeting is the status of progress in security-sector reform in Afghanistan, I shall confine my comments to an update on recent developments since the last briefing to the Council on this item, followed by several observations on security-sector reform from the perspective of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). I shall limit my comments on security-sector reform to the interrelationships among the various activities, leaving the discussion of each specific sector to the lead nations concerned.

But, before beginning my briefing, I wish to inform the Council of some sad news. We have learned from press reports that an aircraft accident near Karachi has caused the death of the Afghan Minister for Mines and Industry, His Excellency Mr. Juma Mohammed Mohammedi, as well as that of a high official of the Pakistani Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mohammad Farhad Ahmed, and of other Afghan and Pakistani colleagues. I should like to express our sincere condolences to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan with regard to that cruel loss.

I now return to the subject of this briefing.

With respect to the implementation of the political transition outlined by the Bonn Agreement, there has been progress in the especially important process of drafting a new constitution. President Karzai's office is currently preparing a decree that will establish the Constitutional Commission and detail the main elements of the constitutional process. The decree will provide the necessary clarity on that essential process, while signalling the Government's strong support for the process. The nine members of the currently functioning Constitutional Drafting Commission will be made part of the larger Constitutional Commission, which should be established early next month. President Karzai's office has compiled a list of almost 80 candidates for possible selection to the Commission.

An important part of the constitutional process will be the series of public consultations to be held between April and June that will solicit the views of Afghans on the political future of their country. Those consultations will take place in every province of Afghanistan, as well as among the diaspora in Iran and Pakistan, and possibly in other countries where there is a significant Afghan diaspora. The results of those consultations will be important elements for consideration in the work of the Constitutional Commission.

Technical assistance from UNAMA, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), bilateral donors and academic sources has been made available to the Drafting Commission and its secretariat. Of course, those resources will also be available to the full Commission. While support from international experts will certainly be a useful resource in the Commission's work, we continue to believe that it is critical for the quality of the constitutional process that it remain Afghan-led, and for Afghans to decide among themselves, using the tools of dialogue and compromise, and to take the decisions on the most politically sensitive issues.

I am also pleased to inform the Council that there has been progress in the preparations for the elections to be held in June 2004. On 15 February 2003, President Karzai sent the Secretary-General a letter formally requesting UNAMA's assistance in organizing the electoral process and coordinating international electoral assistance. A few days ago, the head of UNAMA's electoral section arrived in Kabul and began to work on preparations for the elections. A core team of electoral experts, the first members of which have already arrived, is in the process of being deployed to the United Nations Mission. On the Afghan side, President Karzai has identified a number of candidates for membership in the electoral commission, which we expect will be formed in March. Once the commission

is established, it will work with the UNAMA team to create an Afghan electoral authority to manage the electoral process. An electoral unit has also been set up in the Ministry of the Interior.

(*spoke in English*)

The Government is now engaged in a rigorous process of finalizing its budget for the next Afghan financial year, which begins on 21 March. Ministries are preparing proposals in consultation with the newly formed sector consultative groups, which bring together Government actors and the assistance community in a coordinated framework. That process is an important test of the Government's inter-ministerial and Cabinet policy-making systems. The proposals will be subjected to an intensive Cabinet review and will be finalized so that they can be presented to the Afghanistan Development Forum, which will begin on 13 March in Kabul. In order to sustain the still-fragile Afghan peace process, I would urge all donors to participate in the Development Forum with the same generous spirit that was demonstrated at the meeting of the Afghanistan Support Group in Oslo last December.

Afghans are optimistic that the international community will fulfil the commitments it has already made for 2003. The Government looks forward to the provision of between $1.7 billion and $2 billion in aid this year. That optimism is, however, tempered by concerns about the slow pace of allocations. There is also a fear that, as donors monitor the current international situation, they may withhold funds for possible use elsewhere. As a result, these agencies are concerned that they might not be able to meet their existing assistance commitments to Afghanistan.

The human rights situation in Afghanistan continues to be undermined by the poor overall security environment. In the absence of effective State institutions, many Afghans are subjected to arbitrary rule by local commanders and have no recourse to legitimate judicial institutions. UNAMA human rights officers continue to hear of cases of extrajudicial executions, extortion and forced displacement.

UNAMA is maintaining its efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and to engage with local authorities to prevent abuses. Satellite offices of the Commission are in the process of being opened in Bamyan, Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif. With assistance from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), the Afghan Human Rights Commission has begun to prioritize the more than 600 complaints that have been lodged with it. That exercise will help the Commission to decide the most pressing cases to investigate, while ensuring that its resources are used as effectively as possible and that positive results are demonstrated.

Turning to the main theme of today's meeting, I would like to preface my comments on security-sector reform by describing some recent and worrying security trends in Afghanistan. Those trends highlight the imperative to both quicken the pace of security-sector reform and to consider immediate measures to improve security. Hopefully, those issues too will factor into our discussion today.

While the Bonn process has so far successfully averted full-scale fighting between major rival factions, Afghans continue to suffer on a human level from the insecurity created by the conjunction of weak national security institutions and strong local commanders. Council members will recall that when Mr. Brahimi briefed the Council, less than a month ago, an improvised mine had exploded on a roadside near Kandahar that same day, killing 12 bus passengers. Since then, several other incidents have occurred in Kandahar. On 12 February, a grenade exploded outside the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). That was the second grenade attack on United Nations premises in Kandahar in the last seven months. Fortunately, there were no injuries in either case. On 29 January, an explosive device detonated in the compound of the non-governmental organization Action Against Hunger, fortunately causing no injuries. A week ago, in the north-eastern city of Kunduz, a grenade was thrown over the wall of the compound belonging to the International Organization for Migration. The blast blew out windows in the building, but luckily there were no casualties. An hour later, a second explosion occurred in the centre of Kunduz.

In eastern Afghanistan, the Government's poppy-eradication campaign continues to face strong opposition from local tribes who do not feel they have been offered sufficient compensation. United Nations activities have been suspended in four districts in Nargarhar as a result of that tension.

UNAMA has also recently received credible threats of the kidnapping of international staff in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kunar provinces. Enhanced security measures were implemented as a result. However, we remain worried about increasing threats and actions against international assistance agencies. Purely as a contingency, UNAMA has discussed with United Nations agencies and some foreign missions the response that should be made if the security situation deteriorates to the point that international operations become unsafe in any given area. In the light of the political importance of the international presence to the peace process, there is a common understanding that the overall approach will be to analyse security incidents on a case-by-case basis and conduct any potential withdrawal primarily to other locations in Afghanistan, while continuing operations in all other areas as long as this is feasible and safe. Caution and prudence will guide our actions, but never panic. I must stress that this is simply contingency planning and there is at present no sense among key actors in Afghanistan that there is any area that has, or is likely to, reach a state where withdrawal would be required.

Despite a general sense of concern about security conditions across the country, I am pleased to note the smooth handover of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command from Turkey to Germany and the Netherlands on 10 February. I would like to thank Turkey for the leadership provided over the past seven months by General Hilmi Akin Zorlu and his staff, as well as for the professionalism and dedication that has been, and continues to be, demonstrated by the officers and soldiers of the 22 Member States that contribute to ISAF. I also thank, Mr. President, your Government and that of the Netherlands for assuming joint command under General Norbert van Heyst.

The challenges of reforming the Afghan security sector are significant: the national army needs to be built, factional armies need to be dissolved, and assistance needs to be provided to help ex-combatants reintegrate into civilian life. A national police force needs to be created, the rule of law re-established, the justice sector rehabilitated, and the cultivation of and trafficking in illicit drugs countered. Finally, the bloated and intrusive internal intelligence structures must be reformed so that they no longer inspire fear among the people that they are expected to protect.

Security sector reform is made all the more urgent by the complex political activities planned for the next 16 months. The security sector must be able to provide minimal conditions of stability to ensure that the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the national elections are meaningful and credible. Confirming this assessment, President Karzai has said that the reform of the security sector is his priority in the coming months.

Success will depend on a comprehensive, integrated approach that addresses the linkages between the security subsectors and unites the efforts of international actors and Afghan leaders at every level. For example, the creation of the new army and police is linked to the successful reintegration into civilian life of the members of existing security forces. That will require political consensus at the local and national levels and international commitment to deliver the required assistance.

Success will also depend on creating fully representative institutions of central government. The upper echelons of the Ministries of Defence and the Interior must reflect the regional and political diversity of the country, and they must be seen to work together in the interest of national unity. Only this will build the necessary trust in the national character of the new security forces. The decision on 20 February to effect changes in 17 high-level positions in the Ministry of Defence is therefore a welcome development and a strong signal of the Government's determination to create a truly national army.

The creation of the army, the phasing out of factional militias and the effective demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants constitute the linchpin of security sector reform. If those processes succeed, implementing the others, and the Bonn Agreement in general, will be much easier. While we hope that strong signals and actions at the national government level will help build confidence among various factions that must be disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated, it is also clear that the political support needed to complete the DDR process will probably have to be built, carefully and gradually, from region to region across the country. In terms of international support, a conference on DDR was just held in Tokyo on 22 February, and I am sure that we will hear more about that shortly.

As local militias are drawn down, a reformed national police will have to be created to provide the foundation of law and order across the country. The newly appointed Interior Minister, Ali Ahmad Jalali, has displayed a promising readiness to reform the police. Efforts are also being intensified to support the border police, which has just been moved from the Ministry of Defence to the Ministry of the Interior. Norway and other Nordic countries have expressed an interest in pushing that process forward. President Karzai and the Minister are also working on a draft decree to set the course of reform for the police and border guard, much as the 1 December decree did for the army.

The counter-narcotics effort has been spurred recently by the Government's active poppy eradication campaign in the five core poppy-producing provinces. As mentioned, this law enforcement effort has created some tensions and will need to be accompanied by convincing alternative livelihoods programmes. We estimate that $20 to $40 million in various alternative livelihoods, infrastructure and employment generation projects should be available in the near to medium term. The magnitude of this problem is extremely well documented in a study on the opium economy released last month by the United Nations International Drug Control Programme. The study estimates that gross income from opium production at the farm level may have been as high as $1.2 billion in 2002. This is more than half of what the Government expects in total international aid.

All the activities under the rubric of security sector reform are closely linked to each other and to other critical political and economic developments under the Bonn process. Success therefore requires a great deal of cooperation, and I am pleased at the way the lead nations for each subsector and UNAMA have coordinated their efforts in Kabul. But the resources needed to carry out security sector reform are greater than those that the designated lead nations can provide on their own. For that reason, I would like to re-emphasize that those countries are working to attract and coordinate the assistance of others in their respective sectors. I urge Member States to provide the necessary financial and material support. The United Nations has established four trust funds for contributions to the police, the justice sector, DDR and the payment of salaries and the provision of non-lethal equipment to the Afghan national army.

While the international community can and must provide support, in the end the success of the reform project depends on the Afghans themselves. In the months ahead, the political underpinnings of security sector reform must be strengthened by the deeds and words of the Transitional Administration. The police, army and intelligence service are still viewed by too many Afghans as politically biased. The chances of successfully reforming the security sector will be much enhanced if the statements of Afghan authorities on national reconciliation are demonstrably upheld.

I would like to thank you, Sir, once again for focusing our attention on the important issue of security in all its dimensions. I look forward to a fruitful discussion on this topic, which, in the end, underpins the entire Bonn process.

The President: I now give the floor to Mr. Nishimura.

Mr. Nishimura: Mr. President, thank you very much indeed for this occasion. I deeply appreciate this great occasion to brief the Security Council on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

Following 23 years of war and devastation and one year after the cessation of the latest hostilities, Afghanistan is still replete with weapons and armaments. Despite some notable progress, there is a high level of tension between the armed formations. Nation-building cannot succeed under these conditions. Nor is national reconciliation achievable. Most crucially, the people who have suffered so much for so long cannot enjoy genuine security. That lack of security is a source of great concern to the Afghan people as they toil so hard to reconstruct their country. The restoration of peace and of the rule of law in their country is their greatest aspiration. Indeed, soldiers and officers also share that aspiration. They are tired of life in the army. They yearn to go home and to resume their normal lives.

The international community is also deeply concerned with the lack of security as it mobilizes resources, not just in Kabul but in the remote regions of the country, in order to help all Afghans in their reconstruction efforts. Lack of security prevents donors' resources from reaching remote areas.

Lack of security is therefore the most serious challenge confronting Afghanistan today. It is no wonder, then, that there is unanimous agreement

among all parties concerned that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of soldiers and officers is of the highest priority. Fewer soldiers mean greater security. More ex-soldiers in workplaces mean more peaceful development.

Nevertheless, DDR alone is not enough to provide security. Security in Afghanistan can be ensured only when the State exercises the sole enforcement capacity. This, of course, means the creation of a new national army and national police force.

Counter-narcotics actions are also critical in ensuring security. An independent judiciary is likewise necessary. All these elements must be in place in order for the nation to be able to exist under the rule of law rather than the rule of the gun.

Mindful of these considerations, on 1 December last President Karzai issued an important decree broadly outlining principles and conditions with respect to security, the military, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

The decree specifically states that a new Afghanistan National Army (ANA) will be created of not more than 70,000 soldiers. It will be an ethnically balanced organization. More importantly, the decree also stipulates that military formations, armed groups and any other military or para-military units that are not a part of the ANA shall be prohibited.

This will be a defining moment in the Government's efforts to assert control nation-wide. A new national army will be built, and all regional military formations must disappear. It will be a remarkable development indeed.

On 11 January of this year, President Karzai took further steps to move ahead with DDR by issuing decrees establishing four Government commissions.

As recently as last Saturday, on 22 February, President Karzai announced in Tokyo his intention to disarm his country within one year of the commencement of the process. He said that he would announce a detailed DDR programme on 21 March of this year.

With all of these recent and remarkable developments in place, today I can report to the Council that in Afghanistan a solid foundation for DDR is being laid; that DDR will soon commence, promising to change the profile of Afghanistan from that of a nation in conflict to one that is developing peacefully; and that the entire international community is committed to supporting the programme.

The DDR process in Afghanistan is not different from DDR in other countries. Yet it is anticipated that DDR in Afghanistan will be difficult in view of the heavy legacy of factional rivalries. The fact that a new national army must be built in parallel with DDR adds to the complexity of the undertaking.

Here is the basic process: all soldiers to be disarmed must first pass through the Disarmament Commission and will have to decide to either join the new national army or to demobilize. Those wishing to join the new national army must then pass a number of tough recruitment tests. Those who fail the tests, as well as those who choose to get out of their armed formations, will be registered. They will be offered a variety of reintegration packages, including vocational training, credit schemes, employment through public works, land grants, cash compensation, community-based development projects and so on.

Additionally, demobilized soldiers will be able to take advantage of a wide referral network which will allow them to seek job opportunities around the country.

In terms of the administrative mechanism, the Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) will be created as the main executing body. With offices established in nine cities across the country, the ANBP will register individuals, assist them in choosing the most appropriate job training options and opportunities, and provide the necessary follow-up over a period of three years.

Let me briefly explain what the Government of Japan, as the lead nation, intends to contribute to this programme.

First of all, Japan is totally committed to the success of the DDR process. We will continue to play a cooperative role throughout the entire process, in cooperation with another lead agency, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

On the financial side, the Government of Japan has pledged a contribution of $35 million to jump-start the Partnership for Peace Programme, which is the basic component of the DDR process. In addition to its financial contribution, Japan will consider extending

assistance for the establishment of a large database, which will be indispensable for the implementation of DDR.

Another major area in which Japan is cooperating is vocational training. We will provide an extensive training programme, again in addition to the financial contributions mentioned earlier.

Moreover, we are looking at as many job-creation aid projects as possible in order to meet the requirements of DDR. It is our hope to employ as many ex-combatants as possible in such public-works-type projects.

The task ahead of us is truly daunting. We can expect to be met with numerous challenges and setbacks. But I am confident that the Afghan Government, the Afghan people as a whole and the international community will remain united and rise to the challenges.

Nonetheless, today, realist that I am, I can anticipate some of these challenges.

First, we will have to deal with the problem of how to reach agreement on the number of soldiers and officers to be released from the armed formations. The number of soldiers under arms is difficult to estimate. The definition of a combatant is itself problematic.

Developing a mechanism for the collection of light and heavy weapons and maintaining transparency in the process of weapons collection will also be a difficult issue.

Very careful consideration will have to be paid, in all phases of the programme, to ensuring a strong sense of fairness and impartiality.

In the country, where there is a strong legacy of strife and competition amongst various groups, any attempt which benefits one to the detriment of another is bound to fail. Confidence-building among all parties concerned will be the key to the success of DDR. Therefore, a sensitive approach is absolutely necessary, but at the same time, a practical attitude is also important. The task of disarmament must start where it is most likely to succeed so that it can build momentum for further successes.

The time line is another important factor. President Karzai said in Tokyo last week that, once it begins, the disarmament process would take one year. The idea behind this timetable is to have DDR play a role — of course, a positive one — in the context of the upcoming general election scheduled for June next year.

There is another thorny technical problem — how to treat commanders who still hold sway over large numbers of people and communities — and, of course, as always, there are problems of a financial nature. The donor contributions that have been committed will not be sufficient for the immense task ahead of us.

At the recent Tokyo Conference on DDR, as I said earlier, Japan pledged $35 million. The United States pledged $10 million; the United Kingdom, $3.5 million; and Canada, $2.2 million. This total of more than $50 million for the kick-off is a good record, yet future prospects are not necessarily encouraging and we must keep working on securing financing throughout the process. Finally, the success of DDR will ultimately depend upon the economic capacity of the country itself. How the Afghan economy and the international community will be able to generate enough job opportunities to absorb everyone is a very serious problem.

All these and other problems are sensitive ones which will ultimately require political decisions. Without broad political agreement, DDR will most likely not succeed. The single most important factor for the success of DDR is the steadfast commitment of all political and regional leaders.

If the Government in Kabul and all regional leaders are to achieve and maintain this commitment, it is absolutely essential that the international community as a whole remain committed to Afghanistan and provide it with all possible support and encouragement. In fact, the principal motivation which compelled the Government of Japan to organize the Tokyo International Conference on DDR in Afghanistan just three days ago was to reinforce this solidarity and support. As the Chair of the Conference, I urged all participating countries and agencies to join hands and embrace the Afghan people as they strive to rebuild their nation by restoring the peace and achieving genuine reconciliation.

In the view of Japan and UNAMA, DDR is absolutely crucial to the rebuilding of the nation of Afghanistan. The international community must stay engaged and give every support to our Afghan friends as they begin a courageous struggle, this time in order to achieve genuine peace and reconciliation.

The President: I now give the floor to Mr. Braun.

Mr. Braun: It is quite obvious that the reconstruction of a functioning police system throughout Afghanistan is a vital pillar of the international efforts to create security for that war-torn country. Against this background and at the request of the United Nations and the former Afghan Interim Administration, Germany assumed the lead role in rebuilding the Afghan police force — a task that is closely linked to the four other security sectors that have already been mentioned several times.

What has been achieved so far in the police sector? An initial analysis carried out by German and Afghan experts in early 2002 showed that the Afghan police infrastructure had been largely destroyed in Kabul and throughout most of the country's provinces. Many police officers had little or no training, were inadequately equipped, burdened with a multitude of non-police tasks and lacked health care and social security. Both the pay and the training systems had collapsed and relations with the public were often very poor.

The Interim Administration's control over the police, as in many other fields, was mostly limited to Kabul. Certain police functions were at times executed by informal "back-door policemen", mujahideen who were nominally affiliated with the police force but lacked adequate qualifications to fulfil police tasks and actual assignments. The so-called conscript patrolman system assigned men available for military service either to service in the army or to two compulsory years in the police force as patrolmen without pay.

Thus, the following tasks presented themselves: reorganization of the police force; restructuring the Ministry of the Interior and its relevant departments; reconstructing destroyed police buildings and re-equipping the police force; re-establishing a police training system; qualifying or demobilizing conscript patrolmen and "back-door policemen"; extension of the police rebuilding programme to all parts of the country and the creation of a nation-wide police structure; securing the role of a modern police force operating on the basis of new Afghan police legislation under the rule of law, in the professional ethos of the police and among the populace; and enforcing the State's monopoly on the use of force and the central Government's authority throughout the country.

Based on that assessment and in coordination with the other lead nations in the security sector, the following three-stage timetable was established. In the first stage, starting with the Bonn process in late 2001 and running to the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002, the basic structures of the new Afghan national police were created in Kabul. A second stage, currently under way and set to last until parliamentary elections are held in 2004, comprises the consolidation and expansion of central structures in Kabul and the gradual extension of these structures into the provinces. A third stage will ensure the functionality of federal and provincial police forces and their interlinking with other security structures, as well as our gradual withdrawal as a lead nation by the end of 2005. This is detailed in annex I of the printed version of my statement that is being circulated.

From the outset, it was very clear that certain framework conditions were going to be crucial to success. These are the full implementation of the Bonn Agreement by Afghanistan; Afghan ownership-based support for the Administration from international organizations and lead nations; the continuation of international support for the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan; sustained financial assistance from the international community; the continuation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), at least on the current scale; diminished interference from regional leaders; and interaction in the fight against illicit drugs by the police force, justice system and armed forces.

We all know that not all of these conditions have been fully met in the past 12 months. While cooperation with the Afghan Transitional Administration and, in particular the Ministry of the Interior, was very good, the overall security situation has not significantly improved, with the exception of Kabul, where ISAF guarantees a reasonably secure environment. Regional cooperation in the effort to include all provinces in police training has not been uniformly satisfactory, and progress has also been difficult in the reconstruction of other security sectors, such as the army, and in the fight against illicit drugs.

Financing has been a problem, though not a restricting factor as yet. The principal source for police salaries — the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), administered by the United Nations Development Programme — is struggling with insufficient funding, among other difficulties. The

Fund's current size, $11 million, falls far short of its target of $65 million. Furthermore, international contributions towards police reconstruction do not fully meet current needs. The overall cost of reconstruction, equipment and training for the national police over the next four years has been estimated at roughly 180 million euros — close to $200 million — excluding salaries. That does not include the border police, for which budget figures have not yet been established. The targeted amount of donor participation has to date fallen short of the mark.

Notwithstanding those restraining factors, we are on course with our timetable. The groundwork has been laid for a functioning police force in Kabul. Since August 2002, the reopening of the Police Academy and the successful train-the-trainers programme, as well as international contributions from, inter alia, the Netherlands, India, Norway, Finland and Turkey, have enabled the start of standard training for Afghan police recruits. Approximately 1,500 are now enrolled at the Academy in courses for commissioned and non-commissioned officers and are thus ensuring the permanent nature of the building of a police force committed to the rule of law and to human rights. For the first time in more than 20 years in Afghanistan, classes include female police recruits.

A structure for the further training of serving police officers has been created and training courses began last summer. Annex 2, which is supplementary to my printed statement, shows Police Academy training structures.

The infrastructures of the national criminal police and the national drug police have been re-established, with contributions from the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations International Drug Control Programme. The police force in Kabul is now able to work again, thanks to the reconstruction of its buildings and to new equipment.

The foundations for the re-establishment of the police health service have been laid through the creation of a medical care unit built on the Police Academy premises. A forthcoming contribution by Japan will further expand that nucleus.

The reorganization of the police and of the Ministry of the Interior is making good progress. A structure for the national police and a new Afghan border police, comprising border patrol and immigration units, has been established. Annex 3, supplementary to my statement, shows the structure envisaged for the national police and the border police.

The Ministry of the Interior is adopting a new, modern structure, as can be seen in annex 4. I understand that President Karzai gave his consent to the new Ministry of the Interior structure yesterday.

Payment of Kabul police officers and the students and staff of the Police Academy is guaranteed through LOTFA, thanks to contributions by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the World Bank. A nation-wide, computer-based police information system called POLIS is being established, starting with a central unit in Kabul, where police officers are currently being trained on its future use. Finally, Afghanistan became a member of Interpol in October 2002.

The integration of the provinces into the police rebuilding programme has begun. To date, 10 of the 32 provinces have been evaluated on the basis of their equipment, reconstruction and training needs. The information required for their inclusion in the reconstruction and local training programme and police pay system, as well as for staff restructuring, has been provided. A structure for police deployment in the provinces has been established and can be seen in annex 5.

I would like now to speak about the way ahead. The year 2003 will be decisive. We hope that it will see the consolidation of the work of the re-established central police institutions in Kabul, the further development of the training system and the inclusion in it of the country's patrolmen, the build-up of a professional border police and, above all, the transfer of results achieved in Kabul to other parts of the country. The level of development and achievement will depend on positive developments in the general security situation and the participation of the international community.

A strategy for national police reconstruction through 2005 that is synchronized with advances in demobilization and armed forces build-up and that sets out milestones and benchmarks is currently being fine-tuned by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. We are confident that it will be adopted shortly by the cabinet of the Afghanistan Transitional Administration and that a presidential decree will be issued, mirroring the presidential decree on the reconstruction of the armed forces.

Two critical features of that strategy are, first, the decision on a target size of 50,000 for the National Police and the build-up of a border police force of 12,000; and secondly, the conversion of the conscript patrolman system into a third professional pillar of the Afghan police structure. The conscript system was discontinued at the end of 2002. During the transitional period, current conscripts will be offered professional training programmes so that they can qualify as members of the police force under the nationwide trainer snowballing system, or they will be discharged. The United States of America has undertaken the organization and financing of that momentous task.

Extending police reconstruction to the provinces is a big challenge. In many provinces, the challenge will be chiefly financial and organizational. In others, it will also entail important security problems that cannot be tackled by police means alone. Instability resulting from fighting among regional commanders, ethnic groups and their militias must end in order to successfully integrate all provinces by the end of 2004.

Combating drug production and trafficking will be crucial litmus test with regard to the ability of lead nations in the security sector to achieve synergies in their overlapping fields of responsibility. This will continue to require well-coordinated efforts and commitment from all Afghan and international actors in the security sector.

Building the border police will be another vital task, linking both the anti-drug effort and the rebuilding of the Afghan National Army with the police project. We hope that the Nordic countries, led by Norway, will assume a prominent role in this task. Germany, as the lead nation for overall police reconstruction, is prepared and will be glad to support the Nordic countries with regard to concept and coordination. We are optimistic that initial structures, recently laid out by the Afghanistan Transitional Administration, can be built this year.

We regard lobbying the international community and taking responsibility for international coordination as the central functions of our role as lead nation for the reconstruction of the Afghan police and border police. On a technical level, we have established a catalogue of modules, including training courses, equipment and reconstruction projects, as a basis for potential contributions. Using this, we can implement any kind of support measures, whether directly, through the German project office in Kabul, which is currently staffed by 14 senior German police and border guard officers, through organizations acting on our behalf, or through the Afghanistan Transitional Administration.

I have already mentioned the international contributions that have made the police reconstruction project a success so far. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that sustained and additional support for the Afghan police is needed. We ask Council members to help us to carry that message to their respective Governments.

The upcoming reorganization of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and the strategic decisions made on the future shape and structure of the police and the border police provide us with a solid basis on which to move forward in constructing a modern, professional Afghan police force committed to upholding the rule of law and human rights. But much remains to be done before the Bonn process becomes irreversible and before the Afghan Government and Administration grow stronger and gain the structures and experience necessary for carrying forward the building process on their own. Indeed, 2003 will be an important year in that respect, and we rely on the help and the contributions of Council members to make it a success.

The President: I thank Mr. Braun for his briefing.

I shall now open the floor to Council members who wish to address questions to Mr. Nishimura and to the other briefers. I would suggest that we hear all the questions first; then I shall give the floor back to the three briefers to answer the questions raised and to provide further clarifications.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): First of all, I should like to express the United Kingdom's sincere condolences to Pakistan and Afghanistan with regard to the crash of the Cessna. A particular loss, in the context of today's debate, is that of the Afghan Minister for Mines and Industry, Mr. Juma Mohammed Mohammedi, and we mourn that loss.

We very much appreciate this morning's briefings by Under-Secretary-General Guehenno, Ambassador Nishimura and Ambassador Braun, and we are very grateful to the Japanese Government for its input on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and to

the German Government for what it is doing on the Ministry of the Interior and on police reform.

I should like to seek a bit more detail from Ambassador Braun about the reconstruction programme in the Ministry of the Interior. It was very useful to hear the details in his briefing, and the intended structures seem very sensible, but how is the programme getting on with the recruitment of Afghan individuals for the jobs that are being laid out in the structure? Does the German programme think that, if the money is there, the right individuals with the minimum qualifications can be found to fill out the structure and the system within the time period that he has laid out?

With regard to international involvement, it was interesting to hear of the contributions of Nordic countries and of others. Is this international support broad enough, and is he looking for further particular input from the international community that we can get our Governments to look at specifically?

Mr. Konuzin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We, too, are grateful to Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno, to Ambassador Nishimura and to Ambassador Braun for the extremely interesting and very technical and useful briefings today. I believe that the material that they have given us will be important to us as we carry out our work in the coming years.

We have questions for all three briefers.

Our first question is addressed to Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno. There have been reports about the possibility of getting NATO involved in securing peace and security in Afghanistan. Have there been any contacts with the United Nations Secretariat in that regard?

Our second question is the following. Is work being done on the possibility of extending the security zone, which can be protected by international forces in Afghanistan, beyond the capital, Kabul?

Next, a question for Ambassador Nishimura. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process will be difficult, given the very specific complications of the situation in Afghanistan. We will face a situation in which people are unwilling to give up their weapons voluntarily, not necessarily because they are part of an armed group, but because the situation is insecure and people might want to keep weapons merely to protect their families. From the briefings of Mr. Nishimura and of Mr. Braun, it seems clear that there is a desire to coordinate the disarmament process and to enhance the security situation in the country. But Mr. Nishimura said that disarmament would be completed within a year, and Mr. Braun said that police reform would require up to 2005. So our question is, are the problems encountered in demobilization the same in all provinces, and, if not, which parts of the country require greater efforts? How does Mr. Nishimura see the process being coordinated?

Finally, we have a question for Mr. Braun. As we understand it, one of the main tasks of the Afghan police — primarily the border police — will be combating drug trafficking. How does he see the interaction between the Afghan security forces and the services of the neighbouring countries, which are also trying to block the flow of drugs from Afghanistan? How could the United Nations assist more in that effort, and how could we accelerate such work?

Mr. Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon) (*spoke in French*): This morning, my delegation learned of the airplane crash that occurred in Pakistan, in which the Afghan Minister of Mines and Industry, a high official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and other officials of the two countries died. Under these sad circumstances, my delegation would like to express its deepest sympathy to the Ambassadors of Pakistan and of Afghanistan.

My delegation thanks the three speakers — Mr. Guéhenno, Ambassador Nishimura of Japan and Ambassador Braun of Germany — for their very informative briefings.

We have two questions to ask. On 22 February in Tokyo, the conference on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan was held. On that occasion, several bilateral and multilateral donors confirmed their wish to support a DDR programme in that country. We welcome that.

Turning to my first question, I am concerned about possible links between the pledges made at Oslo and immediately thereafter and the commitments made at Tokyo. In other words, are the resources earmarked for the implementation of DDR to be additional resources or are they to be deducted from the $2 billion that has been pledged to Afghanistan as part of the Oslo process for 2003?

My second comment has to do with the links to be established between the functioning of the justice system — in particular as regards the functioning of the Judicial Commission — and eliminating insecurity, especially in connection with dealing with rebel warlords and the territory under their control. The briefers have referred to the debate that has taken place in Afghanistan. Do they believe that more emphasis should be placed on promoting peace and security rather than on consolidating the rule of law? How can those two aspects be reconciled given the atmosphere of clientism and the growing influence of warlords and their allies?

Those are the two questions I wanted to share with the members of the Council.

Mr. Aguilar Zinser (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation too would like to express its gratitude for the information that has been provided to the members of the Council by Mr. Guéhenno, Mr. Nishimura and Mr. Braun. In particular, we would like to thank Mr. Nishimura and Japan for their outstanding work in maintaining the international community's commitment to Afghanistan's reconstruction. We would also like to recognize and express appreciation for the work being done by Ambassador Braun and Germany in putting together a police force that will make possible the establishment of a reliable legal order in Afghanistan.

In that regard, I would like to know whether, in the light of the information provided to us by Ambassador Braun, a great effort is being made to establish a police force that will have a decisive presence throughout the country and that will secure the borders while providing domestic police enforcement. Given the prevailing circumstances in Afghanistan, we would like to know what mechanisms are envisaged to coordinate efforts to create a national police force with the establishment of provincial police forces. Is that an issue that will ultimately have to be resolved in the process of drafting a new constitution? The very decisive role that a national police force might play in contributing to the establishment of the rule of law vis-à-vis the various armed factions fighting for power in the provinces will in fact be a force for political stability. But in order to achieve that there will be a need to confront the various factions that are likely to dispute areas of jurisdiction. How would Ambassador Braun envisage that consolidation process taking place? What degree of conflict will arise in Afghanistan as a result of an attempt to establish a national police force with authority over any other armed or police forces in the provinces?

Mr. Khalid (Pakistan): First of all, I would like to thank the delegations that have extended their condolences over the tragic air crash. I wish to join all of them in extending our deep condolences to our Afghan brothers over the tragic loss of the Afghan Minister for Mines and Industry in that crash.

We also wish to thank the three briefers for their comprehensive presentations. We express our deep appreciation for the efforts that the international community is making to bring about reform of the Afghan security sector.

Pakistan has also made a modest contribution to that cooperative process of the international community. We have offered equipment and facilities for the training of the Afghan army and police, as well as contributing to the strengthening of Afghanistan's judicial system and narcotics-control mechanisms. We have also offered special training in the field of demining. I am sure it will be of interest to everyone here to know that only last week Pakistan donated to the Afghan Government a large quantity of arms, including 500 MP5A3 sub-machineguns, 180 82-millimetre mortars, 75 rocket-propelled grenades and substantial quantities of ammunition for those weapons. The delivery of those weapons is part of Pakistan's commitment to support and strengthen the Afghan central Government and to assist in the raising of an Afghan national army, as envisioned at the Bonn Conference. We will continue to support efforts aimed at reforming the security sector in Afghanistan.

I have a few questions for Ambassador Nishimura. My first question is whether the design of Afghanistan's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process will include measures to curb the smuggling of arms outside of Afghanistan. We would also like to hear his views about how the international community can ensure the full cooperation of all the factions, big and small, in participating in the disarmament process. He also talked about the financial aspects of the DDR programme. How can it be ensured that this process, and especially its reintegration aspect, remains adequately funded?

Mr. De La Sablière (France) (*spoke in French*): I thank Mr. Guéhenno and Ambassadors Braun and

Nishimura for their briefings. And I thank the German presidency for this excellent initiative. The role of Germany and Japan, as lead nations for police and for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, is very notable. Security and the strengthening of the central authority remain two of the main challenges that Afghanistan must face. This morning, the Council heard about the progress that has been made in those areas. But it also heard about all that remains to be done to ensure security throughout the territory.

Before asking a few questions, I would just like to recall that in the efforts that the international community must continue to make on security-sector reform in Afghanistan, France, together with the United States, is making a special effort in the area of training the unified Afghan army. In 2002, France trained two battalions. A third battalion is now being trained. By the end of 2003, 7,000 soldiers will have undergone basic training. My country will also begin special training for officers. We will thus train 270 officers in the course of this year. As we pursue our work, we plan to train Afghan officers in our military colleges.

I have one question for Mr. Guéhenno. He told us that President Karzai is currently preparing a decree on the reform of the police and the border police in line with the 1 December decree establishing the Afghan national army. That is indeed an essential issue. Could we have some information about the general features of that decree and about what possible difficulties might be encountered in the course of implementing that decree? What will be the concrete steps to implement that decree? That is a question for Mr. Braun, as well.

Ambassador Nishimura told us that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process must begin in those areas where it is most likely to be successful in order to get some momentum under way. I would like to ask Ambassador Nishimura whether he could tell the Council in which areas there is the greatest hope for generating such momentum.

Finally, I wish to say that next month we will be preparing a draft resolution to renew and to improve the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The draft resolution will be a further opportunity for the Security Council to devote its attention to the question of security in Afghanistan, on which — as was said repeatedly this morning — the success of Afghan reconstruction in future years will depend.

Mr. Arias (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): The question I was going to ask has already been put forward by the representative of the Russian Federation. I would like, however, to express my sincere condolences to the delegations of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Mr. Williamson (United States of America): We join others in expressing our condolences to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I have just two quick questions. The first is for Ambassador Nishimura. I wonder whether he could provide some more detailed information on his estimates for the overall funding requirements for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, including, for example, estimates for vocational training and other programmes such as he discussed in his presentation.

My second question is for Ambassador Braun. To build on the British intervention, can he discuss in more detail his efforts to recruit police and what difficulties he is running into. Later I will make reference to some of the challenges in recruiting members to be trained for the army.

Mr. Traoré (Guinea) (*spoke in French*): Like preceding speakers, I should like to extend to the representatives of Pakistan and Afghanistan the sincere condolences of my delegation on the air crash that took the life of the Afghan Minister for Mines and Industry and a number of Pakistani officials.

I would like to thank Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno, Ambassador Nishimura of Japan and Ambassador Braun of Germany for their very useful briefings this morning. I especially thank Germany and Japan, together with other countries, for their important role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

I have one question for Mr. Nishimura with regard to opium production. If I understood correctly, opium production in 2002 amounted to $1.2 billion — an amount equal to more than half of international aid expected for Afghanistan. Given that that aid is slow in coming, I want to ask Mr. Nishimura what concrete steps he thinks must be taken to combat that scourge effectively. If opium production is not curbed, it will compromise the chances of getting the country on track. Everyone is aware of the damaging

consequences of opium and other drugs in general. I believe that it is very important to formulate measures to curb the massive production of opium in Afghanistan.

Mr. Maquieira (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): First, I wish to join in the condolences that are being conveyed to the Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan on the recent air crash. I also wish to thank of Mr. Guéhenno, Ambassador Nishimura and Ambassador Braun for their presence at this meeting. They have given us comprehensive information about developments in Afghanistan.

For the sake of brevity, I should like to ask just a few questions of Mr. Nishimura and of Mr. Braun. With respect to Mr. Nishimura's briefing: bearing in mind the numerous problems that have been mentioned, in particular the influence of local chiefs and militia commanders in the various parts of the country, how does Mr. Nishimura think his work should be focused, and what is the most important challenge to be faced? Which parts of the country does he consider will be the most difficult to integrate into the programme?

I have a second question for Ambassador Nishimura concerning the disarmament and reintegration effort. We in the United Nations have quite a history of such efforts — some of them more successful than others. Perhaps he could indicate whether any of these experiences have served as a basis for his endeavours and to what extent that experience can be applied to the case of Afghanistan.

With respect to the comprehensive briefing that we received from Ambassador Braun, I should like to say first of all that we are sure that this is a very complex undertaking. We know that the Afghan Government lacks the resources to pay police wages and that therefore the contributions of the international community are essential.

I should therefore like to ask Ambassador Brown how he perceives this problem, and does he believe that these forces must have a balanced ethnic composition?

Mr. Mekdad (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): Allow me at the outset, Sir, to express my heartfelt condolences to the Governments of Afghanistan and of Pakistan with respect to the air crash that killed the Afghan Minister for Mines and Industry as well as several Pakistani officials.

We would like to welcome among us Mr. Guéhenno, Ambassador Nishimura and Ambassador Braun, and we thank them all for their important briefings. Mr. Guéhenno briefed us on the general security situation in Afghanistan, and Mr. Braun on the re-establishment of the civil police. We thank them for the detailed information they provided in this regard. Likewise, we would like also to thank Mr. Nishimura, who described the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme in Afghanistan.

In brief, we have a comment and a question. We heard Mr. Guéhenno say that the security situation in Afghanistan remains fragile and that the security environment has not been what we would have all wished for. Naturally, we believe that there is a connection between what Mr. Guéhenno has said and the facts presented by Mr. Braun and Mr. Nishimura. We think that, for us to be able to undertake Mr. Braun's and Mr. Nishimura's ambitious programmes, we must take into account the comments made by Mr. Guéhenno.

We believe that the DDR process will be lengthy and that therefore we must link the reconstruction efforts with the demobilization process.

How do Mr. Nishimura and Mr. Braun intend to bridge the gap between reconstruction and demobilization on the one hand and the security situation on the other?

Mr. Gaspar Martins (Angola): I should like also to join other colleagues in conveying our condolences to the Government of Afghanistan and to the Government of Pakistan on the losses that they have suffered, which we learned of this morning. Afghanistan is a country which has been at war for a very long time and has known a great deal of suffering. In the post-war period, with reconstruction under way, it is still facing tragic situations.

I should like also to say that I was very pleased with the three briefings that were presented to us this morning by Mr. Guéhenno, Ambassador Braun and Ambassador Nishimura. These were very rich briefings on key questions. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is indeed what is required in a country following 23 years of war, and it is good to see a country like Japan take the lead in this respect.

In this connection, let me ask a few questions.

First of all, Mr. Nishimura mentioned the contributions received from various countries, totalling $50 million, adding that this is only a kick-off and that more is required. My question is, what are the prospects for further contributions, because, as has already been mentioned by previous speakers, this is going to be a long process that will require a great deal of funding, and in particular coordination and cooperation on the part of other countries with the lead country.

With respect to the police, during the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, police are trained, new police officers are incorporated, and it is useful to take advantage of those who are being demobilized or brought into the DDR process. What is the coordination between the two? How is it proceeding? Are there any problems in getting recruits and in getting this to move smoothly?

At last month's briefing on Afghanistan, mention was made of the fact that the security situation could create problems for the 2004 elections. Today, I think, it was mentioned that elections are indeed supposed to take place in 2004. Is it, in fact, realistic to see elections taking place in 2004?

The President: Before giving the floor to our briefers to answer the questions raised in the discussion, let me first of all join others in the condolences expressed to the Governments of Afghanistan and of Pakistan.

I give the floor to the representative of Afghanistan.

Mr. Farhâdi (Afghanistan) (*spoke in French*): I am very grateful to Mr. Guehenno, Ambassador Nishimura and Mr. Braun, who have given briefings that have elicited many very relevant questions about Afghanistan, even though some of these questions have already been answered to some extent. I, too, look forward to the answers that will be given.

I am grateful also to Mr. Guehenno for having informed the Council of the death of a great Afghan patriot, Juma Mohammedi. The chartered aircraft he was in crashed, and a number of Pakistani officials were also killed. I extend my condolences to the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. Mohammedi was a man of tremendous experience. He was a hydrologist and also a management expert. Obviously, he was very familiar with Afghanistan's extensive water resources. He was a member of the Afghan royal Government and a minister in the Daoud Republic. He left his post only when he was imprisoned as a cabinet member of Prince Daoud's Government. Upon his release — a Marxist regime held power in Afghanistan at that time — he was immediately hired by the World Bank, which needed someone like him to work on the waterways extending from Turkey to Syria. The work was of a legal and technical nature and Mr. Mohammadi was occupied with it for several years. In his capacity as a former Government minister, he then joined Mr. Karzai's Government.

He was a Pashtun from the Paktika region. He worked with colleagues and technicians from various ethnic groups. He was a true patriot and I trust that he will receive God's blessing.

Mr. Zhang Yishan (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Allow me at the outset to join previous speakers in expressing my deep condolences to the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan over the tragedy that has struck them.

China listened carefully to the statements made by this morning's three briefers. They were extremely detailed and very helpful to our understanding of the situation in Afghanistan. Many of our colleagues have already raised a number of questions, some of which were similar to those I had in mind. I will therefore not repeat them.

I want to ask only two questions. My first question is for Mr. Guehenno. In his briefing, he referred to the repeated attacks against United Nations and other international personnel. One agency has suffered two grenade attacks; fortunately, there were no casualties. Have any specific measures been envisioned to reduce the incidence of such attacks?

My second question is for Mr. Braun, who mentioned in his briefing that Afghanistan is already a member of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Does Mr. Braun have any specific plan to take full advantage of INTERPOL in building the police force in Afghanistan?

Mr. Vassilev (Bulgaria): First of all, I would like to thank you, Sir, for organizing this important meeting on the security situation in Afghanistan and for giving us the chance to listen to such excellent briefings by Ambassador Nishimura, Ambassador Braun and

Mr. Guehenno: We do appreciate the work done and coordinated by Ambassador Nishimura and Ambassador Braun.

In that context, let me just join previous speakers in expressing our condolences over the tragic incident in which Pakistani and Afghan officials were killed in an air crash.

Let me inform the Council that, on 20 February, the third rotation of the Bulgarian contingent in the International Security Assistance Force took place in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

Because many questions have already been asked, I feel that it will be quite difficult for the briefers to answer all of them. Would it simply be possible for them to share with us some preliminary views on the efficiency of the measures taken up to now by the international community and the respective lead countries?

The President: I now call on Ambassador Nishimura.

Mr. Nishimura: I really appreciate the great interest the Council has shown in what we have been doing.

There were several questions directed to me. I will group those questions into three or four broad categories.

First, Council members have expressed their doubts or uncertainties as to how we are going to proceed with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme despite possible resistance on the part of various regional leaders. They may have thought that it is going to be a very difficult process. Indeed, I agree. We all know that we have a very difficult exercise ahead of us, but there are a couple of things to which I think I must draw the Council's attention.

First and foremost, all the decisions which have been made so far by the Government in Kabul have been discussed and debated through the National Defence Council, which comprises all regional political leaders. Therefore, theoretically speaking, there is a general consensus amongst all those leaders to go ahead with the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the soldiers and officers. Our problem, and the problem of Afghanistan, is to test in practice that agreement made in principle by all those political leaders. Therefore, that is the test of DDR programme as well.

I talked about a pragmatic attitude whereby we should start our work where it is most likely to succeed. Indeed, that practicality has something to do with this process. Our intention — and it is the intention of all parties concerned, including the Government of Afghanistan — is to start some kind of new wind in Afghanistan. There are communities and provinces which really wish to start those activities in their territories. Of course, this whole DDR programme entails economic packages and rewards. Communities are now seeing that those rewards can come their way. That is one positive element and we can therefore start in those areas. They are expressing their wish that this programme be started in their communities. Other communities are expressing the desire to see the programme start, because the soldiers themselves wish to leave their military formations. That readiness and disposition has been expressed in other cases. So yes, there will, of course, be lots of resisters, but there are provinces, cities and small villages that wish to go forward. In our view, that might create a new wind — a new tendency, a new current — which might be emulated and copied in other areas. That is our strategy.

The Russian representative asked whether they may wish to keep their weapons. Of course they may wish to do so. As a matter of fact, all weapons of all kinds will not be collected under the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme. As far as I understand it, there will be a category of weapons that must be collected and that there will be other sorts of weapons — light weapons — that will not be collected. There should be a clear distinction between those weapons that are to be collected and those that are not to be collected. This is, I think, the practice that has been adopted by other DDR exercises in other countries. There is nothing wrong with Afghanistan seeing small weapons remain in the hands of people. That is a question in its own right. But that question must be dealt with at a later stage. If you go there, I think the DDR process itself is going to be a huge exercise which the present mechanism and current financial resources cannot cope with.

The financial aspect has been of great interest in all of today's questions. I also appreciate the interest expressed and understand the anxieties members may

have had about the financial prospects for the programme. As a matter of fact, $50 million is the amount for the kick-off of this programme. That is not going to be enough for the entire programme, which may take at least two, three or four years. According to a United Nations Development Programme estimate, there will be a total requirement for three or four years amounting to $130 million to $150 million. So, as I said in my statement, we have to work together to ensure that the financial resources can be collected from the international community to fill those gaps. It is going to be a difficult task but, nonetheless, I think we have to proceed with it.

One thing which I think I have to mention in this respect is the fact that all donor nations can contribute to the United Nations Development Programme fund — which has been set up for the purpose of DDR — not just in financial terms, but by helping to meet the requirements of ex-combatants who have left the army and army formations. There are lots of public-works-type aid projects being offered to Afghanistan by many donor nations, and that is going to be a great help in providing job opportunities for those ex-combatants.

The representative of Cameroon questioned whether the pledges were additional or were part of earlier pledges. I really cannot speak on behalf of other countries, but my impression is that the contributions offered by donor nations are part of their earlier pledges, first made at the International Conference for Afghanistan held in Tokyo one year ago. As a matter of fact, one year ago the Tokyo Conference amassed $4.5 billion of contribution pledges from the international community. At the time the Tokyo Conference was held, no concrete projects were in place. It is therefore only natural for donor countries to contribute out of that total pledge amount as concrete programmes are developed.

As far as Japan is concerned, the $35 million that we have pledged to the programme is part of $500 million that the Government of Japan pledged for overall reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.

The representative of Chile asked about other types of DDR that have been developed in other countries. I am not very familiar with others exercises in this area; Mr. Guéhenno may be able to draw some parallels between those past experiences and the experiences we are having in Afghanistan.

The Syrian representative asked about bridging the gap between DDR and the development projects. I am not sure whether I can answer that question properly. Let me talk about the parallels that I am drawing all the time. It depends upon whom we talk to, but as for the number of soldiers to be released from the army formations, people have been talking about 100,000, 200,000 or 300,000 soldiers being released eventually under the DDR programme. I should also mention the 2 million refugees who have returned to the country since the cessation of conflict.

So, on the one hand, we talk about soldiers to be released from the army structure, but on the other hand, we have a huge number of refugees — almost 10 times as many refugees as soldiers. To attend to refugees and to internally displaced persons is a serious task in itself; we must take care of them. But at the same time, we must take care of soldiers, even though they are fewer in number, because to induce those soldiers to reintegrate into civilian life is clearly an important ingredient for the formation of the new Afghanistan as a country developing in peace.

Therefore, we must indeed deal with many aspects of the development process in Afghanistan, including taking care of refugees, building infrastructure and rehabilitating schools and hospitals, among many other things. We are doing — and we must do — all those things. But, at the same time, we must take care of all these soldiers and officers, because their returning to civilian life means that the country itself will change its basic profile.

The President: I thank Ambassador Nishimura for his comments and clarifications. I now give the floor to Mr. Guéhenno.

Mr. Guéhenno: The representative of the Russian Federation asked whether we had been approached by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). We have not. We have heard from press reports that such an idea might be considered, but thus far I am not aware of any North Atlantic Council decision with respect to Afghanistan.

(*spoke in French*)

The representative of France asked about the forthcoming decree concerning the police. As we understand it, the decree will provide information about the size of the police and border police forces, about the restructuring of the Ministry and about the

creation of a road police as part of the transformation of the police structure in Afghanistan. What will the obstacles be? The obstacles will be of the same kind as those encountered in the creation of the Afghan national army: the questions of funding and of balanced representation among the various ethnic groups within the police and, generally, the question of how to improve the security situation. That is something that we have been discussing this morning. The police in a pacified Afghanistan will necessarily take the lead role vis-à-vis the army. We are not quite there yet. There is also the question of extending the national police beyond Kabul, and I think that will certainly be one of the most delicate and most important questions in moving peace-building forward in Afghanistan.

(*spoke in English*)

The Permanent Representative of Angola asked whether it would be realistic to have elections in 2004. Indeed, the challenges are considerable, and this morning's discussion shows that, as far as improving security is concerned, there is still a long way to go. But was it realistic to have an Interim Administration two weeks after the Bonn Agreement? Was it realistic to have an Emergency Loya Jirga a few months later? I think that, ever since the beginning, we have been under a very tight timetable; that was a political decision. Thus far, we have met the various deadlines, and I think that is a tribute to the political will of the Afghan people — and also to the sustained commitment of the international community. If that political will and the commitment of the international community remain what they should be, then perhaps we will not say that it is unrealistic to have elections.

Ambassador Nishimura referred to me the comments of the representative of Chile about lessons learned from other experiences with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). There are many lessons indeed; I would focus on two of them. One is the question of financing, which is a perennial problem with any DDR programme and a concrete example of the importance of a sustained international commitment to Afghanistan. The other lesson — and I think this morning's discussion has been an illustration of this — is that there must be a close link between the DDR programme and the reform of the security sector; they really go hand in hand. So I think that more and more coordination between those two facets of the consolidation of peace in Afghanistan is welcome.

The representative of China asked us how we could reduce attacks on United Nations personnel. I think there are two answers to that question. One is of a general nature. Attacks on United Nations personnel are only one disturbing aspect of the general security situation in Afghanistan. Everything that is done to reform the security sector — to consolidate local politics throughout Afghanistan through institutions, not through the power of the gun — will have a positive impact on the security of our people. That being said, the other response that we can give is that we must take precautions. We are doing that through the implementation of what we call Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS) — that is, we are instructing United Nations personnel in Afghanistan to follow strict procedures with respect to transit from one place to another — such as from their residences to the places where they work — so as to minimize risk for our people in Afghanistan.

The President: I thank the Under-Secretary-General for his comments and answers. I now give the floor to Ambassador Braun.

Mr. Braun: I should like to group the numerous questions that have been addressed to me under several thematic headings, starting with the question by the representative of the United Kingdom about the recruitment of personnel to the Ministry of Interior and to the police and about their qualifications. I should like to include in this group the questions by the representatives of the United States, Chile and Angola.

It is difficult, but not impossible, to recruit qualified personnel. It seems that work in the police force is attractive to Afghan nationals, that it is prestigious and that it has a good tradition. When candidates were selected for the first intake of 1,500 in the police academy courses, starting in August of last year, it was possible to include qualified recruits from all 32 provinces, providing a proper ethnic mix reflecting of the population.

The second question by the representative of the United Kingdom was whether international support for the police project was broad enough. More international support is needed, as I said in my statement. How can it be increased? We have developed a catalogue of modules, into which the whole police project has been broken down. It is a living document that contains numerous modules of training, reconstruction and equipment details. I have

had an opportunity to share this catalogue with a number of interested countries by travelling to capitals that had indicated interest. I would like to use this opportunity to let the Council know that the catalogue can be had from our United Nations Mission here in New York. It can also be had through Council members' embassies in Berlin, as well as through our embassy and the police project office at Kabul.

We hold regular meetings in Berlin with countries that have been participating in the police project. At the last meeting there were 16 nations present. That is not a closed group. I would like to invite all members to let us know whether there is something they can do in order to support the project. I am pretty certain that in this catalogue of modules there is one that fits existing requirements and possibilities.

(spoke in French)

Mr. Guéhenno has already made some comments regarding the question raised by the representative of France on the presidential decree. Given that this concerns a presidential decree that is currently being prepared, it is probably not appropriate to address this matter in greater detail in an open meeting. However, I am prepared to share with the members of the Security Council, during the closed meeting that is to follow this one, the advice we have given the Administration in Kabul.

(spoke in English)

The representative of Russia asked about cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours in the sector of the police and the services. The representative of Guinea also mentioned this question of cooperation, particularly as regards the fight against illicit drugs. Cooperation has been completely insufficient in the past. It needs to be developed.

I mentioned in my briefing that the police information system (POLIS) currently being developed provides the necessary infrastructure to link Kabul with the provinces. It also provides the software necessary to go beyond borders and to link neighbouring countries into the information system.

A second aspect of regional cooperation is being studied, including through a project for a regional police conference on Afghanistan that is slated to be held in the second or third quarter of this year in a country of the region that has diplomatic relations both with Afghanistan and with all its neighbours.

The representative of Mexico asked about the relationship between national and provincial police forces. I probably did not make it sufficiently clear in my statement that the project is for the establishment of one national police force for the entire country. Provincial forces will be part of that national police force. The plan is not to have any independent police forces in the provinces, as was the case in the past. There will instead be one single, national unified police force, under the command of the Government in Kabul, which, of course, will appoint regional police commanders who will report to the central Government in Kabul. As Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno has mentioned, the implementation of this project is of course one of the biggest obstacles we face.

The representative of China asked about what could be done to get Afghanistan to take full advantage of its membership of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Last year, Germany helped Afghanistan to fulfil the requirements for INTERPOL membership. That membership came about at the INTERPOL conference held in October last year. Part of the police reconstruction project is to build up the INTERPOL unit in the Afghan Ministry of the Interior. We hope that, with the development of that project, Afghanistan will be able to take full advantage of its INTERPOL membership, which of course has the greatest relevance in combating the international problem of drugs.

The President: I thank all three briefers for the very valuable information they have given us.

In accordance with the prior understanding, I shall now adjourn this meeting and convene a short private meeting of the Security Council in order to give Ambassador Braun an opportunity to provide the Council with some additional information. I invite all non-Council members, observers and media personnel to leave the Chamber.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4712

Security Council

Distr.: General
24 February 2003

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 4712th (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 February 2003, at 12.30 p.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"At its 4712th meeting, held in private on 24 February 2003, the Security Council considered the item entitled 'The situation in Afghanistan'.

"The Council, in accordance with the invitation extended at its 4711th meeting under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, heard a statement by H.E. Mr. Harald Braun, Special Representative of the German Government.

"The President extended an invitation to Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, in accordance with the decision taken at the 4711th meeting under rule 39.

"The members of the Council and Mr. Braun, and Mr. Guéhenno had a constructive exchange of views."

03-25696 (E) 240203

United Nations S/PV.4713

Security Council

Fifty-eighth year

Provisional

4713rd meeting

Tuesday, 25 February 2003, 10 a.m.

New York

President	Mr. Pleuger	(Germany)
Members	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Bulgaria	Mr. Raytchev
	Cameroon	Mr. Belinga Eboutou
	Chile	Mr. Maquieira
	China	Mr. Wang Yingfan
	France	Mr. Duclos
	Guinea	Mr. Traoré
	Mexico	Mr. Pujalte
	Pakistan	Mr. Akram
	Russian Federation	Mr. Konuzin
	Spain	Mr. Arias
	Syrian Arab Republic	Mr. Wehbe
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Jeremy Greenstock
	United States of America	Mr. Williamson

Agenda

General issues relating to sanctions

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

03-25756 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Expression of sympathy to the Government and people of China in connection with the recent earthquake in the country

The President: At the outset of the meeting, I should like, on behalf of the Security Council, to extend our heartfelt sympathy to the Government and the people of China in connection with the earthquake which occurred in the Xinjiang region, resulting in considerable destruction and loss of life. I would request the representative of China to convey to his Government and people our grief and sincere condolence.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

General issues relating to sanctions

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Sweden, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

On behalf of the Council, I extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Mr. Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Dahlgren (Sweden), took a seat at the Council table.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Danilo Türk, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Türk to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by His Excellency Mr. Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. I now give him the floor.

Mr. Dahlgren (Sweden): Let me first thank you, Sir, for your invitation and for organizing this session on sanctions. There could be no better time than this, I think, to focus on the need to improve the instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Many situations in the past, when words of condemnation have had little effect and military force has been seen as the last resort, have triggered a search for other means to influence behaviour and obtain compliance with the decisions of the Security Council.

Something between words and war — that is how the instruments of sanctions can be described. Like other tools, they can be truly effective only if they are sharp enough, focused enough and designed for the particular operation they are intended to perform. This is about targeted sanctions, and how such sanctions can be developed into an even more important tool to help the Security Council fulfil its primary task of maintaining international peace and security.

I am here to present to the Council the results of what we have called the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. That project has dealt with how to increase the efficiency of sanctions by reforming and improving their implementation, while also minimizing unintentional negative consequences.

This is the third initiative in a growing international debate on the need for more efficient, more fine-tuned and more humane sanctions. The first was taken in Interlaken, Switzerland, and focused on targeted financial sanctions. That was followed, as the Council knows, by the Bonn-Berlin process on arms embargoes, travel and aviation-related sanctions. The Governments of Switzerland and of Germany recognized early on the need to make sanctions smarter.

The Stockholm report is the result of a process that lasted for more than a year. It has engaged government officials, non-governmental organizations,

regional organizations and international institutions, as well as academics and experts from various areas with expertise in the field of sanctions implementation.

Targeted sanctions are designed to focus specifically on the individuals or other entities that are responsible for threats to and breaches of international peace and security. Ideally, such sanctions will leave other parts of the population, as well as international trade relations, unaffected.

The main goal of the Stockholm Process has been to suggest ways to strengthen the capacity to implement such targeted sanctions, both here within the United Nations system and among Member States. One priority has been to identify measures to enhance the planning, monitoring, reporting and coordination among sanctions committees and monitoring bodies.

In the booklet that is before members, which is full of suggestions for the implementation of United Nations policy options, there is a set of guidelines for how the work of United Nations panels and mechanisms that are tasked with the monitoring of sanctions can be improved. Members will also find that it suggests the idea of establishing a sanctions coordinator, or special adviser, to further improve and support coordination among sanctions committees, expert panels and monitoring mechanisms.

My own conviction that more can be done within the United Nations system to improve the sanctions regimes goes back several years, to 1997, when I was chosen as the first chairperson of the Sierra Leone sanction Committee. Looking back at my work then, I clearly see missed opportunities — situations in which too little rather than too much was done. With better resources and better coordination, much more is now possible.

But sanctions are only as strong as the structures within which they are implemented. That is why the Stockholm Process has looked at different ways to enhance and support Member State implementation by strengthened national capacity. The report before the Council includes an elaborated model law for developing legal frameworks for sanctions implementation.

Members will also find various national measures, listed according to the type of sanctions to be implemented. In addition, there is a recommendation to address a special questionnaire to Member States on their capacity to implement sanctions and on their ability to provide technical assistance to Member States that need it.

While the use of these tools or sanctions has increased, there has been growing concern over the negative effects of economic sanctions on vulnerable populations and societies in general. The collateral effects of sanctions on third States have been highlighted, and rightly so. At the same time, many key actors — those that are intended to be the targets of sanctions — have evaded and circumvented such measures by various means. That is a problem that is increasing. It not only affects the effectiveness of sanctions themselves, but risks eroding the very legitimacy of the measures imposed. The Stockholm Process recommends a number of different strategies, depending on the type of sanctions, to counter sanctions evasion and maintain the accuracy of sanctions.

How to target sanctions best may look to some like a technical question. To me, these issues are very political. When the Security Council takes a decision, it must be respected all over the world. That respect may easily be eroded if the action decided upon cannot be well implemented. That is why sanctions that work, and sanctions that lead to results, will be so important for public support, and for the support that the United Nations itself would thereby gain.

The Government of Sweden sincerely hopes that the concrete and practical results of the Stockholm Process will be of value for policy makers and implementers at all levels. Above all, I hope that they will be of some use to you, Mr. President, and your 14 colleagues, as you constructively carry out your immense responsibility, on behalf of all of us, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The President: I thank the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Danilo Türk.

Mr. Türk: I am very pleased to participate in the discussion today, which coincides with the publication of the key findings of the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. Having actively supported and participated in the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes, the Secretariat has observed with keen interest as ideas and

recommendations emerging from each of those processes have found their expression in recent Security Council deliberations and decisions concerning sanctions.

I should like at the outset to thank the Government of Sweden for its generous support for the Stockholm Process, and to offer particular thanks to Sweden's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hans Dahlgren, for his guidance and expertise, gained in no small part from his dedicated service as a member of the Security Council and as Chairman of the Sierra Leone sanctions Committee. I am very pleased to see Mr. Dahlgren here today at this Council meeting.

I should also like to acknowledge the role played by the Coordinator of the Stockholm Process, Professor Peter Wallensteen of Uppsala University, who is also with us today, in organizing the expert meetings and leading them to a successful conclusion. I also pay tribute at this time to the Governments of Switzerland and Germany for the vital support they provided to the targeted sanctions initiatives that preceded the Stockholm Process.

In his most recent report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General noted that he was encouraged by the ongoing efforts at the intergovernmental and expert levels to design "smarter" Security Council sanctions measures. He also recognized that the participation of partners from civil society, academia and the private sector in the expert meetings — a hallmark of all three processes — could help to build the political will necessary for effective sanctions.

I will not take up valuable time on this occasion to review the activities and findings of the three major processes on targeted sanctions. I would, however, note how highly relevant the work already undertaken in areas such as financial sanctions and arms embargoes continues to be. This is all the more so in the light of concerns about the flow of resources to individuals and entities associated with international terrorism, as well as concerns regarding ongoing instability in a number of regions that has been linked to the illicit flow of small arms. In hindsight, it is clear that the expert meetings on targeted sanctions that we are discussing here today have been on the right track; it is now important that the Council devise further guidance.

The Stockholm paper touches upon the importance of transparency and of promoting a sense of ownership regarding the implementation of targeted sanctions among the broader membership. Resolution 1455 (2003), adopted as the Stockholm paper was being finalized, calls on the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) (1267 Committee), with input from the Monitoring Group, to provide guidance to all Member States regarding submission of the implementation reports required by the resolution. Those reports, based on transparent criteria, will be taken into account in briefings that will be made to the Council by the Chairman of the 1267 Committee, in accordance with resolution 1455 (2003). It is to be hoped that this mechanism will help the Committee to encourage regular input from Member States and that the reports submitted will inform the Committee of areas where technical assistance is most acutely needed.

While recognizing that it may at times be necessary to uphold the confidentiality of sources of information available to expert panels or monitoring groups regarding sanctions-busting or non-compliance, the Stockholm paper notes that the credibility of the findings and the integrity of the process require that evidence be as transparent and verifiable as possible. In that connection, I would note that the Council again acted in parallel to those findings when, in resolutions 1408 (2002) and 1458 (2003), it requested the Panel of Experts on Liberia to make efforts to bring relevant information to the attention of States concerned for investigation and appropriate action, and to allow them the right of reply.

The advances made in sanctions theory and practice, however, have also served to reveal new pitfalls and ineffective implementation, while also drawing attention to existing problems that were hitherto unrecognized. The assistance that the handbook before members will provide to the Council in identifying and addressing those lacunae is undoubtedly one of the most significant outcomes of the Stockholm Process.

One set of findings common to Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin pointed to the need for enhanced monitoring, accompanied by other ways of ensuring that States have the capacity to effectively implement targeted sanctions. Those important concerns were picked up under the able leadership of Sweden and put at the core of the Stockholm Process, together with groundbreaking analysis on how to maintain the focus

of sanctions on targeted actors in response to evasion strategies.

The Council is very familiar by now with the effective work of independent investigative panels and monitoring mechanisms, and it has also heard the findings of field missions undertaken by sanctions committee Chairmen. As the various expert groups established by the Council have proliferated, and as the sanctions committee Chairs have become more engaged, the need for better coordination in many areas of sanctions implementation has come to the fore. Many of the reports produced by the expert groups have identified similar patterns of violation, often orchestrated by identical actors. And, perhaps even more important, the expert group reports have identified similar avenues of follow-up action that the Council could pursue, including in relation to regional or other competent organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

There would appear to be room to improve the expert group mechanism by fully utilizing collective experiences and by coordinating approaches to better respond to the Council's mandates. The Stockholm paper before members includes, for the first time, careful analysis and recommendations on those and related issues. The Secretariat stands ready to do all it can to facilitate contacts between various entities established by the Council, to improve coordination among all actors involved and to enhance institutional memory. For their part, the members of the Security Council and other interested States may wish to continue to seek improved modalities for taking coordinated follow-up action on findings and recommendations of the expert groups.

The Secretariat hopes that the Council will take the findings of the Stockholm Process into account when it conducts sanctions reviews or when it considers future application of the targeted sanctions instrument, because, without effective implementation, there is a risk that much of the good work accomplished since 1997 will remain in the domain of theory rather in that of practice, notwithstanding the results already achieved.

The Secretariat likewise hopes that the Council and the broader international community will continue to build upon the valuable work already undertaken in the area of targeted sanctions. There are a number of key elements that remain to be addressed, including, among others, improving coordination among all relevant actors, optimizing the design and use of sanctions lists, and studying ways by which to probe the deterrent value of targeted Security Council sanctions and their integration into an overall strategy for preventive diplomacy. Issues such as those could be considered now and in the future, and the Secretariat will continue to provide its assistance.

The President: I thank the Assistant Secretary-General for his statement.

Mr. Raytchev (Bulgaria): First of all, I should like to thank you, Mr. President, for organizing this open meeting on general issues relating to sanctions and on the final report of the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. Let me also express our gratitude to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, His Excellency Mr. Hans Dahlgren, as well as to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, under whose auspices the final meeting of the Stockholm Process was held. We appreciate the presentation by Assistant Secretary-General Türk, which was insightful and has been helpful for this discussion. We are also grateful to the academic circles — especially those from Uppsala University — as well as to the diplomats, international officials, scholars and independent experts working in the area of sanctions and, last but not least, to the non-governmental organizations that took part in the Process.

As an active participant both in the preparatory discussion and in the final meeting, held at Stockholm in November 2002, Bulgaria shares and supports the conclusions, guidelines and recommendations laid down in the final text of the report. The inclusion of a special section dedicated to unintended consequences of sanctions implementation for third States and to the need for direct or indirect compensation for damages caused to them was backed by the experience of Bulgaria as a State severely affected by the sanctions imposed on the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq.

We support the final report of the Stockholm Process as a whole. I should like, on behalf of my country, only to add the following comments. Bulgaria supports the view that the imposition of compulsory measures by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against States and/or

other entities whose actions represent a threat to international peace and security shall be done on the basis of a preliminary comprehensive assessment of the situation. That should allow for the adequate focusing of targeted sanctions on responsible decision makers while minimizing unintended side effects, such as negative consequences for the population of the targeted State, its neighbours or third States. In that connection, the Stockholm Process provides valuable practical guidelines on how to improve sanctions methodology.

Secondly, humanitarian impact assessment should be included as a standard requirement in the regular reports of the expert groups, which is the practice developed under Security Council resolution 1408 (2002), on Liberia. Such assessment should be conducted in accordance with preliminary criteria, based on, for example, the methodologies developed by the Inter-agency Standing Committee of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and reflected adequately in the reports of the Expert Groups on Liberia.

Extremely useful, in our view, is the regular assessment of the unintended impact of enforced sanctions, which allows for distinction between the effects of sanctions and other causes of humanitarian and economic crises in the targeted State. We also support the proposal for the establishment of an autonomous uniform mechanism for sanctions-monitoring within the framework of the United Nations Secretariat aimed at improving coordination and avoiding duplication in the work of the ad hoc expert groups.

Coordination between the expert groups and the sanctions committees, on the one hand, and the relevant technical and regional organizations, on the other, should also be improved. We also believe it would be useful to have regular coordination between the sanctions committees, including the holding of joint meetings aimed at facilitating their work and ensuring consistency and continuity among them. In our view, the need to improve the management of information related to the implementation of sanctions is also to be stressed. The putting in place of a centralized and accessible database and the establishment of an integrated institutional memory would ensure continuity in this work and provide timely relevant background information on the implementation of sanctions.

The main objective of the planning and implementation of targeted sanctions should be that they be well focused on the targeted actors. In that regard, the final report of the Stockholm Process contains useful observations and guidelines.

Finally, an important issue related to the negative side effects of the implementation of sanctions is the practical implementation of the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides for consultations between the Security Council and third States confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures in compliance with Chapter VII of the Charter. In our view, although that issue has been extensively discussed in the General Assembly's Sixth Committee, in the Security Council and during the Stockholm Process, there are still aspects to be clarified. Work on those aspects should continue in the future.

In conclusion, I would like to express our confidence that the outcome of the Stockholm Process provides answers to key problems having practical importance for the work of the Security Council in the area of implementing sanctions. We believe that the steady and purposeful work of the participants in the Process will contribute significantly to our common efforts to devise better-targeted and more effective sanctions aimed at more efficiently preventing future threats to international peace and security.

Mr. Wang Yingfan (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): First of all, I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having expressed sympathy to China in connection with the earthquake that caused material and human losses. I will convey to the Government of China the sympathy expressed by the President and other speakers.

I would also like to thank Mr. Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, for his briefing about the Stockholm Process, and Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Türk for the briefing he made.

The Stockholm Process represents a useful exploration of issues pertaining to sanctions in all their aspects. We also take note of the recommendations made by the Stockholm Process on the role and relevance of the United Nations with respect to targeted sanctions and on the Organization's capacity to implement such sanctions and deal with the evasion

of sanctions. We thank the Government of Sweden and the participants in the Process for their efforts.

Sanctions are one of the means of enforcement tools that the Charter provides to the Security Council in its maintenance of international peace and security. Judging from the implementation of Council sanctions in some regions during recent years — particularly in Africa, in Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia — sanctions have played an active role in easing and resolving armed conflicts and in promoting regional peace. At the same time, the grave humanitarian situations resulting from sanctions, and from comprehensive sanctions in particular, have led to general concern in the international community. Among the practical questions facing the Council and the international community are how the Council should use sanctions when deciding to impose such measures, how better to tailor sanctions, how efforts can be made to reduce the impact on civilians and on third countries, and how sanctions should be implemented and their effectiveness enhanced.

First, the Chinese delegation believes that, in the light of the possible impact of sanctions on innocent civilians and on third countries, care must be exercised when a decision to impose sanctions is taken. Specific arrangements must be made in accordance with the situation at hand and exit strategies must be considered in order to limit the duration of sanctions and to avoid or reduce negative impacts as much as possible before a decision to impose sanctions is taken. The Council must also fully assess the possible humanitarian impact of the measures to be taken. Regular assessments relating to humanitarian impact must be carried out in the implementation of sanctions in order that sanctions may be adjusted and improved.

Secondly, in addition to political will among countries, monitoring mechanisms are necessary for sanctions to be effective. Sanctions imposed by the Council against UNITA were relatively successful, in part because a reasonably effective monitoring mechanism was put in place. This could serve as a reference for the effective implementation of other sanctions imposed by the Council. Of course, the Council must provide guidance to the relevant sanctions committees, monitoring mechanisms and groups of experts. At the same time, there must also be greater communication and coordination among those bodies.

Thirdly, any decision to implement sanctions must be based on the overall requirement to ease and resolve conflicts. In that way, sanctions can more effectively and accurately target those responsible for undermining peace and security.

Mr. Gaspar Martins (Angola): I would like to begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for organizing this meeting on a key problem for the Security Council.

The introduction of targeted financial and travel sanctions by the Security Council against individuals involves a qualitative change in the Council's sanctions policy, which we greatly welcome. We view the Stockholm Process as a follow-up to an international process dealing with targeted sanctions on the basis of earlier work in the Interlaken, Bonn and Berlin processes. There has indeed been progress in the work on sanctions, as witnessed by the briefings given to the Council this morning by Assistant Secretary-General Türk and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Dahlgren. My delegation fully supports these kinds of initiatives. We are pleased by those initiatives, and are most sincerely thankful to the Governments of Sweden, Germany and Switzerland for them.

My country, Angola, is an example of the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. As Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, we can greatly benefit from the work of the sanctions Committee, since conflict prevention and resolution in Africa can be greatly enhanced by lessons drawn from the document which has been presented to us.

In conclusion, it is our hope that the combination of these kinds of initiatives and larger meetings will bring about a new and stronger commitment to targeted sanctions, as we are convinced that this can help the Security Council to promote the effective implementation of such sanctions, as a major contribution to international peace and security.

Mr. Duclos (France) (*spoke in French*): Like my colleagues, I wish to thank State Secretary Hans Dahlgren for his presentation of the results of the Stockholm Process. I wish also to thank Mr. Danilo Türk for the remarks he made.

Allow me briefly to make a few comments. First, we welcome the way in which the debate on targeted sanctions has been conducted, because the consideration of this issue, which has been under way

for some time, has been enriched by a large number of constructive exchanges of view between members of the Security Council and non-members, and between the United Nations and civil society. The work that we now have before us is therefore the outgrowth of intensive exchanges of view which owe a great deal to the contribution of academics, private-sector professionals, non-governmental organizations and research institutes. We welcome this.

Overall, France endorses the approach and the conclusions of the Stockholm Process. The approach is based on targeted sanctions, and we believe that targeting sanctions means better increasing pressure where we wish it to be exerted, while identifying and hitting specific actors and at the same time reducing the risk of collateral impact on innocent civilian populations.

As the Council is aware, we support a philosophy of sanctions that is based on certain principles: sanctions should be targeted and time-limited, and their impact should be evaluated regularly, both in terms of their political objective and from the humanitarian standpoint.

Thirdly, in the work that we have before us today, I should like to stress our particular interest in certain recommendations. This is true of the second recommendation concerning the international support that any sanctions regime must receive.

Similarly, we welcome the fact that the proposals concerning panels of experts and enhancing the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat are in accord with the French-British proposal for a semi-permanent monitoring mechanism for the implementation of targeted sanctions and other associated issues. The idea of setting up a United Nations special coordinator for sanctions also merits close study.

I wish to conclude on two points. First, I wish to say how important we believe it is for the Security Council to complete its normative work on sanctions and to adopt the conclusions of the Working Group on sanctions. Secondly, and very specifically, I would like to stress the value of working to implement proposals aimed at improving existing arrangements. In this regard, allow me to state this once again: it would be appropriate to strengthen the capacities of the Secretariat and to learn all the lessons inherent in the success of expert panels.

Likewise, allow me to urge the members of the Council to work on the basis of the French-British proposal and the pertinent recommendations of the Stockholm Process.

Mr. Traoré (Guinea) (*spoke in French*): My delegation would like at the outset to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this public meeting on general questions relating to sanctions. We would like also to welcome the presence here of Mr. Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, and to thank him for his important statement. We would also like to thank Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Türk for his extremely useful statement.

Over the past decade, the Security Council, in accordance with its mandate, has been obliged to make use of sanctions as a means of maintaining and restoring peace and security in many regions of the world. While sanctions have played a crucial role in the promotion of international peace and security, we are obliged, however, to note that they have not had all the success we had hoped for.

In some situations, they have not been effective and have had a clear impact on civilian populations and neighbouring States during the course of their use. This state of affairs has on occasion raised questions regarding the usefulness of sanctions and even tarnished the image of the United Nations.

That is why over time the international community has felt that there is a need to improve not only the definition but also the targets and the effectiveness of sanctions. To that end, our Council decided, in April 2000, to create an informal working group for the consideration of general issues related to sanctions. Along the same lines, the Interlaken process, begun in Sweden in 1998 and 1999, brought together experts, non-governmental organizations and United Nations representatives to consider the issue of financial sanctions.

The Bonn-Berlin process which followed, in 1999 and 2000, in turn dealt with arms embargoes and travel bans. These two processes led to the adoption of smart, targeted sanctions, which have made it possible to minimize the impact of sanctions on civilian populations and on third countries. Those instruments were supplemented by the Stockholm protocol, which led to the drawing up of effective measures for the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions.

My delegation welcomes these commendable initiatives which are mutually complementary and attest to our shared will to make sanctions more effective and more efficient.

The increasingly important role played by the sanctions committees created by the Security Council clearly demonstrates this. Thus it should also be noted that in targeting leaders, administrations or specific groups, sanctions have made it possible to maintain the required pressure on them and, in some cases, to change their stance in order to restore peace.

However, as effective as they may be, it must be recognized that smart sanctions continue to be the subject of frequent violations, be they arms embargoes, freezing of financial assets, or travel bans.

In order to right the situation, it would be desirable for the Council to become further involved in the ongoing improvement of regimes in force, while avoiding selectivity. This means that, in addition to the traditional role allocated to the panels of experts and follow-up groups, we should create a series of reliable and effective uniform monitoring mechanisms. The example of Angola is enlightening in that respect.

Moreover, my delegation believes that, if the mechanism is to function effectively, the sanctions committees must be provided with adequate financial resources so as to be able to assist those States that do not have the means necessary to create the required legal and normative arsenal.

Despite the highly commendable efforts that have been made, the Council's informal working group has yet to agree on a common position that could improve the sanctions regimes. In our view, the remaining differences on certain points may be sensitive but are not insurmountable. With a little more will and the desire to agree, we could overcome those differences and produce a consensus document on the administration, conception and implementation of sanctions. That is why we urge all the members of the group to work to achieve that objective.

Furthermore, we remain convinced that sanctions can be fully effective only if consultation and cooperation are maintained on a regular basis between the Secretariat and the sanctions committees, on the one hand, and interested international, regional and subregional organizations, on the other. We warmly encourage such activities, which contribute to strengthening the dissemination of information on the application of sanctions and their economic and humanitarian consequences. In the same vein, the sanctions committees must strengthen their cooperation because certain of their activities are being duplicated.

In conclusion, I should like to express my delegation's conviction that, far from being repressive measures, targeted sanctions are in fact an excellent means of prompting offending States, organizations and groups to abide by the United Nations Charter. They are therefore an effective tool for stimulating the required political will necessary to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Mr. Williamson (United States of America): The United States delegation expresses its appreciation to State Secretary Hans Dahlgren of Sweden for his concise, informative and extremely valuable briefing on the outcome of the Stockholm Process discussions in Sweden on making targeted sanctions work. The series of meetings held in Sweden in 2002, focusing on ways to improve the implementation and enforcement of targeted multilateral sanctions, was extremely helpful.

We also appreciate the investments previously made by the German and Swiss Governments in hosting similar conferences focused on improving the design and implementation of targeted multilateral sanctions. The Stockholm Process, much like earlier, similar conferences in Interlaken, Bonn and Berlin, was an important forum for the informal exchange of views among experts on making sanctions more effective.

My delegation believes that sanctions remain a viable and very useful policy option for use by the Security Council to modify the behaviour of a State or entity that poses a threat to international peace and security or that has committed an act of aggression. As authorized in Article 41 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council's imposition of a "complete or partial interruption of economic relations" with a targeted actor offers an approach greater than persuasion, but less than the use of force, to compel a desired change in policy and behaviour.

In recent years, sanctions have proven to be an effective policy tool that the Security Council has used to alter events on the ground, increase the costs to non-compliant actors and pressure States and groups to lessen their involvement in illicit activities. With the advent of expert panels and monitoring mechanisms,

the Security Council has found a method for using information gathered by experts to name and shame those who deviate from accepted norms by delegitimizing their activities. We should not underestimate the impact of naming and shaming as a tool to compel parties to adjust their behaviour.

While the United States opposes any effort to limit policy options available to the Security Council to address threats to international peace and security, we acknowledge the desirability, where possible, of targeting restricted measures the Security Council may impose to avoid unnecessary negative impact on civilians and other States. We should not ignore the humanitarian consequences of United Nations sanctions. To the extent possible, sanctions should try to limit the negative impact on civilians who, too often, are already suffering under the yoke of a repressive Government at home.

We believe that recent sanctions regimes, such as the measures imposed by the Security Council on the Government of Liberia under resolutions 1343 (2001) and 1408 (2002), demonstrate our shared desire to focus only on those individuals whose actions and policies pose a threat to stability.

I should like now to comment briefly on the evolution of sanctions policies beyond geographic boundaries. Terrorist acts are a growing threat to international peace and security. Fanatics willing to target and kill innocent civilians to advance their own political agendas are a clear and present danger that must be addressed. Fortunately, the community of nations — individually, in coalitions and in the United Nations — is trying to confront this danger. The recent shift in the focus of Security Council-imposed sanctions beyond geographic borders appropriately reflects our shared commitment to ensuring that the threat of international terrorism is defeated.

The work of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999), both under previous Committee Chairman Valdivieso of Colombia and now under Ambassador Valdés of Chile, deserves special mention as an example of the progress that can be achieved through our collective efforts. Financing is a critical contributing factor to the cycle of terrorist acts. Curbing the financial flow of terrorists stops some of their evil activities and forces terrorists out of their comfort zones. The Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) is making a significant contribution to the war against terrorism.

This is also an area where the United Nations is playing a big role to disrupt terrorist networks, curb their effectiveness and limit their reach. The Al Qaeda/Taliban sanctions regime is, by its very nature, targeted against terrorists and their supporters. Security Council resolution 1455 (2003), adopted in January as a presidential text, should improve Member States' implementation of these sanctions — a key theme emphasized in the Stockholm Process.

Another area that received significant consideration under the Stockholm Process was enhancing the United Nations role in sanctions implementation. In this regard, the United States delegation notes that the Secretariat previously established a roster of experts to serve on United Nations expert panels and monitoring mechanisms. The United States recommends that the Secretariat now seek from all Member States the names of qualified experts in such areas as arms control, border monitoring, financing controls and other relevant areas for immediate addition to the roster. The United States also believes that it is imperative that the Secretariat establish an informal system that would document and categorize the relevant findings and recommendations of the various expert groups currently and previously authorized by the Security Council with a view to generating commonalities in the work of their groups as well as reducing overlap and increasing efficiency.

The international community should continue to seek improvements by Member States in their implementation of all sanction regimes. Gaps in capacity need to be highlighted and better addressed. There are countries with the will and capacity to fight terrorism. There are countries with the will but which lack the capacity to build an adequate infrastructure of laws, border controls, export controls, financial controls, etc. We encourage Governments to assist willing but unable States to improve their capacities, whether through the training of national authorities, increased border controls, the adoption of national legislation or the use of expertise offered by specialized international agencies. This is an area where the United Nations and lead countries can make an enormous contribution by helping others.

Unfortunately, there are States with the capacity but which are unwilling to combat terrorism. Those

countries should be held to account. As Counter-Terrorism Committee Chairman Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Council in January, we must put some teeth into this effort.

In conclusion, first let me respond to an intervention by an earlier delegation and make clear that the United States believes that sanctions measures should be tied directly to the described change in policy and behaviour of targeted actors, rather than artificially linked to the duration of sanctions to an arbitrary time limit.

The United States reiterates its appreciation for the commitment made by the Governments of Sweden, Switzerland and Germany in helping to further the ongoing consideration of ways to improve the design and implementation of targeted multilateral sanctions. While our joint work on these matters remains unfinished, the outcome documents generated by the discussions in Sweden, Germany and Switzerland have helped point us in useful and important directions. We will continue to lend our support to ongoing efforts to improve the effectiveness of sanctions while minimizing their unintended consequences where possible.

Mr. Maquieira (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to begin by joining in the condolences that have been extended to the representative of the People's Republic of China on the recent earthquake in the country. Earthquakes are a phenomenon well known to Chile, and we know their devastating effects.

Allow me also to express my thanks for the useful documentation presented by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Hans Dahlgren, on the results of the Stockholm Process, as well as for the valuable contribution to the process made by Professor Wallensteen. We also welcome the contribution of Mr. Danilo Türk, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who offered us some intelligent points of consideration, as is usual in him.

The process initiated by the Government of Sweden, which is to conclude a broader process, constitutes a significant advance in the quest to improve the concept and implementation of the sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council. The Stockholm, Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes have put forward very interesting and important proposals that should be carefully studied. They have also made proposals of a more complex nature, such as the so-called secondary sanctions, which require more thorough study.

I think it is important to recall here what the Chilean Government's position on sanctions has been. While we attach utmost importance to the effective implementation of the instruments and mechanisms, including sanctions, established under the Charter with a view to helping foster and ensure respect for international peace and security, we believe that the use of indiscriminate, total and open sanctions has in some cases proven not to be effective. The speed of the impact of sanctions on the civilian population is often much greater than the speed of any change produced by the Government — if in fact it does make a change in its conduct.

Consequently, for some time now, Chile has favoured, within the framework of the Charter and the powers and authority it grants the Security Council, drawing up sanctions that are better focused and better targeted in order to change the conduct of those with the power to change, rather than — as was the logic of previous sanctions — to make the life of the population so difficult that it rebelled and produced a change in leadership. That does not usually happen. As a consequence, the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes are extremely welcome.

In general, I think that the documents that the Council has received today on the Stockholm Process deserve our recognition. We endorse both the Process and its recommendations.

On this basis, we should decisively improve the capacity of the United Nations and its Member States in implementing sanctions, including through better cooperation and coordination and technical assistance, attain better management, and allow more effective monitoring. In this process, we have affirmed the need to ensure the proportionality of the measures adopted, to adapt sanctions according to developments in the political situation, and to bear proportionality in mind in political developments.

In his intervention, Assistant Secretary-General Türk made a point that I find interesting. He spoke of the possibility of using smart sanctions as a contribution to preventive diplomacy. One area in which this might be explored, in theory at this stage, is that of financial sanctions. Some difficulties might arise in the effective implementation of that type of sanctions if we start with the supposition that a State is

given a certain period of time to modify its conduct before a sanction is applied. In the case of financial sanctions, given technological capacities and the speed with which financial resources can be moved, there might be a problem in reconciling the time limit a State is given with the effectiveness of the sanctions to be imposed. So, I think we need to explore how this can be done within the perspective of preventive diplomacy. Perhaps State Secretary Dahlgren could comment on that.

I think that the Stockholm Process completes a cycle in which there was a general appreciation of the need to explore targeted sanctions, as was done in those three processes, and that now it is time for the Council to make progress on how those sanctions are to be implemented. To that end, there is a group of experts on sanctions; their task relates to the choice of sanctions, their effectiveness, their implementation and their consequences. They could also explore the feasibility of the so-called exit strategy, which might also play a role in this process.

Lastly, I would like to stress that my country considers the proposal to appoint a coordinator for sanctions to be an interesting suggestion that could be further studied.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom): It is good to see State Secretary Dahlgren back in town; we thank him very much for his briefing. We are very grateful for the way in which he and Professor Wallensteen have given their personal commitment to the Stockholm Process. That means a lot, and it has resulted in an extremely effective and useful booklet.

We are also very grateful to Danilo Türk for his statement, which my delegation carefully noted. I will make some references to it.

The Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes provided guidelines for policy makers on sanctions design. But it is the Stockholm recommendations, as we have heard from State Secretary Dahlgren and Assistant Secretary-General Türk this morning, which take us to the next stage — that of better implementation. We all know how crucial that is. There is no point in adopting sanctions, however carefully crafted and precisely targeted, if we then fail to enforce them. One clear and obvious example is that there have been sanctions against Liberia since 1992, and that yet both the Government and the rebels have been able to import arms with relative impunity — some 200 tons of arms last summer alone — thus making a nonsense of sanctions, making the lives of the population absolutely miserable and undermining the whole objective of the original imposition of sanctions. If we impose sanctions, we must follow up.

The United Kingdom has strongly supported the Stockholm Process, and we look forward to taking forward its recommendations. Many delegations that have spoken so far have identified some of the key points. I would like just to add three points — the first on monitoring, the second on impact and the third a cross-reference to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC).

On monitoring, there is no doubt that improved monitoring should be a priority for the Council, and Stockholm has many good ideas on this, including guidelines for expert panels. As Ambassador Duclos has already noted, we and the French have put forward a joint proposal for an independent monitoring mechanism to replace the current system of ad hoc expert panels, and we are looking carefully at how to adapt that idea to respond to the Stockholm recommendations. But our key objectives will remain the same: to maintain the independent character of sanctions monitors, whether they are expert panels or a monitoring mechanism; to exploit the synergy among the different panels and make them familiar with one another's work; to eliminate overlap between monitors; and to make them more effective by improving their technical backup in terms of their database, roster of experts, network of contacts, and so on. Danilo Türk rightly put his finger on the importance of improved coordination and follow-up in making that process work, and having an effective mechanism is vital to that.

Secondly, impact has to be a primary consideration when designing and implementing sanctions. We give careful thought to humanitarian impact when we are designing sanctions and implementing them. I think that a recent example of that was resolution 1452 (2002) on the Taliban and Al Qaeda. But their impact on the target is also crucial. As Stockholm says, and as Hans Dahlgren re-emphasized this morning, the Council must identify the Achilles heel of a target in order to select sanctions that will really bite and thereby force compliance with the Council's demands.

Thirdly, I would like to make a brief point about the CTC. I was interested to note Stockholm's comments about lessons to be learned from the CTC. Although, as the Stockholm Process points out, the CTC is not a sanctions committee, the practices we have developed of transparency, detailed reporting by Member States and facilitating technical assistance for all those who need it to make the process efficient are all useful lessons for sanctions committees to consider. I think we should try the cross-application of some of those lessons from other fields to our sanctions work.

We very much welcome this initiative and today's briefings, and we look forward to seeing the Stockholm ideas come alive in Council decisions.

Mr. Wehbe (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): I should like at the outset to welcome His Excellency Mr. Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden. We are familiar with his great contributions to the work of this Organization. I would also like to thank him for presenting the final report on the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions — the result of intensive work incorporating the ideas of people known for their expertise in the field of the implementation of sanctions. I would also like to thank Mr. Danilo Türk, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, for the enlightening points that he raised in his statement.

Sanctions have long been a priority subject for many Governments, universities and research institutes because of the absence of proof of their usefulness. At times they have brought about the exact opposite of the intended result. Those research institutes and other parties therefore began to discuss ways and means of making sanctions more influential by defining their objectives. Switzerland was the lead country in this effort. Germany then volunteered to continue the process. The Stockholm initiative was the third step towards bringing the process to fruition and suggesting ways of enhancing the ability of the United Nations system and of Member States to implement targeted sanctions. Here, we must pay tribute to Uppsala University for its valuable efforts, the result of which is before us in the report under consideration today.

The Security Council has used sanctions as a way of carrying out one of its main tasks: the maintenance of international peace and security. It has become clear, however, that at least some of the current sanctions regimes, as well as the composition of the committees entrusted with their implementation, have caused humanitarian suffering in some societies, large sectors of which — including women, children and the elderly — are innocent. If we are talking about improving the system of sanctions, we must address the means to bridge that wide gap. The final report of the Stockholm Process makes some important points, relating to the selection of targeted sanctions, the means necessary to enhance the role of the United Nations in implementing targeted sanctions, and support to enable Member States to implement targeted sanctions. The report goes on to make a number of policy recommendations.

Here, we would like to stress a number of important points relating to this question. First, we must recognize that targeted sanctions are more difficult to implement than collective sanctions. We must not lose sight of their collateral effects, particularly on those sectors of the population that are not being targeted.

Secondly, we must recognize that the political will of Member States — beginning with that of Security Council members — is instrumental for the effective implementation of sanctions. That political will must be reflected in a determination to establish just and fair measures that respect human rights and conform to international humanitarian law.

Thirdly, we emphasize that sanctions must have time limits, to be renewed through resolutions adopted by the Security Council should it become evident that the targeted entity or State has failed to comply and should their significance, effectiveness and impact be deemed still relevant. It is essential that the Council immediately lift sanctions once compliance — as defined in the relevant resolution — is verified or once they are no longer necessary. Sanctions should not continue for decades as a people suffers — or as many peoples suffer.

Fourthly, we must understand the difficulties faced by States — particularly by those neighbouring the targeted entity — especially with regard to their ability to implement sanctions. That is particularly true for States whose vital interests are compromised as a result of sanctions, leading to grave economic damage. Here, we should rule out any punitive or coercive enforcement measures; these should be replaced by cooperation and understanding. Lack of cooperation

and of understanding vis-à-vis affected countries, countries lacking in resources and indeed neighbouring countries will hinder the implementation of Security Council resolutions and will undermine their credibility.

Fifthly, with respect to reporting and monitoring, monitoring groups and expert groups and mechanisms are among the most important tools available to the United Nations for the implementation of sanctions. However, we must seek out competent individuals, and we must avoid duplication and lack of continuity in their work. Even more important, we must address absence of independence on the part of those who serve on the teams.

In conclusion, we should like to say that sanctions are an important tool that has often been used by the Security Council, but they are also a grave and sensitive matter. The time has come for us to unite our official and academic efforts to establish new tools that are less harmful to people's humanitarian, economic and moral welfare and more effective in carrying out the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Konuzin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): At the outset, my delegation would like to associate itself with those delegations that have expressed their condolences and sympathy to the delegation of the People's Republic of China with regard to the natural disaster that has struck China.

We are grateful to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Dahlgren, for having introduced the document summarizing the results of the work of the Stockholm Process, in which Russian representatives played an active part. We are also grateful to Assistant Secretary-General Türk for his briefing.

Over the past decade, the question of sanctions has been the focus of ever greater attention in the work of the Security Council. We believe that there is a need for more rational and effective use of this tool of the Council. In that context, we support the initiative of a large number of countries aimed at conducting studies of an effective sanctions mechanism.

We believe that improving targeted sanctions is impossible without intensifying work to combat the unintended consequences of their use. Here, we must bear in mind the humanitarian needs of populations that do not bear direct political responsibility for the actions of their authorities, and we must minimize harm to the interests of third countries, on whose support the Council often depends for success in achieving its political objectives.

We favour the expansion of the current practice by which restrictive measures imposed by the Security Council are evaluated from the perspective of their humanitarian consequences. It is perfectly clear that, once it has been determined that bans and restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter have had a negative impact on the situation of the population in a given country, or that such sanctions have inflicted substantive damage on third parties, the Council must adjust those sanctions measures appropriately. We share the views expressed on this issue in the outcome document of the Stockholm Process. At the same time, in the light of the importance of conducting such evaluations in raising the general level of confidence in sanctions, we believe that it would be justifiable for the Council to use such a process at the stage of preparing the relevant decisions.

We also agree with the organizers of the Stockholm Process that the Security Council still has much to do to optimize the modalities for the functioning of the recently created United Nations groups of independent experts charged with monitoring the required compliance with sanctions. In that connection, the view has already been expressed — and we agree — that one of the most successful examples in this area is the work of the Monitoring Mechanism on sanctions against UNITA, which played a considerable role in halting the military and financial fuelling of the Angola conflict, as is well known. We believe that the experience acquired by the Monitoring Mechanism could today become a sort of gold standard for other expert groups with regard to a wide range of their activities.

We have no doubt that the study introduced by the Swedish delegation today will be extremely useful for the United Nations. We hope that its conclusions and recommendations will be properly assessed by Member States and will be of practical use in the work of the Organization.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): At the outset, I should like to express the condolences of the Pakistan delegation to the Permanent Representative of China and his delegation with regard to the tragic loss of lives

and property as a result of the recent earthquake that afflicted the Chinese people.

I should also like to thank the Swedish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hans Dahlgren, for his briefing on the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. In addition, I wish to express my appreciation to Assistant Secretary-General Danilo Türk for his contribution.

Article 41 of the Charter allows for the application of measures not involving the use of armed force to achieve certain objectives in the maintenance of international peace and security. Of course certain caveats have arisen with regard to the design and application of Security Council sanctions. Throughout the 1990s we saw an increase in the use of sanctions as a policy instrument by the Council. However, comprehensive sanctions have often led to undesirable results in countries against which such sanctions have been imposed, not to mention the effects on third countries.

The Secretary-General of our Organization noted in previous reports that "humanitarian and human rights policy goals cannot easily be reconciled with those of a sanctions regime" (*A/53/1, para. 64*). In another report he said that

> "Economic sanctions are too often a blunt instrument and may impose hardships on a civilian population that are disproportionate to likely political gains." (*A/56/95, para. 112*)

Sanctions have also, at times, proved to be counter-productive. They have hardened the positions of targeted regimes and caused them to behave in ways contrary to the expectations of the international community. In most cases, sanctioned regimes or groups have sought to evade or circumvent the measures imposed against them. The problem therefore is, on the one hand, to improve the accuracy of the sanctions instrument and to check the evasion of sanctions, and, on the other hand, to minimize negative consequences, especially the humanitarian effects of sanctions.

In that regard, we welcome the recent policy desire to shift to what is called smart sanctions, which aim to focus on the targeted actors and to minimize unintended consequences. We note the Interlaken process, initiated in Switzerland, on financial sanctions, which was followed by the Bonn-Berlin process, which concentrated on the design and implementation of arms embargoes and on travel and aviation-related sanctions. The Stockholm Process is the latest of these processes suggesting ways to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system and of Member States to implement targeted sanctions while giving priority to identifying measures to enhance planning, monitoring and coordination among sanctions committees and monitoring bodies.

While we support all those efforts to improve the way the Security Council designs and implements tighter and smarter sanctions, there is a need to undertake a more comprehensive review of the application, design, implementation, monitoring and, ultimately, termination of sanctions. We believe that the Council's informal working group should undertake such a review. The Council's approach to sanctions, in our view, should incorporate the following principles.

First, sanctions are a coercive measure available under Chapter VII of the Charter. They must be among the last resorts for the Council, not the first. All other possibilities and potentialities available under Chapter VI must first be exhausted before a resort to sanctions.

Second, sanctions should be imposed only in response to violations of international law and non-compliance with Security Council resolutions and obligations. Third, the Security Council is the only body authorized to impose collective international sanctions. Unilateral sanctions by individual States, no matter how well intentioned, do not enjoy international legitimacy and are often counter-productive and destabilizing.

Fourth, sanctions should be based on concrete evidence of and information on violations of international law or Security Council obligations. They should not be based on presumptions, media reports or motivated allegations. Fifth, the threat of sanctions could be more effective than the actual imposition of sanctions. Thus, conditional or deferred sanctions should be considered wherever possible.

Sixth, sanctions resolutions should clearly indicate goals and establish clear criteria for the suspension or termination of sanctions. Seventh, sanctions regimes should be time-bound, allowing for periodic review and amendment. Eighth, provisions should be made to ease sanctions, short of suspension or termination, in response to partial compliance by targeted entities, in order to achieve full compliance.

Ninth, sanctions should be implemented in a transparent manner.

Tenth, sanctions personnel, including United Nations inspectors, should reflect equitable geographic representation. Eleventh, personnel from developing countries should, if necessary, receive the training required to be able to participate in United Nations sanctions monitoring regimes.

Twelfth, sanctions regimes should incorporate humanitarian exemptions and compensation mechanisms in case of unintended consequences.

Thirteenth, sanctions regimes should be carefully and regularly assessed as regards their effectiveness in achieving their objectives and monitoring unintended humanitarian consequences. We welcome the project proposal of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on assessing the humanitarian implications of sanctions. There should also be an independent external review, including the possibility of a judicial review of the monitoring mechanisms of sanctions regimes, to obtain a realistic and objective assessment based on empirical data and field studies in targeted areas.

In conclusion, let me say that Pakistan believes that, while the sanctions regimes should continue and be improved, we must at the same time seek to evolve and strengthen other means envisaged under the Charter, including in Chapter VI, to promote the objectives of the Security Council and the international community. We must adopt a more comprehensive problem-solving approach involving conflict resolution and economic and development objectives to achieve our aims. We should not forget that our Charter provides the scope for all these possibilities. We must graduate from the thinking of the old world and adopt a more innovative approach consistent with the philosophy of solidarity of our new millennium.

Mr. Belinga-Eboutou (Cameroon) (*spoke in French*): First of all, I would like once again to extend to the Ambassador of China our sympathy and condolences over the earthquake in his country that has resulted in numerous victims.

My delegation would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having organized this public meeting of the Security Council on the subject of general issues relating to sanctions. Allow me, at the outset, to congratulate Mr. Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, for his outstanding briefing. On behalf of my country, Cameroon, I would also like to commend the efforts made by his Government to organize and finalize research on the issue of sanctions, a matter to which the international community attaches great importance.

Sanctions represent one of the major instruments available to the Security Council for carrying out its responsibilities with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. That is, in any case, what is stated in Article 41, which speaks of non-coercive measures.

The proliferation of crises and conflicts over the last few years has led to more frequent use of sanctions. However, the various sanctions regimes thus imposed have had different outcomes. Moreover, we deplore the negative consequences for third countries and the pointless suffering inflicted on the population of targeted countries.

It is therefore understandable that the Security Council, together with the international community, is continually trying to enhance the scope and effectiveness of sanctions regimes. That need for effectiveness indicates a dual concern: first, the creation of sanctions regimes designed to make the targeted individuals or entities adapt their behaviour to comply with the wishes of the international community; and secondly, the need to minimize collateral effects on civilian populations and third countries.

This dual concern is having an impact on the direction of work of the sanctions committees of the Security Council. It is also the basis for the work of the Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions, which it has been my honour to chair for the past year. This dual concern also underlies the work done in the framework of the various processes — that is, Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm; today we are seeing the results of the latter process.

My delegation would like to welcome the opportunity provided here today to engage, with the other members of the Security Council and with a representative of the Swedish Government, in a highly enlightening exchange of views, which is the culmination of the work done within the framework of the Stockholm Process.

We would like to emphasize the particular importance of that work, which is supplementing, in a most timely manner, the work done in the framework of the Interlaken and Bonn-Berlin processes, whose outcomes were submitted to the Council in 2001.

As we all are aware, the Interlaken process dealt with the practical and technical aspects of financial sanctions, while the Bonn-Berlin process focused on the negative effects of sanctions on civilian populations and on third countries.

The Stockholm Process made good use of, and built on, the achievements of the first two processes. The outcome of its work, which was presented to us today in the report before us, is particularly interesting and should be of great value to the Council. One of the major merits of the Stockholm Process is that it consolidates the concept of targeted sanctions. Today there is a genuine consensus on that concept within the international community.

The Stockholm Process has also been engaged in systematizing the conceptual, technical and practical elements needed to enhance the effectiveness of financial sanctions, arms embargoes and travel bans.

The various stages — creation, implementation and monitoring — of the process of the imposition of sanctions have been duly noted. So, too, have measures designed to strengthen the role of the United Nations, of States and of other actors of the international community in the implementation of sanctions.

Relevant recommendations are made in this report on the role of the Security Council, its various sanctions committees, expert panels and States. Particular emphasis is placed on the need for coordination and communication among these various actors. The pivotal role played by States deserves our attention. Indeed — and this should be stated — it is the behaviour of States which determines the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the various sanctions regimes. That is why the report wisely recommends that appropriate assistance be provided to the countries of the regions affected by sanctions regimes.

Other ideas can also be emphasized, such as the adoption of a model for national legislation governing the implementation of sanctions, as well as the recommendation for holding States responsible for any violation of sanctions by their nations. All of these ideas deserve careful consideration by the Security Council.

The Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions could, moreover, make good use of these ideas in achieving its goals. The Group, established in 2000, was, as we are aware, entrusted with the elaboration of general recommendations regarding measures to be taken to strengthen the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

The work of the Group — chaired, when it was created, by my colleague Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh — dealt with the administration of sanctions and the sanctions committees, the strengthening of the capacities of the United Nations Secretariat, and the required cooperation between all of those who are participating in the implementation of sanctions.

Significant emphasis has been placed on the concept of sanctions and on problems dealing with the termination of sanctions; on their implementation; on their consideration and on their assessment, as well as on assistance to those States that are implementing them.

Under the chairmanship of Cameroon, the group has made progress on the issues of procedure and humanitarian exemptions. Thus, the group has reached agreement on provisions for improved monitoring to strengthen the effectiveness and viability of sanctions and concerning the unintended effects of sanctions on third-party States.

Despite this considerable progress, differences of opinion remain that are not only hampering the conclusion of the group's work on establishing norms, but are also affecting the management of sanctions regimes. These fundamental differences of opinion are concerned primarily with the scope and duration of sanctions. We would hope that these two issues will receive due attention from the Security Council and civil society.

The reports of the Bonn-Berlin, Interlaken and Stockholm Processes contain a wealth of ideas and proposals that we are convinced will promote progress and the adoption of general rules both to improve the effectiveness of sanctions and to make them a better instrument in the service of international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter.

Mr. Pujalte (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Allow me at the outset, on behalf of the people and Government of Mexico, to express our condolences to and solidarity with the people and Government of China following the loss of human life and physical damage in their country as a result of the recent earthquake.

I wish to express my thanks for this opportunity to address the issue of sanctions. Our appreciation goes to the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Mr. Hans Dahlgren, for presenting the results of the Stockholm Process on the implementation of targeted sanctions. We congratulate Sweden on its leadership role over the past year in the discussions that produced the final report now before us.

Along with other countries, Mexico participated in the Stockholm Process with a will to contribute to deliberations on the implementation of sanctions regimes imposed by the Security Council, as well as on other issues related to that topic. We shared our experience as Chairman of the sanctions Committee for Sierra Leone with the working group of the Stockholm Process responsible for considering measures to strengthen the role of the United Nations in that field.

The exchange of views among representatives of Governments, the United Nations Secretariat, academics, non-governmental organizations and civil society allowed for a candid and in-depth dialogue on the progress, obstacles and challenges involved in devising and applying targeted sanctions, taking as its point of reference the contributions of the Interlaken Process on financial sanctions and the Bonn-Berlin Process on arms embargoes and travel bans.

The recommendations of the Stockholm Process are the outgrowth of those discussions and their substance is of particular relevance to the work of the Security Council and its sanctions committees. That is because the very dynamic of the meetings of the committees requires participants to focus on getting through the immediate agenda before them, but does not make it easy to engage in a thinking process on ways and means to enhance the effectiveness of the implementation of sanctions and the appropriate mechanisms to monitor them.

I wish to highlight the following points from the set of recommendations submitted to the Security Council.

The first concerns improving coordination among sanctions committees. To date, the only attempt at closer coordination has been the tripartite meetings of the sanctions Committees on Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola, particularly in the areas of arms embargoes, diamonds and travel bans. Despite the fact that sanctions regimes apply to a specific country, in the context of Sierra Leone and Liberia the need has emerged to take a regional approach to implementing and monitoring sanctions. Mexico accordingly supports the idea that the chairmen of sanctions committees should meet and convene joint meetings on questions of common interest that would facilitate the implementation of sanctions. This exercise should include the Chairman of the Security Council's Working Group on General Issues on Sanctions.

There is a need to consider the possibility of including in United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates the requirement of reporting violations of sanctions regimes. The mandates of the panels of experts require the submission of observations and recommendations to the sanctions committees with a view to taking the steps necessary when sanctions regimes are violated. However, not all committees have that possibility. We therefore support the idea of considering the desirability of personnel of peacekeeping operations in countries under sanction reporting to the committees and to the Security Council on the violations of sanctions that they have detected. In the case of arms embargoes, it would be extremely useful to be able to draw on information from personnel working in the field.

There is the issue of improving coordination between sanctions committees and other actors. In the case of the sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone, we encourage cooperation and coordination with governmental agencies, the Economic Community of West African States, the countries of the Mano River Union, the International Criminal Police Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Wassenaar Arrangement so as to secure better implementation and monitoring of sanctions imposed on that country. Similarly, we feel that the Counter-Terrorism Committee should strengthen its coordination mechanisms with other actors in order to ensure that its activities are effective.

It is also important to keep open the channels of communication and dialogue with humanitarian agencies, international and local non-governmental

organizations, civil society and public opinion and the media. The exchange of information and coordination of activities has a positive repercussion on the implementation of targeted sanctions.

We need to consider developing guidelines on best practices and lessons learned in the area of sanctions. In the division of the Secretariat responsible for sanctions, a structure should be established — similar to that which already exists in other parts of the Secretariat — responsible for preparing guidelines on best practices and lessons learned from the various sanctions committees, panels of experts and monitoring mechanisms. The immediate task should be compiling the experiences and lessons learned in the sanctions Committee on Angola and the monitoring mechanism on Angolan sanctions, which completed their work in late 2002.

The capacity of the Secretariat should be strengthened. Despite the fact that proposals have been made to establish independent structures with a more ambitious mandate, these have yet to secure consensus among the members of the Security Council. Given that situation, the Secretariat of the United Nations should possess, in the short term, the budgetary and human resources necessary to strengthen sanction activities in order to give adequate support to the sanction committees, the panels of experts, the monitoring mechanisms and the Security Council's Working Group on Sanctions.

Sanctions are an instrument employed by the Security Council to facilitate the maintenance of international peace and security. The effective implementation of sanction regimes in force requires the cooperation of the international community, as well as assistance to those States that need to strengthen their national capacity to implement those sanctions.

Mexico reiterates the need for the Security Council to design and implement effective sanctions regimes that constitute useful instruments to dissuade any attempt to threaten international peace and security, without their harming the civilian population or third countries. In that context, we note with great interest the seven principles suggested in the report on the Stockholm Process for effective implementation of targeted sanctions, as well as a consolidated model law to assist countries lacking legislation in this area.

The opportunity you, Mr. President, have given us today to be informed of the results of the Stockholm Process should motivate us to continue our consideration of questions relative to sanctions in the relevant bodies. But we should find a format that enables us to know the opinions of the membership of the United Nations. We trust that future presidencies of the Security Council will take this suggestion into account.

Mr. Arias (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to convey my sincere condolences to the delegation of China for the catastrophe that has struck their country. I wish to thank the State Secretary of Sweden, Mr. Dahlgren, and Assistant Secretary-General Türk for their briefings on the outcome of the Stockholm Process.

Sanctions are not an end in themselves; they are part of a broader strategy aimed at resolving a conflict. Sanctions that through their deficiency in design affect innocent persons or that are easily flouted can only undermine the trust of the international community, leading it to question the credibility of the United Nations. As well, the unjust consequences of a set of sanctions that are inadequately targeted offer the sanctions' intended targets a perfect opportunity to exploit to their own advantage criticism of measures that harm innocent citizens of their own country, but never — or almost never — impact on the leadership elite. Spain therefore unreservedly supports carrying out periodic reviews to appraise the unfavourable impact of specific sanctions regimes on the socio-economic, humanitarian and political situations.

Whether we like it or not, sanctions are one of the most visible aspects of the activities of the United Nations around the world. In a broad range of public opinion, there is a degree of ignorance concerning the reasons for, and the objectives of, sanctions. We endorse the proposal of the Stockholm Process to establish a system of regular briefings for the media.

To be effective, sanctions also need flexibility and agility. For this reason, Spain resolutely supports the recommendation to introduce the possibility of administrative or judicial processes to correct possible errors or simply to take into account a possible change in the conduct of the sanctions' targets. Some types of sanctions, such as arms embargoes and travel bans, have in common a limited degree of effectiveness. The model suggested by the Stockholm and Bonn-Berlin processes offers practical and imaginative solutions to enhance the accuracy of sanctions to the greatest

possible degree; we therefore consider their application to be of great interest.

With respect to the means of the Secretariat, we feel that the coordinating role of the sanctions branch should be promoted in order to avoid any overlaps. Notwithstanding, political will in itself is not enough to ensure that a sanctions regime is effective. The implementation of a sanctions regime requires appropriate mechanisms in all States. And the more precisely targeted sanctions are, the more complex the instruments employed must be. We believe that the sanctions committees should demand that all States submit rigorous reports on the measures taken to comply with sanctions.

In conclusion, for all those reasons, it is necessary to strengthen, and to create incentives for, the provision of technical and financial assistance to those countries with insufficiencies that negatively impact on the implementation of sanctions. In that regard, the private sector may have something to contribute. Likewise, the Council must be very aware of the role that should be played by regional organizations such as the European Union and the African Union. We believe that the actions of the European Union in that regard provide a model that can be used as an example.

Mr. Pleuger (Germany): I shall now make a statement in my capacity as the representative of Germany.

The excellent briefing by State Secretary Dahlgren on the results of the Stockholm Process, the comprehensive statement by Assistant Secretary-General Türk and the ensuing interventions of Council members have, in our view, achieved two important goals. First, they have contributed to a more transparent discussion within the Security Council on pressing sanctions issues. Secondly, they have highlighted the important input by the Stockholm Process to the debate on how to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system and of Member States to implement targeted sanctions.

As State Secretary Dahlgren has pointed out, the Stockholm Process focused, inter alia, on identifying measures to enhance planning, monitoring and coordination among sanctions committees and monitoring bodies. The development of monitoring mechanisms, with a view to increasing transparency and efficiency, is indeed key to the success of any sanctions regime. The mechanism can furnish the sanctions committee with additional information about the violations of sanctions, as well as their direct and collateral impact. As former chairman of the UNITA sanctions Committee, Ambassador Ryan recently pointed out that its very existence sent a strong warning that the Committee had an additional arm that would systematically and constantly monitor sanctions violations and the violators. The mechanism thus deters those engaged in sanctions busting and at the same time serves as an early warning instrument against disproportional collateral damage.

In this regard, sanctions — meaning measures to be taken against sanction-busting States or individuals — deserve more attention. Here, we see more room for further deliberations. On the other hand, the Security Council also has a responsibility under human rights aspects. Therefore, exemptions and exceptions for certain humanitarian needs should be carefully taken into consideration in order to minimize the humanitarian impact. In doing this, the credibility and legitimacy of a United Nations sanctions regime would be even greater.

We believe that the suggestions of the Stockholm Process for the two following areas deserve particular attention: first, common guidelines for the monitoring of sanctions, and secondly, strategies to counter sanctions evasion and to maintain the accuracy of sanctions, including their adequate assessment.

I should like to conclude by underlining that the Interlaken, Bonn-Berlin and Stockholm processes have contributed to making sanctions more targeted, credible and efficient. The valuable and continued support of the Secretariat in these efforts has been of crucial importance. However, sanctions are tools, not political aims in themselves. They are no substitute for political concepts. The success of a sanctions regime requires a comprehensive approach that considers targeted sanctions as part of a broader coordinated political and diplomatic strategy. This depends on the political will of the actors. The more efficiently, objectively and transparently sanctions regimes are conceived and implemented, the better they can serve as sharp and appropriate instruments under Chapter VII, thus enabling the Security Council to avoid the ultimate use of military force.

I resume my functions as President of the Council.

I now give the floor to His Excellency Mr. Hans Dahlgren, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, to respond to comments and questions raised during the debate.

Mr. Dahlgren (Sweden): I would like to make just three brief points. First, I would like to express my gratitude for the kind words expressed to my Government for the part that it — together with many others — has played in this project.

Secondly, I am of course heartened by the support expressed in the Council for many of the proposals in the Stockholm report. That goes both for the clear willingness of the Secretariat, as explained by Assistant Secretary-General Türk, to play a more active role in improving coordination and monitoring, and for all those members of the Council that have endorsed an improvement in the implementation of targeted sanctions. We look forward to turning some of those ideas into reality.

Thirdly, I agree with Jeremy Greenstock about the lessons that sanctions committees can learn from the Counter-Terrorism Committee with regard to the transparency that that Committee displayed, its effectiveness and, perhaps even more important, its relationships with Member States.

The commitment that has been expressed by so many Council members this morning for improving targeted sanctions is, of course, very positive. But with all due respect, that is not enough. As several speakers have underlined this morning, there must be universal support for targeted sanctions if they are to be successful. Each Member State must do its share. I think that we in the Stockholm Process have an additional task in that important effort: to make those guidelines known, not only in this Chamber in this city, but in capitals all over the world, and, perhaps, to use the resources that may be available to promote an understanding of the need to ensure not only the implementation of more effective targeted sanctions, but also the means to do so.

The President: I now give the floor to Mr. Danilo Türk, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to respond to comments and questions raised in the debate.

Mr. Türk: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, and other members of the Security Council for the kind words of recognition addressed to the Secretariat for its contribution. Let me also assure the Council and Mr. Dahlgren that the Secretariat will remain engaged in the Stockholm Process. There is, of course, a fair amount of work to be done in the future, and the Secretariat will try to do its best in that context.

We have taken due note of the various comments that were made, and we will think about them and do whatever is possible to improve the work of the Secretariat with regard to our support for the sanctions committees. We also took note of the recognition of the need to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat, and obviously we would welcome any additional resources that could be provided in order to make that strengthened capacity a reality.

I would also like to make brief remarks regarding one or two matters that were raised in the discussion. Several speakers referred to the points that I made in my introduction regarding the preventive effects of sanctions and the need for that dimension to be further explored. We certainly will further explore it. At this point we would like to say that the work based on resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1455 (2003) has already had an important preventive effect. Certainly, practice in that context will provide important guidance for the future.

The general points which were made today about improved coordination were, of course, also highly relevant in the context of prevention, because both the patterns of violation and violators are often identical, and that has a cumulative effect. On the other hand, the cumulative effect of activities in the area of sanctions can be preventive if they are properly organized, coordinated and made effective.

We also took note of the point made in the discussion that sometimes a threat of sanctions can be an effective tool. This is an interesting and important point which requires further thought. Certainly the question of how to translate an idea into policy is among the more difficult questions, and we will continue to think about it and see whether the Secretariat can be of any help.

Finally, I would like to recall that the Security Council has adopted resolutions which deal with the issues of the prevention of armed conflict in a very comprehensive way, and it might perhaps be useful if in one of the reviews on those resolutions the aspect of sanctions were given some attention in order to see how it could fit into the overall policy of prevention.

The President: There are no more speakers on my list.

I would like to refer to the statement to the press that has been circulated to all Council members. With their agreement, I will issue that statement following the conclusion of the meeting.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.